Contract
0x66795946fb6cd2eb54916fdbbe64bddc5005e86b
- Address
- 0x66795946fb6cd2eb54916fdbbe64bddc5005e86b
- Kind
- verified contract FinalSlotKeyRegistry
- Balance
- 0 vETH
- Nonce
- 1
- Code
- 5,531 bytes codehash 0x718949bdaa0c08a4bd1969662e3e5bdd46d52fc9c336b50af58d0c373170153b
account tree
- Tree
- 1 · accounts
- Present
- no leaf
- Key
- 0xf70742a9c53c7038f2cd34d512d17c5b16bfb9abb9028a9ea8cf6bd9f8d88379
- Live root
- 0x6d72b53fa4ff33a006dbb1e62210da0466cea22c427258ba677493791d7c7734
This address holds no leaf in the account tree. Every Final Wallet — service identities included — has one, so an absent leaf means an ordinary account rather than a wallet.
source verified
- Contract
- FinalSlotKeyRegistry exact match · immutables masked
- Compiler
- v0.8.33+commit.64118f21
- Optimizer
- enabled · 200 runs
- EVM version
- prague
- Verified
- 2026-09-13T13:30:43.480Z
- Provenance
- preverify-final-chain (forge artifact, bytecode compared against live code)
contracts/finalchain/FinalCertificate.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may link against and call this certificate reader,
// and may encode certificates that it accepts, as part of the Final DeFi
// Protocol.
// 2. Operators, integrators, and end users may have their certificates parsed,
// self-checked, and verified through any Final DeFi surface that links it.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this certificate reader or a competing identity
// certificate format derived from it without permission prior to the
// Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalChainPrecompiles} from "./FinalChainPrecompiles.sol";
import {FinalChainTime} from "./FinalChainTime.sol";
/**
* @title Final Certificate
* @notice Reads a Final Certificate on chain and self-checks it, so a certificate's keys can never be
* anything other than the keys it declares.
* @dev Deployed only as part of this project's own reth-based state plane, and only on the reth-based chains
* that carry the precompiles it calls: SHA3-256 at `0x0202`, ML-DSA-87 at `0x0204` and
* SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s at `0x0205`, each address being that primitive's FIPS number. The contracts it is
* linked into probe those precompiles at construction and refuse to exist where they are absent, so
* this library never runs somewhere its verdicts would be meaningless. It takes part in no CREATE2
* derivation, and nothing outside this directory imports it.
*
* The SHA3 precompile is not a convenience: the certificate format hashes with FIPS-202 SHA3 and the
* EVM's `keccak256` is a DIFFERENT function, so a digest computed with the wrong one matches no
* certificate any issuer ever wrote.
*
* ## Why the chain parses this at all
*
* The alternative is taking the TBS bytes and the public keys as separate arguments and deriving
* `certHash` from the bytes. That looks like verification and is not: nothing compares the keys to the
* certificate, so a registrar could bind any certificate to any keypair, the registry would hold a key
* the certificate does not contain, and every signature that key produced would verify against a
* certificate that never authorised it.
*
* So the keys are read OUT of the certificate. There is one input, and no pair of arguments that can
* disagree.
*
* Gas is deliberately not a design constraint on the chain this runs on and must not be optimised for.
* Parsing and re-hashing on chain costs more than trusting a parse done elsewhere and buys a verdict
* that is re-derivable from public state, which is the trade this whole plane is built on.
*
* ## The key-identifier check
*
* A certificate declares `SubjectKeyId` as the SHA3-256 digest of its `PublicKeyBlock`. Having parsed
* that block, {parse} recomputes the digest and compares. The field sits inside the TBS, so it is
* covered by the issuer's signatures — which makes the check a statement about what the issuer
* attested, not merely about internal consistency of bytes the caller supplied.
*
* ## Deploy-linked, not inlined
*
* {parseLive}, {parseRecovery}, {parseCa} and {verifyIssuerSignatures} are `external`, so the identity
* registry calls them across a link boundary rather than carrying them in its own bytecode, which it
* has no room for. The link target is fixed at deployment: a linked library is code, not a pointer
* anyone can move afterwards.
*
* ## What this library deliberately does not do
*
* It does not verify an issuer's signatures over the TBS as part of parsing, and it does not walk a
* certificate chain to the root. On the registration path there is nothing to walk — a chain-attested
* certificate is admitted by this chain against pinned issuer constants and the holder's own proof of
* possession, so an issuer signature is not what makes it valid. {verifyIssuerSignatures} is here for
* callers verifying an off-chain issuance, and it verifies exactly what it is handed.
*
* It also does not check an encapsulation key's length or structure. Those are checked where they are
* REGISTERED, by the precompiles that own the answer, because two checks of one thing in two shapes is
* how one of them ends up weaker and nobody notices which.
*/
library FinalCertificate {
/// @notice The four magic bytes every certificate opens with, `"PQCF"`.
uint32 internal constant MAGIC = 0x50514346;
/// @notice The current wire generation, which encoders write.
/// @dev A generation this parser does not know fails to parse rather than being reinterpreted: the
/// folded key commitment, and therefore every wallet address, derives from this exact layout, so a
/// layout read under the wrong generation would produce a self-consistent digest that matches
/// nothing.
uint32 internal constant VERSION = 2;
/// @notice The previous wire generation, still accepted on parse.
/// @dev Reading an older artifact is not the same as admitting it. Whether such a certificate may be
/// REGISTERED is settled at admission, by the holder's proof of possession and the chain-issuer
/// pins, rather than by refusing to decode it.
uint32 internal constant VERSION_V4 = 1;
/// @notice The institution identity extension, which carries an issuer's legal name, registration
/// number and jurisdiction.
uint16 internal constant EXT_INSTITUTION = 0x0102;
/// @notice ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203), the lattice half of the encapsulation pair.
/// @dev Algorithm identifiers ARE the FIPS numbers, in one space shared by signatures and encapsulation
/// — the same identifiers the quorum wire format uses, and the numbers the precompile addresses end
/// in. One space rather than two means an identifier can never be read against the wrong table.
uint16 internal constant ALG_ML_KEM_1024 = 0x0003;
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204). Transaction class.
uint16 internal constant ALG_ML_DSA_87 = 0x0004;
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s (FIPS 205). Access class, and the seal.
uint16 internal constant ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S = 0x0005;
/// @notice FN-DSA (FIPS 206). Reserved: there is no implementation behind it and it is never accepted in
/// a slot.
uint16 internal constant ALG_FN_DSA = 0x0006;
/// @notice HQC-5 (FIPS 207), the code-based half of the encapsulation pair.
uint16 internal constant ALG_HQC_5 = 0x0007;
/// @notice Certificate signing, for both of an issuer's keys.
/// @dev Says which key to verify WITH; it grants nothing on its own — capability to issue comes from the
/// depth pair.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_CERT_SIGNING = 0x0004;
/// @notice The live stage's transaction-class slot, ML-DSA-87.
/// @dev A wallet holds four slots in two stages of two, and a certificate carries ONE stage, never all
/// four. The stage is what is issued, rotated and revoked as a unit, and a holder presenting a live
/// certificate presents both of that stage's keys or neither — splitting them per slot would let
/// half a stage be presented as if it were whole.
/// @dev This applies to services exactly as it applies to a user's wallet. A co-signer is a Final
/// Wallet: same four slots, same split, same algorithms. There is no second kind of identity in
/// this system.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_TX = 0x0010;
/// @notice The live stage's access-class slot, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_ACCESS = 0x0011;
/// @notice The recovery stage's transaction-class slot, ML-DSA-87.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_RECOVERY_TX = 0x0012;
/// @notice The recovery stage's access-class slot, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_RECOVERY_ACCESS = 0x0013;
/// @notice The live stage's encapsulation slot.
/// @dev Each stage's encapsulation pair is resolved alongside its signing pair, and the identity
/// registry stores both halves, so a sender can encapsulate to a registered party without a second
/// lookup somewhere less authoritative. Both halves sit under ONE purpose and are told apart by
/// algorithm, which is why the key loop matches on the `(purpose, algorithm)` pair.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_KEM = 0x0014;
/// @notice The recovery stage's encapsulation slot, carrying the same two algorithms.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_RECOVERY_KEM = 0x0015;
/// @notice The seal purpose: a second SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s key that co-signs membership-class quorum
/// decisions (the registrar quorum); operational quorum actions take the ML-DSA-87 vote alone.
/// @dev Distinct from the access key, and carried by SERVICE certificates only — a user's wallet never
/// seals. Optional in the format, so a certificate without it parses unchanged.
/// @dev Outside the folded key commitment: a seal is operational, rotated by issuing a new live
/// certificate, and it must not move a wallet address it plays no part in deriving.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL = 0x0016;
/// @notice A sentinel purpose no certificate can carry.
/// @dev Lets {parse} be told "this stage has no encapsulation slot" without a second boolean argument.
/// `0xffff` is outside the purpose registry and is reserved by being used here.
uint16 internal constant NO_KEM_PURPOSE = 0xffff;
/// @notice Nanoseconds per millisecond, the conversion from a certificate's validity fields to this
/// chain's clock.
/// @dev A certificate stamps validity in NANOseconds and this chain's clock is MILLIseconds, so the
/// parser divides by 1e6 on the way in and nothing downstream ever compares across units. Getting
/// the divisor wrong does not fail loudly: it shifts every window by three orders of magnitude, so
/// every certificate reads as already valid, including one issued for the future.
uint64 internal constant NS_PER_MILLISECOND = FinalChainTime.NS_PER_MILLISECOND;
/**
* @title Parsed
* @notice What the chain keeps out of one certificate.
* @dev Every field is read OUT of the TBS. Nothing here can be supplied alongside the bytes, which is
* what makes it impossible for a caller to bind a certificate to material the certificate does not
* contain.
*/
struct Parsed {
/// `SHA3-256` of the TBS bytes: the certificate's own identity, and the handle revocation is keyed
/// on.
bytes32 certHash;
/// The certificate's 32-byte serial. A serial is per certificate SET, so the two stages of one
/// wallet share it and two stages that disagree are two different wallets.
bytes32 serial;
/// keccak256 of the issuer-name bytes, for the chain-issuer pin: a chain-attested certificate
/// carries the chain's own constant issuer name, and the registry compares one hash rather than two
/// strings.
bytes32 issuerDnHash;
/// The subject-name bytes verbatim. Kept whole rather than hashed because the jurisdiction rule
/// reads its country component at issuer registration.
bytes subjectDn;
/// The institution extension's VALUE, when present; empty otherwise. Issuer registration parses
/// the declared jurisdiction out of it and requires it to match the subject name's country.
bytes institutionExt;
/// SHA3-256 of the ISSUER's public key block. Zero-length — and so
/// `bytes32(0)` here — for exactly one certificate in the hierarchy,
/// which is what terminates chain validation.
bytes32 authorityKeyId;
/// SHA3-256 of this certificate's own public key block. The child's
/// `authorityKeyId` must equal it, which is what links the two.
bytes32 subjectKeyId;
/// Position on the delegation axis; 0 is the chain's own root.
uint8 depth;
/// Deepest level this key may issue to. `== depth` means it signs no certificates at all, which is
/// every end entity. The pair is immutable per certificate, which is why consumers discriminate
/// record kinds by it rather than by a role bit.
uint8 maxDelegationDepth;
/// MILLISECONDS, converted from the schema's nanoseconds — this chain's clock.
uint64 notBefore;
/// Milliseconds. Zero means never expires, which the schema allows.
uint64 notAfter;
/// The stage's transaction-class key. ML-DSA-87 — spending, and every
/// high-cadence protocol action.
bytes transactionKey;
/// The stage's access-class key. SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s — identity,
/// rotation, recovery-pair promotion. A different hardness assumption,
/// so a lattice break leaves the key that governs identity standing.
bytes accessKey;
/// The stage's ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key. Empty on a CA, which has
/// no encapsulation stage, and on any v4 certificate issued without
/// one — see `parse` for why that is tolerated rather than refused.
bytes kemMlKem;
/// The stage's HQC-5 encapsulation key. Carried under the SAME purpose
/// as the lattice half and distinguished only by algorithm, which is
/// why the parser matches on the `(purpose, algorithm)` pair.
bytes kemHqc;
/// The service's seal key (`PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL`, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s).
/// Empty on every certificate that does not carry one — a user wallet,
/// a recovery stage, a CA.
bytes sealKey;
/// Where the TBS ends, so a caller holding the whole certificate can
/// find the `SignatureBlock` without parsing forward again.
uint256 tbsLength;
}
/// @notice The bytes do not open with the certificate magic, so they are not a certificate at all.
/// @param got The four bytes that were present.
error BadMagic(uint32 got);
/// @notice The wire generation is one this parser does not read.
/// @param got The generation the certificate declares.
error BadVersion(uint32 got);
/// @notice The TBS ends before a field the parser was about to read.
/// @param needed The offset the read required.
/// @param got The length actually supplied.
error Truncated(uint256 needed, uint256 got);
/// @notice The recomputed key-block digest does not equal the one the certificate declares, so the keys
/// present are not the keys the issuer attested.
/// @param derived The digest recomputed from the key block.
/// @param declared The digest the certificate carries.
error SubjectKeyIdMismatch(bytes32 derived, bytes32 declared);
/// @notice A stage is missing a key it must carry, or carries half of a pair that is issued whole.
/// @param purpose The purpose whose slot is unfilled.
error MissingSlot(uint16 purpose);
/// @notice A slot carries a key of the wrong scheme. It would verify cryptographically and mean
/// something else entirely, which is exactly what splitting the classes exists to prevent.
/// @param purpose The slot's purpose.
/// @param algorithm The algorithm identifier that was present.
error WrongAlgorithmForSlot(uint16 purpose, uint16 algorithm);
/// @notice Two key entries share one `(purpose, algorithm)` pair, so one would silently shadow the
/// other.
/// @param purpose The repeated purpose.
/// @param algorithm The repeated algorithm identifier.
error DuplicateKey(uint16 purpose, uint16 algorithm);
/// @notice The key entries are not in ascending `(purpose, algorithm)` order. The schema requires that
/// order so `certHash` is reproducible across implementations.
error KeysNotSorted();
/// @notice A signing key whose length is not the one its algorithm defines.
/// @param algorithm The algorithm identifier the entry declares.
/// @param length The key length that was present.
error BadKeyLength(uint16 algorithm, uint256 length);
/// @notice A delegation bound shallower than the certificate's own depth, which admits nothing.
/// @param depth The certificate's position on the delegation axis.
/// @param maxDelegationDepth The deepest level it claims to issue to.
error InvalidDepth(uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
/// @notice A certificate that expires no later than it begins.
/// @param notBefore The declared start, in the schema's nanoseconds.
/// @param notAfter The declared end, in the schema's nanoseconds.
error ValidityInverted(uint64 notBefore, uint64 notAfter);
/**
* @notice Parse and self-check a `TBSCertificate`.
* @dev Checking for a CAPABILITY rather than a type is the certificate schema's own rule, and the reason
* there is no type field to check instead. Passing the LIVE purposes to a recovery certificate
* finds neither key and reverts — which is what stops a recovery certificate being registered as a
* live one and handing the recovery pair everyday authority.
*
* Self-check means the declared `SubjectKeyId` is recomputed from the key block that follows it and
* compared. That field is inside the TBS and therefore covered by the issuer's signatures, so the
* comparison turns "these bytes decode" into "the issuer attested these exact keys". Doing it on
* chain costs one precompile call and buys a verdict any reader can recompute; gas is not a design
* constraint on the chain this runs on, and must not be traded for a check that would then have to
* be taken on trust from whichever process ran it.
*
* A stage is issued as a unit, so both of a stage's signing keys must be present, and its
* encapsulation pair must be present in full or absent in full.
* @param tbs the TBS bytes, verbatim. Not the whole certificate.
* @param txPurpose the transaction-class purpose this stage should carry.
* @param accessPurpose the access-class purpose for the same stage.
* @param kemPurpose the encapsulation purpose for the same stage, or {NO_KEM_PURPOSE} for a stage that
* has none.
* @return out The parsed certificate: digest, serial, names, key identifiers, depth pair, validity
* window, and every key slot the stage carries.
*/
function parse(bytes calldata tbs, uint16 txPurpose, uint16 accessPurpose, uint16 kemPurpose)
internal
view
returns (Parsed memory out)
{
_need(tbs, 58);
if (uint32(bytes4(tbs[0:4])) != MAGIC) revert BadMagic(uint32(bytes4(tbs[0:4])));
// Both live wire generations parse. An artifact issued under the older one is read rather than
// refused; whether it may be ADMITTED is a separate question, settled at registration by the
// holder's proof of possession and the chain-issuer pins.
uint32 wireVersion = uint32(bytes4(tbs[4:8]));
if (wireVersion != VERSION && wireVersion != VERSION_V4) revert BadVersion(wireVersion);
out.certHash = FinalChainPrecompiles.sha3_256(tbs);
out.serial = bytes32(tbs[8:40]);
out.depth = uint8(tbs[40]);
out.maxDelegationDepth = uint8(tbs[41]);
uint64 notBeforeNs = uint64(bytes8(tbs[42:50]));
uint64 notAfterNs = uint64(bytes8(tbs[50:58]));
if (out.maxDelegationDepth < out.depth) {
revert InvalidDepth(out.depth, out.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (notAfterNs != 0 && notAfterNs <= notBeforeNs) {
revert ValidityInverted(notBeforeNs, notAfterNs);
}
out.notBefore = notBeforeNs / NS_PER_MILLISECOND;
out.notAfter = notAfterNs == 0 ? 0 : notAfterNs / NS_PER_MILLISECOND;
// Four length-prefixed fields: IssuerDN, SubjectDN, AuthorityKeyId,
// SubjectKeyId. Every field before them is fixed width, which is the
// whole reason the schema orders them this way.
uint256 p = 58;
uint256 issuerDnLen;
(p, issuerDnLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
out.issuerDnHash = keccak256(tbs[p - issuerDnLen:p]);
uint256 subjectDnLen;
(p, subjectDnLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
out.subjectDn = tbs[p - subjectDnLen:p];
uint256 akidLen;
(p, akidLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
out.authorityKeyId = _bytes32At(tbs, p - akidLen, akidLen);
uint256 skidLen;
(p, skidLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
uint256 skidStart = p - skidLen;
_need(tbs, p + 2);
uint16 keyCount = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
p += 2;
// AFTER the count word. `SubjectKeyId` is SHA3-256 of the KeyEntry
// array alone — `encodeTbs` writes `PublicKeyCount` as its own field and
// `encodePublicKeyBlock` returns only the entries. Hashing the count in
// produces a digest that is self-consistent and matches no certificate
// any issuer ever wrote.
uint256 blockStart = p;
uint32 previousSort = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keyCount; i++) {
_need(tbs, p + 8);
uint16 alg = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
uint16 purpose = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p + 2:p + 4]));
uint32 keyLen = uint32(bytes4(tbs[p + 4:p + 8]));
p += 8;
_need(tbs, p + keyLen);
// Ascending by (purpose, algorithm), duplicates invalid. The schema
// requires the order so `certHash` is reproducible across
// implementations; enforcing it here also means a second entry for
// one slot cannot quietly shadow the first.
uint32 sortKey = (uint32(purpose) << 16) | uint32(alg);
if (i > 0) {
if (sortKey == previousSort) revert DuplicateKey(purpose, alg);
if (sortKey < previousSort) revert KeysNotSorted();
}
previousSort = sortKey;
// The algorithm is pinned per CLASS, not merely recorded. A
// transaction slot carrying an access-class key would verify
// cryptographically and mean something entirely different — an
// identity key must never authorize a transaction, or splitting the
// classes buys nothing.
// Matched on the PAIR, not on the purpose alone. A CA carries two
// keys under one purpose (`0x0004`) distinguished only by
// algorithm, so matching on purpose first would find the first of
// them twice and the second never.
if (purpose == txPurpose && alg == ALG_ML_DSA_87) {
if (keyLen != FinalChainPrecompiles.ML_DSA_87_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
revert BadKeyLength(alg, keyLen);
}
out.transactionKey = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == accessPurpose && alg == ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S) {
if (keyLen != FinalChainPrecompiles.SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
revert BadKeyLength(alg, keyLen);
}
out.accessKey = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == kemPurpose && alg == ALG_ML_KEM_1024) {
out.kemMlKem = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == kemPurpose && alg == ALG_HQC_5) {
out.kemHqc = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL && alg == ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S) {
if (keyLen != FinalChainPrecompiles.SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
revert BadKeyLength(alg, keyLen);
}
out.sealKey = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL) {
// The seal is hash-based by definition — it exists to stand on
// the OTHER assumption from the transaction key it co-signs
// with. A lattice seal would be two signatures on one bet.
revert WrongAlgorithmForSlot(purpose, alg);
} else if (purpose == txPurpose || purpose == accessPurpose) {
// A slot the caller asked for, carrying the wrong scheme. It
// would verify cryptographically and mean something else
// entirely — an identity key must never authorize a
// transaction, or splitting the classes buys nothing.
revert WrongAlgorithmForSlot(purpose, alg);
} else if (purpose == kemPurpose) {
// Same rule for the encapsulation slot. A third KEM appearing
// under this purpose is a hybrid whose second family nobody
// agreed on, and admitting it silently is how a pair becomes a
// trio that one reader honours and another ignores.
revert WrongAlgorithmForSlot(purpose, alg);
}
// NO length check on the KEM keys here, and that is deliberate.
// The signing slots are checked against a constant because the
// parser's own callers depend on the length; an encapsulation key
// is checked by `0x0203` / `0x0207` at the moment it is REGISTERED,
// where the answer is a well-formedness verdict rather than a
// parse failure. Two checks of the same thing in two shapes is how
// one of them ends up weaker and nobody notices which.
p += keyLen;
}
// `SubjectKeyId` is SHA3-256 of the KeyEntry array, count word
// EXCLUDED — `blockStart` is taken after the count is consumed, for the
// reason given where it is set. Recomputing it is what turns "these
// bytes decode" into "the CA signed these exact keys"; the field is
// inside the TBS, so it is covered by the signatures.
out.subjectKeyId = FinalChainPrecompiles.sha3_256(tbs[blockStart:p]);
bytes32 declared = _bytes32At(tbs, skidStart, skidLen);
if (out.subjectKeyId != declared) revert SubjectKeyIdMismatch(out.subjectKeyId, declared);
// Both or neither. A stage is issued as a unit, so a certificate
// carrying one of its two keys is not a partial certificate — it is a
// certificate for a stage that does not exist.
if (out.transactionKey.length == 0) revert MissingSlot(txPurpose);
if (out.accessKey.length == 0) revert MissingSlot(accessPurpose);
// The encapsulation pair is both-or-neither for the same reason, and
// the reason is louder here: a hybrid quietly reduced to one family is
// identical on the wire, so a certificate carrying only the lattice
// half would seal successfully and silently drop the code-based hedge.
// Neither is the CA case and the pre-v4 case, both legitimate.
if ((out.kemMlKem.length == 0) != (out.kemHqc.length == 0)) {
revert MissingSlot(kemPurpose);
}
_need(tbs, p + 2);
uint16 extCount = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
p += 2;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < extCount; i++) {
_need(tbs, p + 7);
uint16 extType = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
uint32 valueLen = uint32(bytes4(tbs[p + 3:p + 7]));
p += 7;
_need(tbs, p + valueLen);
// The Institution extension's VALUE, kept for the issuer
// profile's jurisdiction rule. Everything else is skipped as
// before — extensions are structural to certHash, semantic to
// whichever consumer knows them.
if (extType == EXT_INSTITUTION) out.institutionExt = tbs[p:p + valueLen];
p += valueLen;
}
out.tbsLength = p;
}
/// @notice Parse a LIVE-stage certificate: the live transaction and access keys.
/// @dev `external`, like the other three entry points below. The identity registry sits against the
/// deployed-code ceiling and this parser is its single largest inlined dependency, so the four doors
/// it calls are DEPLOY-LINKED: the library is one more contract in the state plane's fixed deploy
/// order, and its address is baked immutably into the registry's bytecode. A linked library is code,
/// not a key — nothing can repoint it after deployment, so the split costs a call boundary and no
/// trust.
/// @param tbs The TBS bytes, verbatim.
/// @return The parsed and self-checked certificate.
function parseLive(bytes calldata tbs) external view returns (Parsed memory) {
return parse(tbs, PURPOSE_ACTIVE_TX, PURPOSE_ACTIVE_ACCESS, PURPOSE_ACTIVE_KEM);
}
/// @notice Parse a RECOVERY-stage certificate.
/// @dev The recovery pair authorizes rotating the wallet's own credentials and NOTHING else. Acting as a
/// guardian is an ordinary action for that account and uses the live access key, so keeping the two
/// stages in separate certificates is what makes that boundary something a verifier can see.
/// @param tbs The TBS bytes, verbatim.
/// @return The parsed and self-checked certificate.
function parseRecovery(bytes calldata tbs) external view returns (Parsed memory) {
return parse(tbs, PURPOSE_RECOVERY_TX, PURPOSE_RECOVERY_ACCESS, PURPOSE_RECOVERY_KEM);
}
/// @notice Parse a certificate authority's certificate, whose two keys are both cert-signing.
/// @dev Both classes resolve to the same purpose, which is why {parse} matches on the
/// `(purpose, algorithm)` PAIR: an authority carries two keys under one purpose and matching on the
/// purpose alone would find the first of them twice and the second never.
/// @dev No encapsulation purpose. An authority signs and is never sealed to, so {NO_KEM_PURPOSE} is
/// passed as a value the key loop can never match. An authority certificate carrying encapsulation
/// keys would parse them into slots the registry then discards, which is a shape worth refusing to
/// have at all.
/// @param tbs The TBS bytes, verbatim.
/// @return The parsed and self-checked certificate.
function parseCa(bytes calldata tbs) external view returns (Parsed memory) {
return parse(tbs, PURPOSE_CERT_SIGNING, PURPOSE_CERT_SIGNING, NO_KEM_PURPOSE);
}
/**
* @notice Verify an issuer's dual signature over a TBS.
* @dev Both must verify, not either. Two signatures under two different hardness assumptions is the
* entire reason a certificate carries two, and accepting one would collapse that to whichever
* family breaks first.
*
* Provided for callers that verify an off-chain issuance against keys they already trust. The
* caller supplies the issuer's keys, so it is the caller's job to have taken them from a registered
* record rather than from its own calldata — a key handed in with the signature proves nothing.
* @param tbs The signed TBS bytes.
* @param issuerMlDsaKey The issuer's registered ML-DSA-87 cert-signing key.
* @param issuerSlhDsaKey The issuer's registered SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s cert-signing key.
* @param mlDsaSignature The lattice signature over `tbs`.
* @param slhDsaSignature The hash-based signature over `tbs`.
* @return Whether both signatures verify.
*/
function verifyIssuerSignatures(
bytes memory tbs,
bytes memory issuerMlDsaKey,
bytes memory issuerSlhDsaKey,
bytes memory mlDsaSignature,
bytes memory slhDsaSignature
) external view returns (bool) {
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(issuerMlDsaKey, tbs, mlDsaSignature)
&& FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(issuerSlhDsaKey, tbs, slhDsaSignature);
}
/// @notice Refuse a TBS that is shorter than the parser is about to read.
/// @dev Called before every read rather than once at the top, because the layout is variable-length: a
/// certificate can be well-formed up to its key block and truncated inside it, and a parser that
/// only checked the fixed header would read whatever calldata followed.
/// @param tbs The TBS bytes.
/// @param upto The offset the next read needs to be valid.
function _need(bytes calldata tbs, uint256 upto) private pure {
if (tbs.length < upto) revert Truncated(upto, tbs.length);
}
/// @notice Step over one four-byte-length-prefixed field and report where it was.
/// @dev Bounds-checks the prefix before reading it and the value before returning, so a truncated
/// certificate cannot make the cursor run past the end of calldata. The caller recovers the value's
/// slice as `tbs[next - length:next]`.
/// @param tbs The TBS bytes.
/// @param p Offset of the length prefix.
/// @return next Offset just past the field's value.
/// @return length The field's declared length.
function _skipLengthPrefixed(bytes calldata tbs, uint256 p)
private
pure
returns (uint256 next, uint256 length)
{
_need(tbs, p + 4);
length = uint32(bytes4(tbs[p:p + 4]));
next = p + 4 + length;
_need(tbs, next);
}
/// @notice Read a key identifier out of the TBS as one word.
/// @dev Answers `bytes32(0)` for any length other than 32 rather than reverting. A key identifier that
/// is not 32 bytes is not a SHA3-256 digest, so it cannot match the value it is compared against,
/// and the comparison at the call site produces the correct refusal with no separate error to
/// define. The one legitimate short case is a zero-length authority key identifier, which the
/// caller must reject on its own terms.
/// @param tbs The TBS bytes.
/// @param start Offset of the field's value.
/// @param length The field's declared length.
/// @return The 32-byte value, or zero when the field is not 32 bytes long.
function _bytes32At(bytes calldata tbs, uint256 start, uint256 length)
private
pure
returns (bytes32)
{
// A SubjectKeyId that is not 32 bytes is not a SHA3-256 digest, so it
// cannot match and the comparison will fail — which is the correct
// outcome and needs no separate error.
if (length != 32) return bytes32(0);
return bytes32(tbs[start:start + 32]);
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalChainInitializable.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {StorageSlot} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/StorageSlot.sol";
/**
* @title Final Chain Initializable
* @notice The once-only initializer of a Final Chain state-plane contract that stands behind `FinalChainProxy`
* (ruled 2026-09-12: every plane contract does).
*
* @dev The proxy never re-runs an implementation's constructor, so a constructor that writes STORAGE — the
* trees' zero-hash ladder and live roots, a bootstrap admin, the supply's 100M — would leave the proxy's
* storage empty: the writes land in the implementation, which nothing reads through. Such a contract
* moves those writes into one internal `_setUp(...)` guarded by {initializer} and calls it from BOTH
* places: its constructor (a direct deploy — every Foundry fixture, every test — behaves exactly as
* before, and the bare implementation marks its OWN storage initialized, so nobody can initialize it
* later) and an external `initialize(...)`, which `FinalChainProxy`'s constructor runs by `delegatecall`
* in the proxy's storage. Constructor immutables (`registry`, `trees`, …) need none of this: they live in
* the implementation's code and read as constants through the proxy.
*
* The flag lives in a namespaced slot, not in Solidity storage: inheriting this contract shifts no
* layout, and an implementation upgraded in place can never collide with it. An upgrade that appends
* storage seeds it through a new guarded function of its own — `initialize` runs once per proxy, ever.
*
* A proxy deployed WITHOUT its init data is a live hole: `initialize` is external and the first caller
* would be the admin. The deploy tool refuses to place a proxy whose implementation declares
* `initialize` without running it, and reads {initialized} back before it continues.
*/
abstract contract FinalChainInitializable {
/// @dev `bytes32(uint256(keccak256("final.chain.initialized")) - 1)`.
bytes32 private constant INITIALIZED_SLOT = 0x1bf7ff51edde3507ea8edc0d02272dc3e66fd14d0a75a234f844ee7b236829d2;
/// @notice The contract's storage was set up — by its constructor (a direct deploy) or by `initialize`
/// through its proxy.
event Initialized();
/// @notice `initialize` ran already in this storage — the constructor's, or a proxy's, once.
error AlreadyInitialized();
/// @dev Guards the one function that replays the constructor's storage writes. Sets the flag BEFORE the
/// body so a re-entrant call from inside the body cannot run it twice.
modifier initializer() {
StorageSlot.BooleanSlot storage flag = StorageSlot.getBooleanSlot(INITIALIZED_SLOT);
if (flag.value) revert AlreadyInitialized();
flag.value = true;
_;
emit Initialized();
}
/// @notice Whether this storage was set up. False on a proxy whose init data was not run — the state the
/// deploy tool refuses.
function initialized() external view returns (bool) {
return StorageSlot.getBooleanSlot(INITIALIZED_SLOT).value;
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalChainPrecompiles.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may link this library into contracts deployed on a
// Final DeFi Protocol chain in order to reach that chain's hash and
// post-quantum signature-verification precompiles.
// 2. Integrators, node operators, and auditors may use it to reproduce and
// independently re-verify any verdict those precompiles produced, as part of
// their integration with the Final DeFi Protocol.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this library or a competing state plane derived
// from it without permission prior to the Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
/**
* @title Final Chain Precompiles
* @notice The three primitives Final Chain adds to the EVM, and the only
* supported way to reach them.
*
* @dev **These exist ONLY on Final Chain (chain id 48359).** They are provided
* by this chain's own node binary, and
* nothing at these addresses on Ethereum, Optimism or any other chain will
* answer. A contract that calls them must be one that only ever runs here;
* `assertAvailable` below is the cheap way to fail loudly rather than treat an
* empty return as a verified signature.
*
* The addresses are the FIPS numbers, which is the whole allocation rule —
* there is no local registry to consult and no way for two implementations to
* disagree about where a primitive lives:
*
* | address | primitive | FIPS |
* |---|---|---|
* | `0x…0202` | SHA3-256 | 202 |
* | `0x…0203` | ML-KEM-1024 key validation | 203 |
* | `0x…0204` | ML-DSA-87 verify | 204 |
* | `0x…0205` | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s verify | 205 |
* | `0x…0207` | HQC-5 key validation | 207 |
*
* The two KEM addresses VALIDATE keys and do nothing else, for one reason:
* encapsulation is a SENDER operation and decapsulation needs the secret key,
* so neither belongs on a chain at all. Checking that a registered public key
* is well-formed is hardening rather than a dependency, and nothing in this
* system waits on it.
*
* HQC's number is 207. It had none when the KEM pair was chosen, which was the
* one thing separating it from ML-KEM here — a primitive with no standard
* number has no address under this rule, and inventing one would have been a
* local convention masquerading as the global one.
*
* **No AEAD precompile, at any number.** The chain must never be able to
* decrypt an intent, and checking a revealed body against its commitment is a
* hash compare that `0x0202` already serves.
*
* ## Why this library refuses to take a public key from its caller
*
* It does take one — the primitives are pure functions and cannot do otherwise.
* The rule lives one level up, in `FinalPqQuorum`: a key passed as an argument
* proves nothing, because anyone holding a keypair can produce a valid
* signature under it. Only a key read from `FinalIdentityRegistry` is evidence
* about WHO signed. Every call site here must be able to answer "where did this
* key come from" with "storage", never "calldata".
*
* ## `success` is not the answer
*
* A `staticcall` to a verifier returns two things and both matter. `success`
* false means the call was malformed — usually a length bug in the caller — and
* `success` true with a zero word means the signature did not verify. The
* helpers below collapse both to `false` for the caller's convenience, which is
* safe in that direction and only in that direction: treating a failed call as
* a valid signature would be the whole security of the system.
*/
library FinalChainPrecompiles {
/// @notice SHA3-256 (FIPS 202). NOT `keccak256`, which is the
/// pre-standardisation padding and produces a different digest.
address internal constant SHA3_256 = address(0x0202);
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 verification (FIPS 204). Transaction-class keys.
address internal constant ML_DSA_87 = address(0x0204);
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s verification (FIPS 205). Access-class keys.
address internal constant SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S = address(0x0205);
/// @notice ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation-key validation (FIPS 203).
/// @dev VALIDATES; it does not encapsulate. Runs FIPS 203 §7.2's own
/// encapsulation-key check — the type check and the modulus check — and
/// nothing else. Encapsulation is a sender operation and decapsulation
/// needs the secret key, so neither belongs on a chain.
address internal constant ML_KEM_1024 = address(0x0203);
/// @notice HQC-5 public-key validation (FIPS 207).
/// @dev Structural only: the length, and the three padding bits the
/// encoding leaves beyond `n = 57637`. HQC has no cheap key-validity
/// predicate and this does not pretend to one.
address internal constant HQC_5 = address(0x0207);
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 public key length. Round-3 Dilithium5 shares it.
uint256 internal constant ML_DSA_87_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN = 2592;
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 signature length. Round-3 Dilithium5 is 4595.
uint256 internal constant ML_DSA_87_SIGNATURE_LEN = 4627;
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s public key length (`PK.seed ‖ PK.root`).
uint256 internal constant SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN = 64;
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature length. The `f` set is 49,856.
uint256 internal constant SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_SIGNATURE_LEN = 29792;
/// @notice Thrown when a precompile is absent, i.e. this is not Final Chain
/// or the node is stock reth rather than `final-reth`.
error PrecompileUnavailable(address precompile);
/**
* @notice Reverts unless all five precompiles answer.
* @dev Call this from a constructor. A contract whose security rests on PQ
* verification must not deploy onto a chain that cannot perform it — the
* failure mode otherwise is a quorum that reaches threshold with zero valid
* signatures, discovered at the worst possible moment.
*
* The probe is SHA3-256 of the empty string, whose value is a published
* FIPS 202 constant. It cannot be produced by an address with no code
* (which returns empty) nor by `keccak256` (which gives a different digest
* for the same input), so it distinguishes "the right precompile" from both
* "nothing here" and "the wrong hash function".
*/
function assertAvailable() internal view {
bytes32 expected = 0xa7ffc6f8bf1ed76651c14756a061d662f580ff4de43b49fa82d80a4b80f8434a;
(bool ok, bytes memory out) = SHA3_256.staticcall("");
if (!ok || out.length != 32 || bytes32(out) != expected) {
revert PrecompileUnavailable(SHA3_256);
}
// The two signature verifiers are probed by shape rather than by a
// known-answer vector: a KAT here would put a 29,792-byte signature in
// this contract's bytecode. A deliberately short input is a
// *precompile error* by contract, so a FAILED call is the pass and a
// silent success would mean something else is answering at the address.
_probeRejectsShortInput(ML_DSA_87);
_probeRejectsShortInput(SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S);
// The two KEM validators are probed the other way round, because they
// are total by contract: a wrong length is a malformed KEY, which is
// the question being asked, so they ANSWER rather than error. A
// one-byte input must therefore come back as a well-formed `false`, and
// a failed call means nothing is there.
_probeAnswersFalse(ML_KEM_1024);
_probeAnswersFalse(HQC_5);
}
/**
* @dev A short input must make the precompile ERROR. The gas budget is the
* whole subtlety.
*
* A reverting CONTRACT refunds the gas it did not use. A precompile that
* returns an error consumes **everything forwarded to it** — and Solidity
* forwards 63/64 of what is left by default. Two such probes in a
* constructor therefore burn all but 1/4096 of the deployment's gas, and
* the deploy fails with no revert data at all.
*
* That is not hypothetical: it is what happened the first time this ran
* against a real `final-reth`, and no Foundry test could have caught it.
* A mocked precompile is a contract, and a contract's `require` hands the
* gas back.
*
* 5,000 is generous for a call that fails on a length check before any
* cryptography runs, and small enough that both probes together are noise
* against a deployment.
*/
function _probeRejectsShortInput(address precompile) private view {
bool ok;
assembly ("memory-safe") {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore8(ptr, 0x00)
ok := staticcall(5000, precompile, ptr, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00)
}
if (ok) revert PrecompileUnavailable(precompile);
}
/**
* @dev A one-byte input must come back as a well-formed zero word.
*
* The inverse of `_probeRejectsShortInput`, and the inversion is the point:
* these two precompiles are TOTAL. Every byte string has an answer to "is
* this a well-formed key", and for one byte the answer is no. A precompile
* that errored here would be one that treats a malformed key as a caller
* bug, which is the opposite of what a registry wants.
*
* Gas is bounded for the same reason as the other probe — an erroring
* precompile consumes everything forwarded — even though the pass case
* returns normally and refunds.
*/
function _probeAnswersFalse(address precompile) private view {
bool ok;
bytes32 answer;
assembly ("memory-safe") {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore8(ptr, 0x00)
ok := staticcall(5000, precompile, ptr, 0x01, ptr, 0x20)
answer := mload(ptr)
}
if (!ok || answer != bytes32(0)) revert PrecompileUnavailable(precompile);
}
/**
* @notice Is `encapsulationKey` a well-formed ML-KEM-1024 key?
*
* @dev The check a registry owes a sender. A malformed encapsulation key
* stored on chain is an account whose intents cannot be sealed, and the
* discovery happens at the first attempt to seal one — on the hybrid path,
* as a pair silently reduced to one family, which is the failure with no
* error attached.
*
* False rather than reverting on any shape, including the wrong length,
* because the caller is asking a question and every input has an answer.
*/
function isWellFormedMlKem1024(bytes memory encapsulationKey) internal view returns (bool) {
return _validatesKey(ML_KEM_1024, encapsulationKey);
}
/// @notice Is `publicKey` a well-formed HQC-5 key?
/// @dev Structural, and honestly partial — see the precompile. It catches a
/// truncated key, a key from the wrong parameter set, and a tail carrying
/// smuggled bytes, which are the three ways this goes wrong in practice.
function isWellFormedHqc5(bytes memory publicKey) internal view returns (bool) {
return _validatesKey(HQC_5, publicKey);
}
/// @dev A failed CALL is not a false answer. It means nothing is at the
/// address — this is not Final Chain, or the node is stock reth — and
/// reading it as "the key is malformed" would silently disable the check on
/// exactly the deployment where it cannot run.
function _validatesKey(address precompile, bytes memory key) private view returns (bool) {
(bool ok, bytes memory out) = precompile.staticcall(key);
if (!ok || out.length != 32) revert PrecompileUnavailable(precompile);
return bytes32(out) != bytes32(0);
}
/// @notice FIPS 202 SHA3-256 over `data`.
/// @dev The certificate schema hashes `TBSCertificate`, `SubjectKeyId` and
/// `AuthorityKeyId` with this, so it is the only function that can check a
/// `certHash` against the bytes it claims to summarise.
function sha3_256(bytes memory data) internal view returns (bytes32 digest) {
(bool ok, bytes memory out) = SHA3_256.staticcall(data);
if (!ok || out.length != 32) revert PrecompileUnavailable(SHA3_256);
digest = bytes32(out);
}
/// @notice Verify an ML-DSA-87 signature. False on any failure, including
/// a malformed call.
function verifyMlDsa87(bytes memory publicKey, bytes memory message, bytes memory signature)
internal
view
returns (bool)
{
if (
publicKey.length != ML_DSA_87_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
|| signature.length != ML_DSA_87_SIGNATURE_LEN
) return false;
return _verify(ML_DSA_87, publicKey, signature, message);
}
/// @notice Verify an SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature. False on any failure.
function verifySlhDsa(bytes memory publicKey, bytes memory message, bytes memory signature)
internal
view
returns (bool)
{
if (
publicKey.length != SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
|| signature.length != SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_SIGNATURE_LEN
) return false;
return _verify(SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S, publicKey, signature, message);
}
/// @dev `publicKey ‖ signature ‖ message`, in that order. Both fixed-length
/// fields come first so the message is unambiguously the remainder — the
/// same reason the precompile takes no length prefix.
function _verify(
address precompile,
bytes memory publicKey,
bytes memory signature,
bytes memory message
) private view returns (bool) {
(bool ok, bytes memory out) =
precompile.staticcall(abi.encodePacked(publicKey, signature, message));
return ok && out.length == 32 && bytes32(out) != bytes32(0);
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalChainTime.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may link this time library into contracts deployed on
// a Final DeFi Protocol chain, and may read its constants to interpret the
// timestamps and durations that chain publishes.
// 2. Integrators, indexers, and operators may use it to convert between this
// chain's clock and the units their own systems keep, as part of their
// integration with the Final DeFi Protocol.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this library or a competing state plane derived
// from it without permission prior to the Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
/**
* @title Final Chain Time
* @notice **On this chain, `block.timestamp` is MILLISECONDS, not seconds.**
* @dev Every other EVM chain stamps seconds. This one cannot. It mints a block every 100 ms, and the protocol
* requires block timestamps to strictly increase, so a second-denominated clock would exhaust its distinct
* values ten times over per second. Milliseconds is the deliberate consequence, and it is a property of the
* CHAIN itself rather than of any contract here — nothing in this library can change it, and nothing deployed
* beside this library may assume otherwise.
*
* Every duration and every instant on this chain is therefore in milliseconds. This library exists so that fact
* is stated in one place and converted in one place, instead of being assumed independently everywhere a
* deadline or a delay is written.
*
* ## The naming rule, which is a safety rule
*
* A field or constant carrying a duration or an instant on this chain ends in `Ms`. This is not decoration. A
* delay field named for seconds while holding milliseconds elapses a thousand times too fast: a one-day
* recovery delay would mature in about eighty-six seconds, and a two-year dormancy threshold in under a day.
* Those delays are the whole of what stands between a stolen credential and an account, so a name that states
* the wrong unit is not a cosmetic defect — it is the defect, wearing a disguise. `Seconds`-suffixed names do
* not appear in this directory and must not be introduced.
*
* A test harness is not a check on this. Standard EVM tooling stamps `block.timestamp` in seconds, so a suite
* can agree with the contracts under test and both be wrong about the chain they deploy to. The unit has to be
* carried by the names.
*
* Solidity's `hours` and `days` suffixes remain the clearest way to write a duration, so durations are written
* as `24 hours * MS_PER_SECOND` rather than as a bare literal: the intent stays readable and the unit stays
* explicit at the point of use.
*/
library FinalChainTime {
/// @notice Milliseconds per second — the whole conversion between this chain's clock and ordinary time,
/// named once.
/// @dev Multiply a `seconds`-denominated Solidity duration literal by this to express it in this chain's
/// units. It is deliberately the only place the factor appears.
uint64 internal constant MS_PER_SECOND = 1_000;
/// @notice Nanoseconds per millisecond — the divisor for values that arrive stamped in nanoseconds.
/// @dev The certificate schema stamps validity windows in nanoseconds, so a certificate converts DOWN to
/// this chain's clock. Dividing rather than multiplying is the direction that cannot overflow, and it
/// truncates toward the past, which for a validity window is the conservative rounding.
uint64 internal constant NS_PER_MILLISECOND = 1_000_000;
/// @notice This chain's current time, in milliseconds.
/// @dev A function rather than a bare `block.timestamp` read so the unit is visible at every call site.
/// It performs no arithmetic and exists purely so that reading the clock is self-describing, where
/// `block.timestamp` on this chain is silently a thousand times what a reader would assume.
/// @return nowInMs The current block's timestamp, in milliseconds.
function nowMs() internal view returns (uint64) {
return uint64(block.timestamp);
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalIdentityRegistry.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may deploy this identity registry as part of a Final
// DeFi Protocol state plane, and may register, rotate, and revoke identity
// records in it under the authority this contract enforces.
// 2. Operators, integrators, and end users may read the certificates, public
// keys, role bits, and signer bindings it holds, and may call its views to
// resolve an identity, a sender, or a quorum roster.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this identity registry or a competing certificate
// authority derived from it without permission prior to the Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalCertificate} from "./FinalCertificate.sol";
import {FinalChainTime} from "./FinalChainTime.sol";
import {FinalChainPrecompiles} from "./FinalChainPrecompiles.sol";
import {FinalPqQuorum} from "./FinalPqQuorum.sol";
import {FinalSweep} from "../utils/FinalSweep.sol";
import {FinalChainInitializable} from "./FinalChainInitializable.sol";
/// @dev Commitment space for one stage's encapsulation pair.
/// Byte-equal to `FinalWalletFactory.DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE` and to the certificate issuer's own preimage
/// constant. Three independent derivations of one word: a mismatch in any of them is a certificate that
/// verifies nowhere, so the value is pinned by test against the other two rather than imported.
bytes32 constant DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE = keccak256("FINAL_KEM_BUNDLE_v01");
/// @dev Commitment space for the identity tree's wallet leaf.
/// Byte-equal to `IdentityRootModule.DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF` on every execution chain. Restated rather
/// than imported because that module lives on other chains and no import would make the two one value; a
/// cross-contract parity test pins the pair. The spelling is FROZEN: the premined certificates were mined
/// against this exact constant, and the leaf it derives is the `certHash` inside a wallet's address
/// derivation, so changing a byte here moves addresses that already exist.
bytes32 constant DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_IDENTITY_LEAF_PQ_v01");
/// @dev Commitment space for the identity tree's ISSUER leaf.
/// An issuer projects under its own domain — `DOMAIN_ISSUER_LEAF ‖ certHash ‖ version ‖
/// issuerTreeRoot` — so an issuer record is stapleable for offline licence verification while the distinct
/// domain keeps it out of wallet admission: an execution chain's gateway folds with the wallet domain, so an
/// issuer leaf can never satisfy an identity-certificate check there. `issuerTreeRoot` is a RESERVED word,
/// zero until an issuer's own certificate-tree anchor is wired — the only clean path to offline licence
/// revocation, since fixed-depth insertion-ordered state trees cannot prove non-inclusion.
bytes32 constant DOMAIN_ISSUER_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_ISSUER_LEAF_v01");
/// @dev The issuer name every chain-attested certificate carries, as a keccak digest.
/// The chain is the issuer but holds no keypair, so a chain-attested certificate carries this named
/// value in its issuer field: required by the wire format, verifying nothing on its own, and covered by
/// `certHash`. The name is deliberately environment-agnostic and jurisdiction-silent — the issuer is the
/// worldwide network rather than a legal entity, and an environment-specific name would fork `certHash` per
/// environment. Compared as a hash rather than as a string, so the check costs one word.
bytes32 constant CHAIN_ISSUER_DN_HASH = keccak256("CN=Final Chain,O=Final DeFi");
/// @dev The authority key identifier every chain-attested certificate names.
/// `SHA3-256(utf8("FINAL_CHAIN_AUTHORITY_v01"))` — a DOMAIN constant rather than the digest of a key,
/// because the chain issues certificates and holds no public key block to hash. Precomputed rather than
/// derived at construction: the harness the unit tests run under does not implement the real SHA3 function,
/// and the literal is pinned by test against a reference implementation. A zero-length authority key
/// identifier is reserved and is admitted nowhere.
bytes32 constant CHAIN_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID =
0x9a6a5d8139ad2d28957698330aaa691017dba7dc80eb7cbec585239fb680bbab;
/**
* @title Identity Leaf Sink
* @notice The identity tree's projection door on the state-trees contract.
* @dev A narrow interface rather than an import, because the trees contract imports THIS file — the
* dependency runs that way, and this is the one call that runs the other. Declaring the single method
* here keeps the cycle away from the compiler without duplicating either contract's surface.
*/
interface IIdentityLeafSink {
/// @notice Recompute and store the identity-tree leaf for each named account.
/// @dev Called inside the same transaction as every identity mutation, so an execution chain's admission
/// set sees a registration, rotation or revocation the moment this chain does. The leaf VALUE is
/// derived by the trees contract from the registry's post-mutation state, so the caller supplies
/// accounts and never a leaf.
/// @param accounts The accounts whose leaves are stale.
function syncIdentityLeaves(address[] calldata accounts) external;
}
/**
* @title Revocation Recorder
* @notice The revocation log's recording door.
* @dev Same narrow-interface reasoning as the leaf sink above. `recorded` is read first, so a fingerprint
* somebody already recorded through the log's permissionless door cannot revert the registry mutation
* that feeds it.
*/
interface IRevocationRecorder {
/// @notice Fold a permanently retired signer fingerprint into the revocation log.
/// @dev The log applies its own permanence gate, reading this registry back; the call states nothing the
/// registry has not already decided.
/// @param signerId The fingerprint that has lost standing for good.
function record(bytes32 signerId) external;
/// @notice Whether the log already holds `signerId`.
/// @param signerId The fingerprint to look up.
/// @return Whether a leaf for it exists.
function recorded(bytes32 signerId) external view returns (bool);
}
/**
* @title Final Identity Registry
* @notice Who every party in the system is, on chain: one record per party, carrying its certificate and its
* actual public keys.
* @dev Every service, every co-signer, every certificate authority and every operator has one record here.
* The record holds the party's public keys in full rather than commitments to them, and this contract is
* the certificate authority as well as the roster.
*
* ## Where this runs
*
* Only on this project's own reth-based chains. Verification happens inside precompiles that exist
* nowhere else: SHA3-256 at `0x0202`, ML-DSA-87 at `0x0204` and SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s at `0x0205`, each
* address being that primitive's FIPS number. The constructor probes them and refuses to deploy where
* they are absent, so a registry of keys the chain cannot check never comes into existence. This
* contract takes part in no CREATE2 derivation — its address is per chain, and nothing derives an
* address from it — and nothing outside this directory imports it.
*
* Gas is deliberately NOT a design constraint on that chain and must not be optimised for. Where a
* choice below trades gas for a verdict that is re-derivable from public state, the verdict wins: a
* signature checked in a precompile is a fact anyone can recompute, where the same check run in a
* library by whichever process happened to hold the keys is only a claim.
*
* ## Keys are read from STORAGE, never from calldata
*
* A commitment would be a quarter of the storage and would be enough to CHECK a key someone hands you.
* It is not enough to VERIFY A SIGNATURE, because verification needs the key itself — and a key that
* arrives in calldata proves nothing, since anyone holding a keypair can produce a valid signature under
* it. A quorum built on caller-supplied keys is a quorum of one: whoever built the calldata.
*
* So the keys live here in full. `FinalPqQuorum` resolves a member through this registry and reads that
* member's key from this registry's storage, and "which key is co-signer three" has exactly one answer,
* in exactly one place. That is the load-bearing rule of every quorum on the chain, not an optimisation.
*
* ## The certificate is the record, not a pointer to one
*
* `certHash` is `SHA3-256(TBSCertificate)`: the certificate's own identity, and the handle revocation is
* keyed on. {registerWallet} and {registerIssuer} take the certificate's TBS bytes and read everything
* out of them — the digest, the serial, the key identifiers, the depth pair, the validity window and
* every public key. Neither takes a key argument, so no two arguments can disagree and no registrar can
* bind a certificate to a keypair that certificate does not contain.
*
* ## The root is the first record here, not a self-signed file
*
* This chain is the only root certificate authority, and the root is pinned as an entry in this registry
* rather than distributed as a self-signed certificate somebody has to install. Chain validation
* terminates here BY IDENTITY. Everything registered after the root is verified on chain, inside the
* precompiles, against what this registry already holds: the holder's own two signatures over the
* admission digest, the pinned chain-issuer constants, and — for a nested issuer — lineage to a
* registered parent whose depth admits it. There is no path by which a key enters this registry
* unattested; a registrar cannot register anything else.
*
* ## Roles are a bitmask
*
* One party is legitimately several things: a co-signer that also publishes, an operator that is also a
* guardian. A single enum would force either duplicate records for one key, which is two sources of
* truth about one party, or a role hierarchy nobody agrees on. A mask has neither problem, and a quorum
* asks whether an account CARRIES a capability rather than whether it IS a type.
*
* ## Membership is hybrid-gated
*
* Who is in this registry, and with which roles, is the root of every quorum on the chain, so it is the
* one thing no single key may decide. Once bootstrap is sealed, every membership mutation — register,
* roles, revoke, a hash-based signing key, the registrar threshold itself — and every state-plane
* configuration change routed through {requireRegistrarQuorum} takes a `ROLE_REGISTRAR` quorum whose
* approvals carry BOTH families: the ML-DSA-87 vote and the SLH-DSA seal. A lattice break cannot then
* rewrite the roster, and neither can a hash-function break; only both at once.
*
* The bootstrap window is the only exception. While it is open the bootstrap admin writes alone, because
* every roster has to be installed by someone before it can install itself. {sealBootstrap} closes it
* irreversibly, and refuses to close it onto a registrar quorum that cannot be met.
*
* ## The sender is not the account
*
* Transactions on this chain are signed by ML-DSA-87, and the node derives `msg.sender` from the key as
* `keccak256(0x04 ‖ publicKey)[12:]`. That address pays gas and holds no authority. {accountOfSender}
* binds it to the identity whose live transaction key it derives from, so a `msg.sender` gate anywhere
* on this chain asks {senderHasRole} and resolves to the identity — and a key rotation moves the binding
* instead of the roster.
*
* ## What this contract deliberately does not do
*
* It never un-revokes: a revoked certificate is finished, and reversing that would reopen every past
* verification. It never enumerates a mapping inside a mutation — the registrars supply the chain list a
* revocation touches, and a fingerprint an incomplete list missed stays permanently recordable through
* the revocation log's own permissionless door. It holds no funds, exposes no payable entrypoint, and
* reserves nothing against a sweep. And it grants no capability by parsing one: a certificate says which
* keys a party holds, `roles` says what the party may do, and the two arrive as different arguments on
* purpose.
*/
contract FinalIdentityRegistry is FinalSweep, FinalChainInitializable {
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- roles
/// @notice May co-sign account-state rounds (tree 1).
uint256 public constant ROLE_ACCOUNT_COSIGNER = 1 << 0;
/// @notice May co-sign MMR / bundle-log advances.
uint256 public constant ROLE_MMR_COSIGNER = 1 << 1;
/// @notice May publish PHI ledger state (tree 2).
uint256 public constant ROLE_PHI_PUBLISHER = 1 << 2;
/// @notice May publish vAsset state (tree 3).
uint256 public constant ROLE_VASSET_PUBLISHER = 1 << 3;
/// @notice May publish oracle data (tree 4).
uint256 public constant ROLE_ORACLE_PUBLISHER = 1 << 4;
/// @notice May publish settlement / asset registry roots (trees 5 and 6).
uint256 public constant ROLE_REGISTRY_PUBLISHER = 1 << 5;
/// @notice May act as a wallet guardian.
uint256 public constant ROLE_GUARDIAN = 1 << 6;
/// @notice May submit transactions on behalf of the protocol.
uint256 public constant ROLE_RELAYER = 1 << 7;
/// @notice May register and revoke identities once bootstrap is sealed.
uint256 public constant ROLE_REGISTRAR = 1 << 8;
/// @notice A certificate authority — the root, or an intermediate under it.
uint256 public constant ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY = 1 << 9;
/// @notice May co-sign `FinalSettlementLog` appends — the cross-chain
/// settlement quorum, the same members whose LMS keys satisfy the
/// execution chains' settlement set. A role of its own rather than a
/// second use of `ROLE_REGISTRY_PUBLISHER`: the registries (trees 5/6)
/// change on listing cadence and settlement leaves release custody, and
/// one role for both would put the value plane behind the listing roster.
uint256 public constant ROLE_SETTLEMENT_COSIGNER = 1 << 10;
// ----------------------------------------------------- action domains
/// @notice Action domain for registering or rotating a wallet identity.
/// @dev One domain per membership mutation, so an approval to grant a role can never be replayed as one
/// to revoke. This registry is its own verifying contract for all of these, and the digest also
/// binds a per-contract counter, so an approval authorises exactly one action once.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REGISTER_WALLET = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REGISTER_WALLET_v01");
/// @notice Action domain for registering or rotating an issuer.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REGISTER_ISSUER = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REGISTER_ISSUER_v01");
/// @notice The admission proof-of-possession digest domain.
/// @dev The HOLDER signs `keccak256(abi.encode(domain, chainid, registry, certHash, recoveryCertHash,
/// gateNonce))` with the live transaction key (ML-DSA-87) AND the live access key
/// (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s) — both families, in the admission transaction, verified by the precompiles.
/// Possession lives in the TRANSACTION, never in the artifact, so holding a copy of somebody's
/// public certificate admits nothing.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_IDENTITY_ADMISSION = keccak256("FINAL_IDENTITY_ADMISSION_v01");
/// @notice Action domain for root-plane global certificate revocation, by handle.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE =
keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE_v01");
/// @notice Digest domain for an issuer revoking a certificate it signed off chain.
/// @dev Signed by the issuer's own registered cert-signing keys rather than approved by a quorum, and
/// bound to the issuer's own gate nonce, so one issuer's revocations cannot be replayed as
/// another's.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_ISSUER_CERT_REVOCATION =
keccak256("FINAL_ISSUER_CERT_REVOCATION_v01");
/// @notice Action domain for recording an account's hash-based signing key.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REGISTER_LMS_KEY = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REGISTER_LMS_KEY_v01");
/// @notice Action domain for replacing an identity's capability bitmask.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_SET_ROLES = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_SET_ROLES_v01");
/// @notice Action domain for retiring an identity.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REVOKE = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REVOKE_v01");
/// @notice Action domain for moving the registrar threshold itself.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_SET_REGISTRAR_THRESHOLD =
keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_SET_REGISTRAR_THRESHOLD_v01");
/// @notice The algorithm identifier the sender derivation is domain-separated by.
/// @dev ML-DSA-87, FIPS 204 — the only algorithm this chain's transaction envelope admits. Prefixing it
/// means a key of another family can never derive the same sender address.
uint8 private constant ENVELOPE_ALG_ML_DSA_87 = 4;
// ------------------------------------------------------------- storage
/**
* @title Identity
* @notice One party's on-chain identity.
* @dev `version` increments on every mutation, and that increment is what a rotation IS: the record is
* replaced rather than appended to, and the version is how a reader on another chain knows which of
* two copies it has seen is newer.
*/
struct Identity {
/// SHA3-256 of the LIVE certificate's TBS bytes. The revocation handle.
bytes32 certHash;
/// SHA3-256 of the RECOVERY certificate's TBS bytes.
bytes32 recoveryCertHash;
/// The certificate's 32-byte serial, `16 B entropy ‖ 16 B counter`.
bytes32 serial;
/// SHA3-256 of this certificate's public key block. A child names it in
/// its own `AuthorityKeyId`, which is how the chain links the two.
bytes32 subjectKeyId;
/// Capability bitmask. Zero for a registered-but-idle party.
uint256 roles;
/// Position on the delegation axis; 0 is the Final Chain root.
uint8 depth;
/// Deepest level this key may issue to. `== depth` means it signs no
/// certificates at all, which is every end entity.
uint8 maxDelegationDepth;
/// Milliseconds since the epoch, on this chain's clock. The certificate schema stamps validity in
/// nanoseconds and the parser converts on the way in, so nothing here ever compares across units.
uint64 notBefore;
/// Milliseconds since the epoch, or 0 for "never expires" — which the certificate schema allows and
/// personal identity certificates use. The bound is exclusive.
uint64 notAfter;
/// Monotonic. A rotation that does not advance it is refused.
uint64 version;
/// Set by `revoke`. Never unset: a revoked certificate is finished, and
/// an un-revoke would make every past verification re-openable.
bool revoked;
/// Distinguishes "no record" from "a record whose fields are all zero".
bool registered;
}
/**
* @title Lms Key
* @notice A hash-based (LMS) signing key held by a registered account.
* @dev The execution chains' quorums verify LMS rather than ML-DSA, because those chains have no
* post-quantum precompiles and check a keccak hash chain instead. Those keys are the authority over
* the post-quantum anchor, and therefore over post-quantum execution — which makes "who holds this
* fingerprint?" a question the state plane has to be able to answer, exactly as it answers it for
* every other key.
*
* Recorded against an account that is ALREADY registered, so an LMS key is a capability of a known
* identity rather than a standalone credential. It inherits that identity's revocation: a revoked
* account's signer is a revoked signer, with nothing extra to remember to do.
*/
struct LmsKey {
/// `I`, hashed into every step of the signature.
bytes16 keyId;
/// Merkle tree height. Bound into the fingerprint, because the leaf
/// commits to node `2^h + q` and a signer who could vary it could vary
/// the numbering.
uint8 height;
/// `T[1]`, the LMS public key.
bytes32 root;
/// Monotonic. A rotation that does not advance it is refused, so a
/// replayed registration cannot reinstate a superseded key.
uint64 version;
/// Distinguishes "no key" from "a key whose fields are all zero".
bool registered;
}
/// @notice The hash-based (LMS) signing key an account holds, per chain.
/// @dev One slot per account AND chain. A single-use hash-based counter is a complete defence only while
/// the key it names signs for ONE chain, so the roster is stored the way it is armed: the same
/// operator is a different signer on every chain, and a rotation on one says nothing about another.
mapping(address account => mapping(uint64 chainId => LmsKey)) private _lmsKey;
/**
* @title Lms Binding
* @notice What a signer fingerprint is bound to: the account holding it and the chain it signs for.
* @dev Two fields in one slot, deliberately. This contract sits within a few bytes of the deployed-code
* ceiling, so anything added to this surface has to pay for itself in bytecode first — which is why
* checks that no authority consults, such as refusing a zero chain identifier, are left to the
* publisher off chain rather than spent here.
*/
struct LmsBinding {
/// The account that registered the fingerprint. Zero means no account ever did.
address account;
/// The chain that registration was for. Zero alongside a zero account, for a fingerprint never
/// registered.
uint64 chainId;
}
/// @notice Which account a signer fingerprint belongs to, and which chain it signs for.
/// @dev The lookup the whole LMS record exists for: an execution chain's roster names fingerprints and
/// nothing else, so without this the keys behind those names are unattributable. Written once at
/// registration and left in place when the key is superseded, because attribution is history — a
/// signature made under a retired key was still made by that operator.
///
/// The chain it names is what selects the slot {lmsSignerIsLive} resolves the fingerprint against.
mapping(bytes32 signerId => LmsBinding) private _lmsBinding;
/// @notice The identity record for an account.
mapping(address account => Identity) private _identity;
/// @notice The live transaction key, ML-DSA-87: spending, and every high-cadence protocol action.
/// @dev All four key slots are stored in FULL rather than as commitments, because the precompiles verify
/// against a KEY and a key that arrived in calldata proves nothing about who signed. This is the
/// rule every quorum on this chain rests on.
/// @dev A certificate authority has two keys rather than four, and they live in the two active slots.
/// One storage shape rather than two, because every reader would otherwise have to know which kind
/// of party it was looking at before it could look.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeTransactionKey;
/// @notice The live access key, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s: identity, rotation and guardianship.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeAccessKey;
/// @notice The pre-committed recovery transaction key, ML-DSA-87. Empty for a certificate authority.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryTransactionKey;
/// @notice The pre-committed recovery access key, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s. Empty for a certificate
/// authority.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryAccessKey;
/// @notice The seal key: a service's second SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s key, which co-signs membership-class
/// quorum decisions (the registrar quorum); operational quorum actions take the ML-DSA-87 vote alone.
/// @dev Empty for every identity whose certificate carries no seal slot, which is every user wallet and
/// every certificate authority. An identity with no seal can never contribute to a sealed quorum,
/// so {sealableMemberCount} counts this rather than counting role bits.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeSealKey;
/// @notice The live stage's ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key, the lattice half of the pair.
/// @dev Two algorithms per stage — ML-KEM-1024 and HQC-5 — so a break in either family leaves the other
/// standing, the same reasoning that pairs the two signature families. The pair is written and
/// cleared together, so an account holds both or neither.
/// @dev Stored as the RAW keys, like the signing keys, because a registry that held only commitments
/// could not answer "encapsulate to this party" without a second lookup somewhere less
/// authoritative.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeKemMlKem;
/// @notice The live stage's HQC-5 encapsulation key, the code-based half of the pair.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeKemHqc;
/// @notice The recovery stage's ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key. Empty when the account has no recovery
/// stage.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryKemMlKem;
/// @notice The recovery stage's HQC-5 encapsulation key. Empty when the account has no recovery stage.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryKemHqc;
/// @notice Reverse index. A certificate identifies exactly one account, so
/// presenting a `certHash` is enough to find who it belongs to.
mapping(bytes32 certHash => address account) public accountOfCertificate;
/// @notice Revocation by certificate, independent of the account record.
/// A certificate stays revoked even if its account is later re-registered
/// under a new one.
mapping(bytes32 certHash => bool) public certificateRevoked;
/// @notice Who revoked a certificate through the ISSUER half of the lane.
/// Scoped by the verifier: the entry binds only when the recorded revoker
/// is the certificate's own issuer. Never gates registration.
mapping(bytes32 certHash => address) public certificateRevokedBy;
/// @notice Every registered account, in registration order. Small by
/// construction — this is services and co-signers, not wallets.
address[] private _accounts;
/// @notice Bootstrap authority. Zero once `sealBootstrap` has run.
address public bootstrapAdmin;
/// @notice Whether registration still accepts the bootstrap admin.
bool public bootstrapSealed;
/// @notice Where identity mutations project the tree-8 leaf, same-tx.
/// Zero only before {wireStatePlane} — the deploy tooling wires it before
/// the first registration, and the projection is skipped while unset so
/// the wiring transaction itself can be ordered freely in the bootstrap
/// window.
address public stateTrees;
/// @notice Where the PERMANENT standing losses — revocation and LMS-key
/// supersession — are recorded, same-tx. Zero only before {wireStatePlane}.
address public revocationLog;
/// @notice Sealed `ROLE_REGISTRAR` approvals a membership mutation needs.
/// @dev Zero until set, and bootstrap cannot be sealed while it is zero or
/// unreachable: a registry sealed behind a threshold nobody can meet is a
/// registry nobody can ever write to again.
uint256 public registrarThreshold;
/// @notice Replay counter per verifying contract — this registry for its
/// own mutations, each state-plane contract for its configuration. Bound
/// into every registrar digest, so an approval is for exactly one action.
mapping(address caller => uint64) private _gateNonce;
/// @notice The identity a Final Chain sender belongs to. See the contract
/// notes: a sender is derived from the `activeTransaction` key and is not
/// the account.
mapping(address sender => address account) public accountOfSender;
// -------------------------------------------------------------- events
/// @notice An identity was registered, or an existing one rotated onto a new certificate set.
/// @param account The identity written.
/// @param certHash The live certificate's handle.
/// @param roles The capability bitmask now in force.
/// @param version The record's monotonic version.
event IdentityRegistered(
address indexed account, bytes32 indexed certHash, uint256 roles, uint64 version
);
/// @notice An identity's capability bitmask was replaced.
/// @param account The identity whose roles changed.
/// @param previousRoles The mask before the change.
/// @param newRoles The mask now in force.
event IdentityRolesChanged(address indexed account, uint256 previousRoles, uint256 newRoles);
/// @notice An account's hash-based signing key for one chain was recorded or rotated.
/// @param account The identity that holds the key.
/// @param signerId The fingerprint an execution chain's roster names.
/// @param chainId The chain the key is armed for.
/// @param keyId The LMS key identifier.
/// @param height The Merkle tree height.
/// @param root The LMS public key.
/// @param version The lineage counter for this account and chain.
event LmsKeyRegistered(
address indexed account,
bytes32 indexed signerId,
uint64 indexed chainId,
bytes16 keyId,
uint8 height,
bytes32 root,
uint64 version
);
/// @notice An identity was retired. Irreversible, and its roles are cleared in the same transaction.
/// @param account The identity that was revoked.
/// @param certHash The certificate it held at the time.
event IdentityRevoked(address indexed account, bytes32 indexed certHash);
/// @notice One revocation-lane entry.
/// @param certHash The certificate that was revoked.
/// @param revoker Zero for a root-plane revocation, the issuing identity for an issuer's own.
event CertificateRevoked(bytes32 indexed certHash, address indexed revoker);
/// @notice The bootstrap window closed. After this there is no single-caller write path left.
/// @param sealedBy The bootstrap admin that closed it, immediately before being cleared.
event BootstrapSealed(address indexed sealedBy);
/// @notice The one-shot state-plane wiring landed. Emitted at most once in this contract's lifetime.
/// @param stateTrees The state-trees contract that owns the identity tree.
/// @param revocationLog The append-only log of retired signer fingerprints.
event StatePlaneWired(address stateTrees, address revocationLog);
/// @notice The number of sealed registrar approvals a membership mutation needs was set.
/// @param threshold The new threshold.
event RegistrarThresholdSet(uint256 threshold);
/// @notice A registrar quorum authorized an action.
/// @param verifyingContract The contract the approvals were collected for, and whose counter was burned.
/// @param actionDomain The action domain the approvals bound.
/// @param nonce The counter value the approvals were made over; the next action needs the next one.
/// @param valid How many approvals verified.
event RegistrarQuorumApproved(
address indexed verifyingContract, bytes32 indexed actionDomain, uint64 nonce, uint256 valid
);
// -------------------------------------------------------------- errors
/// @notice The caller holds none of the authority the entry point requires.
/// @param caller The address that called.
error NotAuthorized(address caller);
/// @notice The bootstrap window is already closed. Closing it is irreversible.
error BootstrapAlreadySealed();
/// @notice No record claims this account, or a zero address was offered as one.
/// @param account The address that was named.
error UnknownAccount(address account);
/// @notice A certificate's encapsulation key failed the chain's own well-formedness check.
/// @dev Names the algorithm, because the pair is stored together and "one of these two" is not an
/// actionable answer.
/// @param account The account being registered.
/// @param algorithmId The algorithm whose key was malformed.
error MalformedEncapsulationKey(address account, uint16 algorithmId);
/// @notice The certificate is already bound to a different account. One certificate identifies exactly
/// one party.
/// @param certHash The certificate's handle.
/// @param boundTo The account that already holds it.
error CertificateAlreadyBound(bytes32 certHash, address boundTo);
/// @notice The certificate has been revoked, or the account's own certificate has. Revocation is never
/// undone, so this is terminal for that handle.
/// @param certHash The revoked certificate's handle.
error CertificateIsRevoked(bytes32 certHash);
/// @notice A registration or rotation did not advance the record's version. Monotonicity is what stops a
/// replayed transaction reinstating credentials their holder has moved off.
/// @param current The version on record.
/// @param offered The version the caller presented.
error VersionNotNewer(uint64 current, uint64 offered);
/// @notice The named account does not carry `ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY`, or does not currently stand.
/// @param issuer The account that was named.
error IssuerNotACertificateAuthority(address issuer);
/// @notice The named parent has reached its own delegation bound and may issue nothing further.
/// @param issuer The parent account.
/// @param depth The parent's depth.
/// @param maxDelegationDepth The deepest level the parent may issue to.
error IssuerMayNotSign(address issuer, uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
/// @notice A certificate sits at a depth its lineage does not put it at. Levels cannot be skipped,
/// because skipping one is how an issuer escapes its own delegation bound.
/// @param got The depth the certificate declares.
/// @param want The depth its lineage requires.
error WrongDepth(uint8 got, uint8 want);
/// @notice A child certificate claims a deeper delegation bound than the parent that admits it.
/// @param child The child's `maxDelegationDepth`.
/// @param issuer The parent's `maxDelegationDepth`.
error DelegationWidened(uint8 child, uint8 issuer);
/// @notice The certificate names an authority key that is not its declared parent's subject key.
/// @param got The authority key identifier the certificate carries.
/// @param want The parent's subject key identifier.
error AuthorityKeyIdMismatch(bytes32 got, bytes32 want);
/// @notice The live and recovery certificates carry different serials, so they describe two different
/// certificate sets rather than two stages of one.
/// @param liveSerial The live certificate's serial.
/// @param recoverySerial The recovery certificate's serial.
error StagesDisagree(bytes32 liveSerial, bytes32 recoverySerial);
/// @notice An LMS tree height outside 1 through 24, the range the verifier admits.
/// @param height The height offered.
error LmsHeightOutOfRange(uint8 height);
/// @notice A zero LMS root commits to no tree and is refused.
error LmsRootIsZero();
/// @notice This signer fingerprint already belongs to a different account.
/// @param signerId The fingerprint offered.
/// @param boundTo The account that already holds it.
error LmsKeyAlreadyBound(bytes32 signerId, address boundTo);
/// @notice Two identities cannot share a transaction key: the sender it derives would be attributable to
/// both.
/// @param sender The derived sender address.
/// @param boundTo The account that already claims it.
error SenderAlreadyBound(address sender, address boundTo);
/// @notice Fewer registrars able to seal than the threshold asks for.
/// @param sealable How many standing registrars hold a seal key.
/// @param threshold How many approvals a membership mutation needs.
error RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(uint256 sealable, uint256 threshold);
/// @notice A zero registrar threshold was offered, or a quorum was demanded before one was set. A zero
/// threshold is a registry with no authority behind its membership.
error RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
/// @notice {wireStatePlane} has already run. Both pointers are trust topology and are written once.
error StatePlaneAlreadyWired();
/// @notice {wireStatePlane} was handed a zero address for the trees or for the revocation log.
error ZeroStatePlane();
/// @notice The holder's proof of possession did not verify: one family failed, or the digest was built
/// over the wrong nonce.
/// @param account The account the admission was for.
error AdmissionProofInvalid(address account);
/// @notice The certificate does not name the chain's authority key, so it is not chain-attested.
/// @param authorityKeyId The authority key identifier that was presented.
error NotChainAttested(bytes32 authorityKeyId);
/// @notice The certificate's issuer name is not the chain's own.
/// @param issuerDnHash The digest of the name that was presented.
error WrongIssuerDn(bytes32 issuerDnHash);
/// @notice A chain-attested end entity sits at depth 1 with `maxDelegationDepth == depth`; anything else
/// is not an end entity.
/// @param depth The certificate's position on the delegation axis.
/// @param maxDelegationDepth The deepest level it may issue to.
error NotAnEndEntity(uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
/// @notice An issuer that cannot sign is an end entity wearing an issuer profile, and belongs in
/// {registerWallet}.
/// @param depth The certificate's position on the delegation axis.
/// @param maxDelegationDepth The deepest level it may issue to.
error IssuerCannotSign(uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
/// @notice A registered issuer's certificate never expires.
/// @dev Expiry is the passive half of an issuer's lifecycle, so a zero `NotAfter` is refused here even
/// though the certificate schema allows one for an end entity.
error IssuerMustExpire();
/// @notice An issuer validity window past {MAX_ISSUER_VALIDITY_MS}.
/// @param notBefore The certificate's start, in this chain's milliseconds.
/// @param notAfter The certificate's end, in this chain's milliseconds.
error IssuerValidityTooLong(uint64 notBefore, uint64 notAfter);
/// @notice An institution registration whose subject name carries no ISO 3166 country component, or
/// whose institution extension is too short to hold one.
/// @dev Only the trust root is jurisdiction-silent; a registered institution names where it answers for
/// itself.
error JurisdictionMissing();
/// @notice The subject name's country and the institution extension's `jurisdiction` field disagree, or
/// the extension's jurisdiction is not a two-byte country code.
error JurisdictionMismatch();
// --------------------------------------------------------- constructor
/**
* @notice Deploy the registry with a bootstrap registrar in place.
* @dev The precompile probe is the point of the constructor. This contract is meaningless on a chain
* that cannot verify post-quantum signatures, and deploying it there would produce a registry full
* of keys nothing on that chain can check — so it refuses to exist where the precompiles are
* absent rather than existing and being trusted.
*
* The admin is the whole authority until {sealBootstrap} runs, because every roster has to be
* installed by someone before it can install itself.
* @param admin The bootstrap registrar. Genesis names the chain deployer.
*/
constructor(address admin) {
FinalChainPrecompiles.assertAvailable();
_setUp(admin);
}
/**
* @notice The constructor's storage write, for a registry behind `FinalChainProxy` — whose upgrade
* authority is this registry itself: the proxy is built with its own address as `registry`.
* Runs once, in the proxy's constructor; `AlreadyInitialized` afterwards and on a direct deploy.
* @param admin The bootstrap registrar.
*/
function initialize(address admin) external {
_setUp(admin);
}
/// @dev The bootstrap admin is storage (cleared by {sealBootstrap}), so a proxy needs it replayed.
function _setUp(address admin) internal initializer {
bootstrapAdmin = admin;
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------- authority
/**
* @notice The authority gate on every membership mutation this registry performs.
* @dev Bootstrap is a real window, not a formality: every roster in this system has to be installed by
* someone before it can install itself, and a design that pretends otherwise ends up with a roster
* that cannot be brought into existence at all. It is closed by {sealBootstrap}, irreversibly.
*
* While the window is open the admin writes alone. Once it is closed there is no single-caller path
* left — not for a registrar, not for anyone — and every mutation goes through the sealed registrar
* quorum, whose approvals carry both signature families.
* @param actionDomain One of the `DOMAIN_*` constants naming the mutation.
* @param payloadDigest The mutation's own arguments, folded.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at. Ignored while bootstrap is open.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open.
*/
function _requireMembershipAuthority(
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) private {
if (!bootstrapSealed && msg.sender == bootstrapAdmin) return;
_requireRegistrarQuorum(address(this), actionDomain, payloadDigest, anchorBlock, approvals);
}
/**
* @notice The sealed registrar quorum, for the other contracts in the state plane.
* @dev `msg.sender` — the calling contract — is the verifying contract the digest binds and the counter
* it burns, so an approval collected for one contract's configuration cannot be spent on another's.
* The caller decides its own bootstrap exemption before calling; this function knows no caller's
* admin and applies none.
*
* Anyone may SUBMIT such a transaction. Authority is the approvals, not the sender, which is the
* whole point of a quorum.
* @param actionDomain The caller's own action domain for the change being authorised.
* @param payloadDigest The change's arguments, folded by the caller.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at.
* @param approvals The registrar approvals, each carrying both families.
*/
function requireRegistrarQuorum(
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireRegistrarQuorum(msg.sender, actionDomain, payloadDigest, anchorBlock, approvals);
}
/// @notice Burn one gate nonce and require a sealed registrar quorum over the action.
/// @dev The digest is `FinalPqQuorum.digest(verifyingContract, actionDomain, anchorBlock,
/// keccak256(abi.encode(nonce, payloadDigest)))`. The counter is burned BEFORE verification, so an
/// approval set is spent whether or not it turns out to be sufficient.
///
/// The seal is required rather than optional: membership is the hybrid class, and an approval
/// carrying only the lattice vote is not an approval here.
/// @param verifyingContract The contract the approvals are for, and whose counter is burned.
/// @param actionDomain One of the `DOMAIN_*` constants, so an approval to grant cannot be replayed to
/// revoke.
/// @param payloadDigest The action's own arguments, folded.
/// @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at.
/// @param approvals The registrar approvals, each carrying both families.
function _requireRegistrarQuorum(
address verifyingContract,
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) private {
if (registrarThreshold == 0) revert RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
uint64 nonce = _gateNonce[verifyingContract];
_gateNonce[verifyingContract] = nonce + 1;
bytes32 quorumDigest = FinalPqQuorum.digest(
verifyingContract, actionDomain, anchorBlock, keccak256(abi.encode(nonce, payloadDigest))
);
uint256 valid = FinalPqQuorum.require_(
this,
approvals,
quorumDigest,
ROLE_REGISTRAR,
registrarThreshold,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
true
);
emit RegistrarQuorumApproved(verifyingContract, actionDomain, nonce, valid);
}
/**
* @notice Set how many sealed registrar approvals a membership mutation needs.
* @dev The bootstrap admin while the window is open; the current registrar quorum afterwards, so a
* registrar set that grows or shrinks can move the threshold to match itself.
*
* Refuses a threshold the sealable registrars cannot meet, and refuses zero. Both are a registry
* that can never be written to again, and the way that presents is every membership mutation
* reverting forever with nothing naming the threshold as the cause.
* @param threshold How many sealed approvals a mutation needs. Must be reachable and non-zero.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at. Ignored while bootstrap is open.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open.
*/
function setRegistrarThreshold(
uint256 threshold,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_SET_REGISTRAR_THRESHOLD, keccak256(abi.encode(threshold)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
if (threshold == 0) revert RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
uint256 sealable = sealableMemberCount(ROLE_REGISTRAR);
if (sealable < threshold) revert RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(sealable, threshold);
registrarThreshold = threshold;
emit RegistrarThresholdSet(threshold);
}
/// @notice The replay counter the next registrar approval for `caller` must be made over.
/// @dev One counter per verifying contract, so an approval collected for one contract's configuration
/// cannot be spent on another's. A caller reads this to build the digest its registrars will sign.
/// @param caller The verifying contract the approvals will name — this registry for its own mutations.
/// @return The value the next approval must bind.
function gateNonceOf(address caller) external view returns (uint64) {
return _gateNonce[caller];
}
// -------------------------------------------------------- LMS signers
/**
* @notice The roster identity of an LMS public key.
* @dev Byte-identical to `FinalRootAuthority.signerId` on the execution chains. Restated rather than
* imported because the two live on different chains and no import would make them one value —
* which is precisely why a test pins them together. A drift here would make every lookup miss while
* looking perfectly well-formed.
*
* The height is bound into the fingerprint as well as the root, because a leaf commits to a node
* number derived from it, so a signer free to vary the height could vary the numbering.
* @param keyId The LMS key identifier.
* @param height The Merkle tree height.
* @param root The LMS public key.
* @return The fingerprint an execution chain's roster names.
*/
function lmsSignerId(bytes16 keyId, uint8 height, bytes32 root) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(keyId, height, root));
}
/**
* @notice Record the hash-based (LMS) signing key an already-registered account holds for one chain.
* @dev Membership-gated, like every other write here.
*
* Deliberately NOT a certificate: an LMS key is a capability of an existing identity, not an
* identity of its own. Binding it to an account means it inherits that account's revocation, so
* retiring a compromised operator is one action rather than one action per key they hold.
*
* A rotation records the SUPERSEDED fingerprint into the revocation log in the same transaction, so
* the execution chains' suspension lane never depends on someone noticing. The superseded
* fingerprint is left BOUND to this account rather than cleared, because attribution is history.
*
* A zero `chainId` is a tooling mistake rather than an attack — the slot it occupies is
* self-consistent and no authority consults it — so the publisher refuses it off chain and this
* contract spends no bytecode on the check.
* @param account Must already be registered and not revoked.
* @param chainId The execution chain this key is armed for.
* @param keyId The LMS key identifier, hashed into every step of a signature under it.
* @param height The Merkle tree height, 1 through 24.
* @param root The LMS public key. Zero commits to no tree and is refused.
* @param version Strictly increasing per account and chain. A rotation that does not advance it is
* refused, so a replayed registration cannot reinstate a key the operator has moved off.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at. Ignored while bootstrap is open.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open.
*/
function registerLmsKey(
address account,
uint64 chainId,
bytes16 keyId,
uint8 height,
bytes32 root,
uint64 version,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REGISTER_LMS_KEY,
keccak256(abi.encode(account, chainId, keyId, height, root, version)),
anchorBlock,
approvals
);
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (id.revoked) revert CertificateIsRevoked(id.certHash);
// A zero chain id is a tooling mistake, not an attack: the slot it
// would occupy is self-consistent and no authority consults it. The
// publisher refuses it; EIP-170 pressure keeps the check off-chain.
if (height == 0 || height > 24) revert LmsHeightOutOfRange(height);
if (root == bytes32(0)) revert LmsRootIsZero();
// Version lineage is PER account and chain: the same operator is a different signer on every chain,
// so one chain starting at version 1 says nothing about another already being at version 3.
LmsKey storage existing = _lmsKey[account][chainId];
// An empty slot holds version 0, so this alone also refuses a version-0
// registration — versions start at 1.
if (version <= existing.version) {
revert VersionNotNewer(existing.version, version);
}
bytes32 signerId = lmsSignerId(keyId, height, root);
address boundTo = _lmsBinding[signerId].account;
if (boundTo != address(0) && boundTo != account) {
revert LmsKeyAlreadyBound(signerId, boundTo);
}
// The fingerprint being superseded, captured before the slot moves —
// `existing` is a storage pointer and reads the NEW key afterwards.
bytes32 superseded = existing.registered
? lmsSignerId(existing.keyId, existing.height, existing.root)
: bytes32(0);
// The superseded fingerprint is left bound to this account rather than
// cleared. It is history: a signature made under the old key was made
// by this operator, and a lookup that stopped resolving would make that
// unprovable after the fact.
_lmsKey[account][chainId] = LmsKey(keyId, height, root, version, true);
_lmsBinding[signerId] = LmsBinding(account, chainId);
emit LmsKeyRegistered(account, signerId, chainId, keyId, height, root, version);
// Supersession is a PERMANENT transition — the old fingerprint stops
// being this slot's current key and nothing re-registers it (a
// re-registration of the same material is the same fingerprint, which
// the guard below leaves alone). Recorded same-tx so the execution
// chains' suspension lane never depends on someone noticing.
if (superseded != bytes32(0) && superseded != signerId) {
_recordRevokedSigner(superseded);
}
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/// @notice The LMS key an account holds for one chain, if any.
/// @dev Keyed per account AND per chain, because a single-use hash-based counter is only complete while
/// the key it names signs for one chain. `registered` is the field to branch on; the zero struct
/// means no key rather than a key of zeroes.
/// @param account The identity to read.
/// @param chainId The chain the key is armed for.
/// @return The stored key, copied to memory.
function lmsKeyOf(address account, uint64 chainId) external view returns (LmsKey memory) {
return _lmsKey[account][chainId];
}
/// @notice What a fingerprint is bound to: the account that registered it and the chain it signs for.
/// @dev The binding survives supersession, because attribution is history: a signature made under a
/// retired key was still made by that operator, and a lookup that stopped resolving would make that
/// unprovable after the fact. Standing is a separate question, answered by {lmsSignerIsLive}.
///
/// The revocation log's permanence gate reads this to find the slot a fingerprint belongs to; that
/// slot's current key is what separates a superseded fingerprint, which is permanent and
/// recordable, from a merely lapsed one, which renewal undoes.
/// @param signerId The fingerprint to resolve.
/// @return account The account that registered it, or zero for a fingerprint never registered.
/// @return chainId The chain that registration was for, or zero alongside a zero account.
function lmsBindingOf(bytes32 signerId) external view returns (address account, uint64 chainId) {
LmsBinding storage binding = _lmsBinding[signerId];
return (binding.account, binding.chainId);
}
/**
* @notice Whether a signer fingerprint is held by a standing, unrevoked account.
* @dev The question a verifier actually has. An execution chain's authority roster names fingerprints
* and learns nothing else about them, so without this the keys behind those names are
* unanswerable from the state plane.
*
* Standing is asked through {isActive} rather than by spelling the conditions out again, because a
* second spelling is how two answers drift: an expired identity already holds no role, and a signer
* lookup that disagreed would leave a roster satisfiable by an operator the rest of the registry
* has stopped honouring.
*
* Live means the CURRENT key of the fingerprint's own account-and-chain slot, not merely one this
* account ever held. A superseded fingerprint stays attributable but stops being live, and a
* rotation on one chain says nothing about the same operator's key on another.
* @param signerId The fingerprint an authority roster names.
* @return live Whether the fingerprint is that slot's current key and the account still stands.
* @return account The account the fingerprint is bound to, or zero when none ever registered it.
*/
function lmsSignerIsLive(bytes32 signerId) external view returns (bool live, address account) {
LmsBinding storage binding = _lmsBinding[signerId];
account = binding.account;
if (account == address(0)) return (false, address(0));
// `isActive`, not a registered/revoked pair spelled out here. The
// certificate validity window is part of standing: an expired identity
// already holds no role, and a signer lookup that disagreed would leave
// a roster satisfiable by an operator the rest of the registry has
// stopped honouring. Spelling the condition out a second time is how
// the two drift apart.
if (!isActive(account)) return (false, account);
// The CURRENT key of the fingerprint's own (account, chain) slot, not
// merely one this account ever held: a superseded fingerprint stays
// attributable but stops being live, and a rotation on one chain says
// nothing about the same operator's key on another.
LmsKey storage k = _lmsKey[account][binding.chainId];
live = k.registered && lmsSignerId(k.keyId, k.height, k.root) == signerId;
}
/// @notice Close the bootstrap window. Irreversible.
/// @dev Refuses while the registrar quorum is unset or unreachable, because sealing then would leave a
/// registry nobody can ever write to again — including to fix the threshold that locked it. The
/// count is of registrars that can SEAL: a certificate authority carrying the registrar role is
/// registered from a certificate with no seal slot and can never contribute an approval, so
/// counting role bits alone would seal onto a quorum that looks reachable and is not.
///
/// Clears the admin as well as setting the flag, so no single-caller path survives the seal.
function sealBootstrap() external {
if (msg.sender != bootstrapAdmin) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
if (bootstrapSealed) revert BootstrapAlreadySealed();
if (registrarThreshold == 0) revert RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
uint256 sealable = sealableMemberCount(ROLE_REGISTRAR);
if (sealable < registrarThreshold) {
revert RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(sealable, registrarThreshold);
}
bootstrapSealed = true;
bootstrapAdmin = address(0);
emit BootstrapSealed(msg.sender);
}
// ------------------------------------------------- state-plane wiring
/**
* @notice Wire the state trees and the revocation log, once, inside the bootstrap window.
* @dev One-shot because both pointers are TRUST TOPOLOGY: the trees pointer decides where the
* wallet-creation admission set is written, and the log pointer decides where permanent standing
* losses are recorded. A re-wireable pointer would be a key over both.
*
* It cannot be a constructor argument, because both of those contracts take THIS registry as one of
* theirs. The deploy tooling calls it in the same nonce-fixed block that deploys them, before any
* identity is registered, which is why the projection is silently skipped while the pointers are
* zero rather than reverting.
* @param stateTrees_ The state-trees contract that owns tree 8. Zero is refused.
* @param revocationLog_ The append-only log of retired signer fingerprints. Zero is refused.
*/
function wireStatePlane(address stateTrees_, address revocationLog_) external {
if (bootstrapSealed || msg.sender != bootstrapAdmin) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
if (stateTrees != address(0) || revocationLog != address(0)) revert StatePlaneAlreadyWired();
if (stateTrees_ == address(0) || revocationLog_ == address(0)) revert ZeroStatePlane();
stateTrees = stateTrees_;
revocationLog = revocationLog_;
emit StatePlaneWired(stateTrees_, revocationLog_);
}
/// @notice Refresh `account`'s tree-8 leaf in the state trees, same transaction.
/// @dev Skipped while the plane is unwired, which is a bootstrap-window state the deploy tooling closes
/// before the first registration, and never otherwise. The leaf VALUE is derived by the trees
/// contract from this registry's post-mutation state, so there is nothing here to get wrong beyond
/// forgetting to call it — which is why every mutation calls it, including the one that cannot
/// change the leaf.
/// @param account The identity whose leaf is stale.
function _projectIdentity(address account) private {
address trees = stateTrees;
if (trees == address(0)) return;
address[] memory one = new address[](1);
one[0] = account;
IIdentityLeafSink(trees).syncIdentityLeaves(one);
}
/// @notice Record a permanently retired signer fingerprint into the revocation log, same transaction.
/// @dev Skipped while the log is unwired, and skipped when somebody already recorded the fingerprint
/// through the log's permissionless door — the log refuses a duplicate, and a membership mutation
/// must not be revertible by a stranger who front-ran its bookkeeping.
/// @param signerId The fingerprint that has lost standing for good.
function _recordRevokedSigner(bytes32 signerId) private {
address log = revocationLog;
if (log == address(0)) return;
if (IRevocationRecorder(log).recorded(signerId)) return;
IRevocationRecorder(log).record(signerId);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------- registration
/**
* @title Admission Proof
* @notice The holder's proof of possession at admission: both live-stage families over the admission
* digest.
* @dev There is no root keypair and no issuer signature on this path. The chain admits, and the two
* signatures presented at creation are the HOLDER's, verified by the precompiles inside the same
* transaction that writes the record. Possession lives in the TRANSACTION, never in the artifact:
* a public certificate is a document anyone may hold, so presenting one proves nothing.
*/
struct AdmissionProof {
/// The holder's ML-DSA-87 signature under the live TRANSACTION key, over the admission digest.
bytes mlDsaSignature;
/// The holder's SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature under the live ACCESS key, over the same digest. Two
/// families over one message, so neither a lattice break nor a hash-function break alone admits an
/// identity.
bytes slhDsaSignature;
}
/**
* @notice Register or rotate a Final Wallet identity from its two public certificates.
* @dev **Both stages, together.** A wallet has four keys in two stages and the recovery pair is
* PRE-COMMITTED — written at wallet initialization from the same certificate set that determined
* the wallet's address, which is why enabling post-quantum mode later takes no key arguments. The
* two certificates must share a serial: a serial is per certificate SET, so two stages that
* disagree about it are two different wallets.
*
* **Chain-attested means pinned, per stage:** the chain's issuer name and authority key, depth
* exactly 1 so the certificate hangs directly under the chain, and `maxDelegationDepth == depth` so
* the holder issues nothing. That immutable pair is what {identityTreeLeafOf} discriminates record
* kinds by.
*
* Issuance authority is the registrar quorum and possession is the holder's own proof; there is no
* root keypair anywhere and no certificate-authority signature over this admission.
* @param account The wallet address the certificate set derives.
* @param liveTbs The live certificate's TBS bytes: the live transaction and access keys.
* @param recoveryTbs The recovery certificate's TBS bytes: the pre-committed recovery pair.
* @param proof The holder's two signatures over the admission digest — the live transaction key
* (ML-DSA-87) and the live access key (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s), both verified in the precompiles
* inside this transaction.
* @param roles Capability bitmask. The one thing the certificates do not say, because capability is this
* system's decision rather than the certificate's.
* @param version Monotonic. A rotation that does not advance it is refused.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at. Ignored while bootstrap is open.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open. The digest binds the
* account, both certificates' bytes, the roles and the version.
* @return certHash The handle the live certificate is now known by.
*/
function registerWallet(
address account,
bytes calldata liveTbs,
bytes calldata recoveryTbs,
AdmissionProof calldata proof,
uint256 roles,
uint64 version,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external returns (bytes32 certHash) {
// Read BEFORE the authority check: the quorum path burns this counter
// inside `_requireRegistrarQuorum`, and the proof must bind the value
// the round was built over. The bootstrap path burns it explicitly in
// `_requireAdmissionProof`, so an admission is one-shot in both regimes.
uint64 admissionNonce = _gateNonce[address(this)];
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REGISTER_WALLET,
keccak256(
abi.encode(account, keccak256(liveTbs), keccak256(recoveryTbs), roles, version)
),
anchorBlock,
approvals
);
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory l = FinalCertificate.parseLive(liveTbs);
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory r = FinalCertificate.parseRecovery(recoveryTbs);
if (l.serial != r.serial) revert StagesDisagree(l.serial, r.serial);
_requireChainAttestedEndEntity(l);
_requireChainAttestedEndEntity(r);
_requireAdmissionProof(account, l, r.certHash, proof, admissionNonce);
certHash = l.certHash;
_write(account, l, r, roles, version, false);
}
/**
* @notice Register or rotate an ISSUER: a third party, or one of this system's own intermediates, that
* signs certificates off chain with the keys registered here.
* @dev Admission is chain-native like any identity — the registrar quorum authorises, and the holder's
* own proof of possession establishes that the party controls the keys it is claiming. The
* delegation rules survive as LINEAGE: a nested issuer's depth, delegation bound and
* `AuthorityKeyId` must chain to its registered parent. No parent signs anything; this chain's
* admission IS the issuance.
*
* A registered issuer always expires, and its window is bounded by {MAX_ISSUER_VALIDITY_MS}.
*
* An institution must carry its real ISO 3166 country in its subject name, matching the
* `jurisdiction` field of its institution extension. That is enforced at the door because a
* verifier's legal recourse starts with knowing where an issuer answers for itself.
*
* `ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY` is added to whatever `roles` asks for, rather than being required in
* it: the capability is what this entry point means, so it cannot be forgotten in an argument.
* @param account The issuer's account on this chain.
* @param tbs The issuer certificate's TBS bytes: two cert-signing keys, ML-DSA-87 and
* SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s, and no recovery stage — renewing an issuer is re-issuing, a governance act
* rather than a key rotation.
* @param parent The registered parent issuer for a nested intermediate; zero for an issuer hanging
* directly under the chain.
* @param proof The issuer's own two cert-signing keys over the admission digest. The recovery-handle
* slot in that digest is zero, because there is no recovery stage to bind.
* @param roles Capability bitmask, over and above the certificate-authority bit this call adds.
* @param version Monotonic. A rotation that does not advance it is refused.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at. Ignored while bootstrap is open.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open. The digest binds the
* account, the certificate bytes, the parent, the roles and the version.
* @return certHash The handle the registered certificate is now known by.
*/
function registerIssuer(
address account,
bytes calldata tbs,
address parent,
AdmissionProof calldata proof,
uint256 roles,
uint64 version,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external returns (bytes32 certHash) {
uint64 admissionNonce = _gateNonce[address(this)];
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REGISTER_ISSUER,
keccak256(abi.encode(account, keccak256(tbs), parent, roles, version)),
anchorBlock,
approvals
);
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c = FinalCertificate.parseCa(tbs);
// An issuer that cannot sign is an end entity wearing a profile —
// and an end entity belongs in `registerWallet`.
if (c.depth == 0 || c.maxDelegationDepth <= c.depth) {
revert IssuerCannotSign(c.depth, c.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (c.notAfter == 0) revert IssuerMustExpire();
if (c.notAfter - c.notBefore > MAX_ISSUER_VALIDITY_MS) {
revert IssuerValidityTooLong(c.notBefore, c.notAfter);
}
if (c.issuerDnHash != CHAIN_ISSUER_DN_HASH) revert WrongIssuerDn(c.issuerDnHash);
_requireLineage(parent, c);
_requireJurisdiction(c);
_requireAdmissionProof(account, c, bytes32(0), proof, admissionNonce);
certHash = c.certHash;
_write(account, c, c, roles | ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY, version, true);
}
/// @notice The validity ceiling a registered issuer's certificate may not exceed, in this chain's
/// milliseconds: two 366-day years.
/// @dev Expiry is the passive half of an issuer's lifecycle — the touchpoint that proves an issuer is
/// still there without anyone having to act — so a registered issuer always carries a real
/// `NotAfter` and a bounded window. Renewal re-issues under the same registered keys with a version
/// bump rather than extending a certificate in place.
uint64 public constant MAX_ISSUER_VALIDITY_MS = 2 * 366 days * 1000;
/// @notice Pin one stage of a chain-attested end-entity certificate.
/// @dev Three checks, run once per stage: the certificate names the chain's authority key, it carries the
/// chain's issuer name, and its depth pair is exactly that of an end entity — depth 1, directly
/// under the chain, issuing nothing. The depth pair is immutable per version, which is why
/// {identityTreeLeafOf} discriminates record kinds by it rather than by a role bit.
/// @param c The parsed certificate stage.
function _requireChainAttestedEndEntity(FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c) private pure {
if (c.authorityKeyId != CHAIN_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID) revert NotChainAttested(c.authorityKeyId);
if (c.issuerDnHash != CHAIN_ISSUER_DN_HASH) revert WrongIssuerDn(c.issuerDnHash);
if (c.depth != 1 || c.maxDelegationDepth != c.depth) {
revert NotAnEndEntity(c.depth, c.maxDelegationDepth);
}
}
/// @notice Check a nested issuer's lineage to its registered parent.
/// @dev Delegation is governed by DEPTH, not by a boolean: a parent may sign only while
/// `depth < maxDelegationDepth`, a child sits exactly one level down so it cannot skip levels to
/// escape that bound, and its own bound may never widen past its parent's. The child's
/// `AuthorityKeyId` must equal the parent's `SubjectKeyId`, which is the link the chain follows.
///
/// A zero `parent` means the issuer hangs directly under the chain: it must then name the chain's
/// own authority key and sit at depth 1. No parent SIGNS anything here — admission by this chain is
/// the issuance, and lineage is what keeps the delegation bounds honest across it.
/// @param parent The registered parent issuer, or zero for one directly under the chain.
/// @param c The parsed issuer certificate.
function _requireLineage(address parent, FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c) private view {
if (parent == address(0)) {
if (c.authorityKeyId != CHAIN_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID) {
revert NotChainAttested(c.authorityKeyId);
}
if (c.depth != 1) revert WrongDepth(c.depth, 1);
return;
}
Identity storage ca = _identity[parent];
if (!hasRole(parent, ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY)) {
revert IssuerNotACertificateAuthority(parent);
}
// Delegation is governed by depth, not by a boolean. `Depth <
// MaxDelegationDepth` permits signing, and a child sits exactly one
// level down — an issuer cannot skip levels to escape its own bound.
if (ca.depth >= ca.maxDelegationDepth) {
revert IssuerMayNotSign(parent, ca.depth, ca.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (c.depth != ca.depth + 1) revert WrongDepth(c.depth, ca.depth + 1);
if (c.maxDelegationDepth > ca.maxDelegationDepth) {
revert DelegationWidened(c.maxDelegationDepth, ca.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (c.authorityKeyId != ca.subjectKeyId) {
revert AuthorityKeyIdMismatch(c.authorityKeyId, ca.subjectKeyId);
}
}
/// @notice Refuse an issuer whose subject name carries no jurisdiction, or one that disagrees with its
/// institution extension.
/// @dev An issuer that answers for itself somewhere is an issuer a verifier has recourse against, so a
/// registered institution must name its jurisdiction and must name it once. Only the trust root is
/// jurisdiction-silent, because the root is the worldwide network rather than a legal entity.
///
/// The rule is a real ISO 3166 alpha-2 `C=` component in the subject name, equal to the
/// `jurisdiction` field of the certificate's institution extension. The name is in canonical
/// comma-separated form, so `C=` matches at the start or immediately after a comma, and the
/// component value is exactly two bytes — a longer one is a different component that happens to
/// start with the same letter.
/// @param c The parsed issuer certificate.
function _requireJurisdiction(FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c) private pure {
bytes memory dn = c.subjectDn;
bytes2 country;
bool found = false;
for (uint256 i = 0; i + 4 <= dn.length; i++) {
if ((i == 0 || dn[i - 1] == ",") && dn[i] == "C" && dn[i + 1] == "=") {
// Exactly two bytes, then end-of-DN or the next component.
if (i + 4 < dn.length && dn[i + 4] != ",") revert JurisdictionMissing();
country = bytes2(bytes.concat(dn[i + 2], dn[i + 3]));
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found) revert JurisdictionMissing();
// Institution extension: legalNameLength ‖ legalName ‖
// registrationNoLength ‖ registrationNo ‖ jurisdictionLength ‖
// jurisdiction. The jurisdiction must EQUAL the DN's country.
bytes memory ext = c.institutionExt;
if (ext.length < 6) revert JurisdictionMissing();
uint256 q = 2 + (uint256(uint8(ext[0])) << 8 | uint256(uint8(ext[1])));
if (ext.length < q + 2) revert JurisdictionMissing();
q += 2 + (uint256(uint8(ext[q])) << 8 | uint256(uint8(ext[q + 1])));
if (ext.length < q + 2) revert JurisdictionMissing();
uint256 jLen = uint256(uint8(ext[q])) << 8 | uint256(uint8(ext[q + 1]));
q += 2;
if (jLen != 2 || ext.length < q + 2) revert JurisdictionMismatch();
if (bytes2(bytes.concat(ext[q], ext[q + 1])) != country) revert JurisdictionMismatch();
}
/// @notice Verify the holder's proof of possession over the admission digest.
/// @dev Both live-stage families, in the precompiles, inside this transaction: an ML-DSA-87 signature
/// under the certificate's transaction key and an SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature under its access
/// key. Possession lives in the TRANSACTION rather than in the artifact, so holding a copy of
/// somebody's public certificate proves nothing.
///
/// The keys come out of the certificate being admitted, not out of calldata, which is what makes
/// this a proof rather than a self-signed assertion.
///
/// Burns the gate nonce on the bootstrap path — the quorum path burned it already — so an admission
/// is one-shot in both regimes and a captured proof cannot be replayed into a second registration.
/// @param account The account being admitted; named in the revert so a failure is attributable.
/// @param live The parsed live-stage certificate whose keys verify the proof.
/// @param recoveryCertHash The recovery certificate's handle, bound into the digest; zero for an issuer.
/// @param proof The holder's two signatures.
/// @param admissionNonce The gate-nonce value the digest was built over.
function _requireAdmissionProof(
address account,
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory live,
bytes32 recoveryCertHash,
AdmissionProof calldata proof,
uint64 admissionNonce
) private {
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(
keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_IDENTITY_ADMISSION,
block.chainid,
address(this),
live.certHash,
recoveryCertHash,
admissionNonce
)
)
);
if (
!FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(live.transactionKey, message, proof.mlDsaSignature)
|| !FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(live.accessKey, message, proof.slhDsaSignature)
) revert AdmissionProofInvalid(account);
if (_gateNonce[address(this)] == admissionNonce) {
_gateNonce[address(this)] = admissionNonce + 1;
}
}
/**
* @notice Commit one parsed certificate set to storage and project the result.
* @dev The single write path behind both registration entry points, so a wallet record and an issuer
* record cannot diverge in how they are stored. Every authorization, parse and pin has already run;
* what is left is the ordering that keeps the record consistent with its indexes.
*
* A rotation RELEASES the previous certificate's binding rather than revoking it: a superseded
* certificate and a compromised one are different facts, and revocation is the louder of the two.
* The sender binding moves with the transaction key for the same reason — a rotation is the account
* disowning that key, and a gate that still resolved the old sender would honour a retired key.
*
* A certificate already bound to another account is refused, and so is a version that does not
* advance, so neither a replayed registration nor a stolen certificate can take a record over.
* @param account The identity being written. Zero is refused.
* @param live The parsed live-stage certificate; for an issuer, its single certificate.
* @param recovery The parsed recovery-stage certificate; for an issuer, the same value, discarded.
* @param roles The complete capability bitmask to store.
* @param version Monotonic per account. Must exceed the stored value.
* @param isCa Whether this is a certificate authority, which stores no recovery, seal or
* encapsulation material.
*/
function _write(
address account,
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory live,
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory recovery,
uint256 roles,
uint64 version,
bool isCa
) private {
if (account == address(0)) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (certificateRevoked[live.certHash]) revert CertificateIsRevoked(live.certHash);
address boundTo = accountOfCertificate[live.certHash];
if (boundTo != address(0) && boundTo != account) {
revert CertificateAlreadyBound(live.certHash, boundTo);
}
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) {
_accounts.push(account);
id.registered = true;
} else {
if (version <= id.version) revert VersionNotNewer(id.version, version);
if (id.revoked) revert CertificateIsRevoked(id.certHash);
// A rotation releases the previous certificate's binding. It is NOT
// revoked — a superseded certificate and a compromised one are
// different facts and revocation is the louder of the two.
if (id.certHash != live.certHash) delete accountOfCertificate[id.certHash];
}
id.certHash = live.certHash;
id.recoveryCertHash = recovery.certHash;
id.serial = live.serial;
id.subjectKeyId = live.subjectKeyId;
id.roles = roles;
id.depth = live.depth;
id.maxDelegationDepth = live.maxDelegationDepth;
id.notBefore = live.notBefore;
id.notAfter = live.notAfter;
id.version = version;
// The sender binding moves with the transaction key. The old sender is
// released rather than kept: a rotation is the account disowning that
// key, and a gate that still resolved it would honour a retired key.
address sender = senderFor(live.transactionKey);
address senderBoundTo = accountOfSender[sender];
if (senderBoundTo != address(0) && senderBoundTo != account) {
revert SenderAlreadyBound(sender, senderBoundTo);
}
if (_activeTransactionKey[account].length != 0) {
address previousSender = senderFor(_activeTransactionKey[account]);
if (previousSender != sender) delete accountOfSender[previousSender];
}
accountOfSender[sender] = account;
_activeTransactionKey[account] = live.transactionKey;
_activeAccessKey[account] = live.accessKey;
// A CA has no recovery pair; the two active slots are all it has.
_recoveryTransactionKey[account] = isCa ? bytes("") : recovery.transactionKey;
_recoveryAccessKey[account] = isCa ? bytes("") : recovery.accessKey;
// Cleared on a rotation to a certificate without one, for the same
// reason the encapsulation pair is: a stale seal surviving a rotation
// would let a retired key keep co-signing execution.
_activeSealKey[account] = isCa ? bytes("") : live.sealKey;
// The encapsulation pair, validated before it is stored.
//
// **The registry is where a sender looks up "encapsulate to this
// party", so a malformed key here is not a bad record — it is an
// account nobody can seal an intent to.** The discovery would happen at
// the first attempt, and on the hybrid path it would happen as a pair
// silently reduced to one family, which is identical on the wire. The
// precompiles make it a refusal at registration instead.
//
// Neither is a re-implementation of the KEM: `0x0203` runs FIPS 203
// §7.2's own encapsulation-key check and `0x0207` runs the structural
// check HQC-5's encoding admits. Encapsulation is a sender operation
// and decapsulation needs the secret key, so nothing more belongs here.
//
// A CA is sealed to by nobody and carries no encapsulation stage, so
// its slots are cleared rather than checked.
_storeKemPair(account, isCa, live.kemMlKem, live.kemHqc, true);
_storeKemPair(account, isCa, recovery.kemMlKem, recovery.kemHqc, false);
accountOfCertificate[live.certHash] = account;
emit IdentityRegistered(account, live.certHash, roles, version);
// Same-tx: a registration or rotation is visible to every execution
// chain's admission set the moment it is visible here.
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/**
* @notice Store one stage's encapsulation pair, or clear it.
* @dev Empty is legitimate and is not the same as absent-and-wrong: a certificate authority has no
* encapsulation stage, and a certificate may be issued without one. The parser has already refused
* the half-populated case, so by here the pair is both or neither.
*
* Cleared rather than left alone on a rotation to an empty pair. A stale key surviving a rotation is
* a sender encapsulating to a credential the account has disowned, and the message then never
* decrypts — the failure mode with no error attached, and the one this pairing exists to avoid.
* @param account The identity being written.
* @param isCa Whether the record is a certificate authority, which carries no encapsulation stage.
* @param mlKem The stage's ML-KEM-1024 key, or empty.
* @param hqc The stage's HQC-5 key, or empty.
* @param isLive Whether this is the live stage; false selects the recovery slots.
*/
function _storeKemPair(address account, bool isCa, bytes memory mlKem, bytes memory hqc, bool isLive)
private
{
if (isCa || mlKem.length == 0) {
delete (isLive ? _activeKemMlKem : _recoveryKemMlKem)[account];
delete (isLive ? _activeKemHqc : _recoveryKemHqc)[account];
return;
}
if (!FinalChainPrecompiles.isWellFormedMlKem1024(mlKem)) {
revert MalformedEncapsulationKey(account, FinalCertificate.ALG_ML_KEM_1024);
}
if (!FinalChainPrecompiles.isWellFormedHqc5(hqc)) {
revert MalformedEncapsulationKey(account, FinalCertificate.ALG_HQC_5);
}
if (isLive) {
_activeKemMlKem[account] = mlKem;
_activeKemHqc[account] = hqc;
} else {
_recoveryKemMlKem[account] = mlKem;
_recoveryKemHqc[account] = hqc;
}
}
/// @notice Grant or withdraw capabilities without rotating keys.
/// @dev Separate from registration because the two have different cadences: a role changes when a
/// service's job changes, a key changes when it is compromised or aged out. Folding them together
/// would force a key rotation to express a role change, which is the more dangerous of the two
/// operations doing the work of the safer one.
/// @param account Must already be registered and not revoked.
/// @param roles The complete new capability bitmask; it replaces the old one rather than merging.
/// @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at.
/// @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open.
function setRoles(
address account,
uint256 roles,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_SET_ROLES, keccak256(abi.encode(account, roles)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (id.revoked) revert CertificateIsRevoked(id.certHash);
uint256 previous = id.roles;
id.roles = roles;
_requireRegistrarQuorumReachable();
emit IdentityRolesChanged(account, previous, roles);
// Roles are not in the tree-8 leaf, so this rewrites the same value —
// kept anyway so "every identity mutation projects" has no exceptions
// to remember.
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/// @notice Refuse a mutation that would leave the registrar quorum unreachable.
/// @dev Once bootstrap is sealed, that is the one change nothing could ever undo: a registry whose
/// threshold exceeds its sealable membership can never be written to again, including to fix
/// itself. Checked AFTER the write so the count reflects the mutation being attempted.
function _requireRegistrarQuorumReachable() private view {
if (!bootstrapSealed) return;
uint256 sealable = sealableMemberCount(ROLE_REGISTRAR);
if (sealable < registrarThreshold) {
revert RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(sealable, registrarThreshold);
}
}
/// @notice Revoke an identity and its certificate. Irreversible.
/// @dev Clears the roles as well as setting the flag. Both are checked everywhere, but leaving a revoked
/// record carrying roles invites a future reader that checks only one of them. The fingerprints of
/// the named LMS slots are recorded into the revocation log after the flag lands, so the log's own
/// permanence gate sees the transition it requires.
/// @param account The identity to retire.
/// @param chainIds The chains whose LMS-key slots this account holds. The registrars supply the list and
/// the approval digest binds it, because a mapping cannot enumerate its own keys. A chain with no
/// slot is skipped, and a fingerprint an incomplete list missed stays permanently recordable
/// through the revocation log's permissionless door, since a revoked account never regains
/// standing.
/// @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at.
/// @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open.
function revoke(
address account,
uint64[] calldata chainIds,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REVOKE, keccak256(abi.encode(account, chainIds)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
id.revoked = true;
id.roles = 0;
certificateRevoked[id.certHash] = true;
_requireRegistrarQuorumReachable();
emit IdentityRevoked(account, id.certHash);
// AFTER the flag lands, so the log's own gate sees the permanent
// transition it requires.
for (uint256 i = 0; i < chainIds.length; i++) {
LmsKey storage k = _lmsKey[account][chainIds[i]];
if (k.registered) _recordRevokedSigner(lmsSignerId(k.keyId, k.height, k.root));
}
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/**
* @notice Root-plane GLOBAL certificate revocation, by `certHash`.
* @dev The half of the revocation lane that gates registration and covers break-glass: any certificate —
* registered here, issued off chain, or never seen — can be killed by handle under the registrar
* quorum, because the handle is all a break-glass caller may have.
*
* When the handle is a registered identity's CURRENT certificate the identity falls with it: flag,
* roles cleared, same-transaction projection. So revoking by handle is never weaker than {revoke};
* it only skips the LMS-slot enumeration, and those fingerprints stay permanently recordable
* through the revocation log's own permissionless door.
* @param certHash The certificate to revoke. Need not correspond to any record.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open.
*/
function revokeCertificate(
bytes32 certHash,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE, keccak256(abi.encode(certHash)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
certificateRevoked[certHash] = true;
address bound = accountOfCertificate[certHash];
if (bound != address(0)) {
Identity storage id = _identity[bound];
if (!id.revoked) {
id.revoked = true;
id.roles = 0;
_requireRegistrarQuorumReachable();
emit IdentityRevoked(bound, certHash);
_projectIdentity(bound);
}
}
emit CertificateRevoked(certHash, address(0));
}
/**
* @notice The issuing identity's half of the revocation lane: a registered issuer revokes a certificate
* it signed off chain, by `certHash`.
* @dev This records WHO revoked, and a verifier honours the entry only when the recorded revoker is the
* certificate's own issuer — which the verifier knows, because it holds the certificate. It
* deliberately does NOT set the global `certificateRevoked` flag: that flag gates registration, and
* letting any registered issuer set it for an arbitrary handle would be a griefing lane over other
* people's certificates.
*
* Anyone may SUBMIT. Authority is the two signatures — the issuer's registered cert-signing keys
* over a digest binding this registry, this chain, the handle and the issuer's own gate nonce, both
* verified in the precompiles inside this transaction. The keys come from storage, so a submitter
* cannot supply the pair its own signatures verify under.
*
* One-way: the first revoker of a handle is recorded and a second write is refused, because
* "revoked twice by two parties" is two facts where this lane models one.
* @param issuer The registered certificate authority making the statement.
* @param certHash The certificate being revoked.
* @param proof The issuer's own ML-DSA-87 and SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signatures over the revocation digest.
*/
function revokeIssuedCertificate(
address issuer,
bytes32 certHash,
AdmissionProof calldata proof
) external {
if (!hasRole(issuer, ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY)) {
revert IssuerNotACertificateAuthority(issuer);
}
if (certificateRevokedBy[certHash] != address(0)) revert CertificateIsRevoked(certHash);
uint64 nonce = _gateNonce[issuer];
_gateNonce[issuer] = nonce + 1;
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(
keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_ISSUER_CERT_REVOCATION,
block.chainid,
address(this),
issuer,
certHash,
nonce
)
)
);
if (
!FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(
_activeTransactionKey[issuer], message, proof.mlDsaSignature
)
|| !FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(
_activeAccessKey[issuer], message, proof.slhDsaSignature
)
) revert AdmissionProofInvalid(issuer);
certificateRevokedBy[certHash] = issuer;
emit CertificateRevoked(certHash, issuer);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- views
/// @notice The full identity record.
/// @dev Returns the zero struct for an address no record claims, so `registered` is the field to branch
/// on rather than any of the hashes.
/// @param account The identity to read.
/// @return The stored record, copied to memory.
function identityOf(address account) external view returns (Identity memory) {
return _identity[account];
}
/// @notice The live transaction key, ML-DSA-87: what a quorum vote is verified against.
/// @dev Read from STORAGE by every quorum on this chain, never from a caller's argument — a key supplied
/// as calldata proves nothing, because anyone holding a keypair can sign under it.
/// @param account The identity to read.
/// @return The raw public key, or empty when the account holds none.
function activeTransactionKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _activeTransactionKey[account];
}
/// @notice The live access key, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s: identity, rotation, and guardianship.
/// @dev A different hardness assumption from the transaction key, so a lattice break leaves the key that
/// governs identity standing intact.
/// @param account The identity to read.
/// @return The raw public key, or empty when the account holds none.
function activeAccessKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _activeAccessKey[account];
}
/// @notice The seal key, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s: what `FinalPqQuorum` verifies an approval's seal against.
/// @dev A service's second hash-based key, distinct from its access key, so a quorum decision carries
/// one signature from each hardness assumption. Empty when the identity carries no seal, in which
/// case it cannot take part in a sealed quorum at all — which is why {sealableMemberCount} counts
/// this rather than counting role bits.
/// @param account The identity to read.
/// @return The raw public key, or empty when the account holds no seal.
function activeSealKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _activeSealKey[account];
}
/// @notice The recovery-stage transaction key, ML-DSA-87.
/// @dev Authorizes rotating this account's own credentials and nothing else — acting as a guardian is an
/// ordinary action for an account and uses the live keys. Empty for a certificate authority.
/// @param account The identity to read.
/// @return The raw public key, or empty when the account holds none.
function recoveryTransactionKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _recoveryTransactionKey[account];
}
/// @notice The recovery-stage access key, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s.
/// @dev The other half of the pre-committed recovery stage. Empty for a certificate authority, which has
/// no recovery stage at all.
/// @param account The identity to read.
/// @return The raw public key, or empty when the account holds none.
function recoveryAccessKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _recoveryAccessKey[account];
}
/// @notice The four signing-key commitments, in the order tree 1's leaf wants them.
/// @dev keccak, not SHA3: these feed `FinalWalletFactory.accountStateLeafHash`, which every execution
/// chain verifies with, and that one hashes with keccak. An account missing a slot commits to the
/// hash of the empty string rather than reverting, so the leaf stays buildable for a certificate
/// authority, which holds no recovery pair.
/// @param account The identity to commit to.
/// @return liveAccess Commitment to the live access key.
/// @return liveTransaction Commitment to the live transaction key.
/// @return recoveryAccess Commitment to the recovery access key.
/// @return recoveryTransaction Commitment to the recovery transaction key.
function keyCommitments(address account)
external
view
returns (
bytes32 liveAccess,
bytes32 liveTransaction,
bytes32 recoveryAccess,
bytes32 recoveryTransaction
)
{
liveAccess = keccak256(_activeAccessKey[account]);
liveTransaction = keccak256(_activeTransactionKey[account]);
recoveryAccess = keccak256(_recoveryAccessKey[account]);
recoveryTransaction = keccak256(_recoveryTransactionKey[account]);
}
/**
* @notice The tree-8 leaf `account` currently earns: the execution chains' identity leaf while the
* identity stands, zero once it does not.
* @dev The leaf VALUE is `keccak256(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF ‖ serial ‖ keysHash)` — byte-identical to
* `IdentityRootModule.identityLeafHash`, which is also the `certHash` inside a wallet's address
* derivation — with `keysHash` folded exactly as the certificate issuer folds it:
* `keccak256(activeAccess ‖ activeTransaction ‖ recoveryAccess ‖ recoveryTransaction ‖ activeKem ‖
* recoveryKem)`, six commitment words packed in slot order. The issuing tooling and this function
* are pinned against each other by test over the premined certificate fixtures, because a wallet
* whose address was derived from a different fold is a wallet no chain can admit.
*
* Zero — the empty slot's own value, unprovable as a leaf because no certificate hashes to it — for
* anything that must not admit a wallet creation: a revoked identity, one outside its validity
* window, and any certificate authority. The authority exclusion is STRUCTURAL rather than a role
* read: an end entity has `depth == maxDelegationDepth` because it issues nothing, an authority
* never does, and that pair is immutable per version where `roles` is not.
*
* Lives here rather than on the state-trees contract that consumes it because every input is this
* contract's storage, and the trees contract has no bytecode headroom to spare.
* @param account The identity to project. Reverts for an account with no record at all.
* @return The tree-8 leaf value, or zero while the identity does not stand.
*/
function identityTreeLeafOf(address account) external view returns (bytes32) {
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (id.revoked || !_withinValidity(id)) return bytes32(0);
if (id.depth != id.maxDelegationDepth) {
// An ISSUER exists in tree 8 under its own domain, so its record is stapleable for offline
// licence verification while the distinct domain keeps it out of wallet admission. `certHash`
// suffices — it covers the whole TBS and the verifier holds the certificate — `version` makes
// supersession move the leaf, and the third word RESERVES the issuer's own certificate-tree
// anchor, zero until one is wired. Zero-on-revoke above is load-bearing for both record kinds:
// a fresh staple is an unrevoked statement.
return keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_ISSUER_LEAF, id.certHash, uint64(id.version), bytes32(0))
);
}
bytes32 liveKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _activeKemMlKem[account], _activeKemHqc[account]));
bytes32 recoveryKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _recoveryKemMlKem[account], _recoveryKemHqc[account]));
bytes32 keysHash = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(
keccak256(_activeAccessKey[account]),
keccak256(_activeTransactionKey[account]),
keccak256(_recoveryAccessKey[account]),
keccak256(_recoveryTransactionKey[account]),
liveKem,
recoveryKem
)
);
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF, id.serial, keysHash));
}
/// @notice Per-stage encapsulation commitments, in the order the account-state leaf wants them.
/// @dev One word per STAGE, folded over both of that stage's encapsulation public keys under
/// `DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE`. The pair is the unit — an account holds both keys or neither — so
/// committing to them separately would model a state the protocol does not recognise, and every
/// downstream record would carry two words where one says the same thing.
///
/// An account whose certificate carries no encapsulation stage folds the empty string here rather
/// than reverting: the projection into the state trees must keep succeeding for it, and a leaf that
/// cannot be built is a party that cannot be revoked.
/// @param account The identity to commit to.
/// @return liveKem The live stage's encapsulation commitment.
/// @return recoveryKem The recovery stage's encapsulation commitment.
function kemCommitments(address account)
external
view
returns (bytes32 liveKem, bytes32 recoveryKem)
{
liveKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _activeKemMlKem[account], _activeKemHqc[account]));
recoveryKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _recoveryKemMlKem[account], _recoveryKemHqc[account]));
}
/// @notice The live-stage encapsulation keys themselves, for a party composing a sealed message.
/// @dev Returns both halves of the pair together because the pair is the unit: encapsulating to one
/// family alone is indistinguishable on the wire from a hybrid, and silently dropping the hedge is
/// the failure this pairing exists to prevent. Empty for an account with no encapsulation stage.
/// @param account The party to encapsulate to.
/// @return activeMlKem The lattice half, ML-KEM-1024.
/// @return activeHqc The code-based half, HQC-5.
function kemKeysOf(address account)
external
view
returns (bytes memory activeMlKem, bytes memory activeHqc)
{
return (_activeKemMlKem[account], _activeKemHqc[account]);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------- senders
/**
* @notice The sender address a transaction key produces on this chain.
* @dev `keccak256(uint8(4) ‖ publicKey)[12:]` — byte-identical to what the node derives from a
* post-quantum transaction envelope and to the backend's own derivation. The leading algorithm byte
* is what domain-separates it, so a key of another family can never derive the same address.
*
* Pure, so a client can compute the address from a certificate before the identity is registered —
* which is what lets an admission transaction be funded and submitted from the very sender it is
* about to bind.
* @param transactionKey The raw ML-DSA-87 public key.
* @return The sender address that key signs from.
*/
function senderFor(bytes memory transactionKey) public pure returns (address) {
return address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ENVELOPE_ALG_ML_DSA_87, transactionKey)))));
}
/// @notice The sender `account`'s transactions arrive from.
/// @dev The forward direction of {accountOfSender}, derived rather than stored, so it cannot disagree
/// with the transaction key on record.
/// @param account The identity to resolve.
/// @return The derived sender, or zero for an account with no transaction key on record.
function senderOf(address account) external view returns (address) {
bytes storage key = _activeTransactionKey[account];
if (key.length == 0) return address(0);
return senderFor(key);
}
/// @notice {hasRole} for a `msg.sender`: resolves the sender to its identity first.
/// @dev The form every `msg.sender` gate on this chain uses. A sender is derived from a transaction key
/// and holds no authority itself, so asking it directly would be asking the wrong address. False for
/// a sender no identity claims.
/// @param sender The address a transaction arrived from.
/// @param roleMask The capability required.
/// @return Whether the identity behind that sender stands and carries the whole mask.
function senderHasRole(address sender, uint256 roleMask) external view returns (bool) {
address account = accountOfSender[sender];
return account != address(0) && hasRole(account, roleMask);
}
/// @notice How many accounts carrying `roleMask` also hold a seal key — the members that can take part
/// in a sealed quorum.
/// @dev The count every membership threshold is checked against, because membership approvals are the
/// hybrid class and a member with no seal can never contribute one. A certificate authority
/// carrying `ROLE_REGISTRAR` is registered from a certificate with no seal slot, so it is counted
/// out here rather than being discovered at the first quorum that fails to reach its threshold.
/// @param roleMask The capability the quorum is over.
/// @return sealable How many standing accounts carry the mask and hold a seal key.
function sealableMemberCount(uint256 roleMask) public view returns (uint256 sealable) {
uint256 n = _accounts.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
address a = _accounts[i];
if (hasRole(a, roleMask) && _activeSealKey[a].length != 0) sealable++;
}
}
/// @notice Number of registered accounts.
/// @dev Never decreases: revocation clears a record's roles and sets its flag but leaves it in the list,
/// so an index handed out once keeps pointing at the same account for good.
/// @return How many accounts have ever been registered.
function accountCount() external view returns (uint256) {
return _accounts.length;
}
/// @notice Registered account by index, in registration order.
/// @dev Reverts on an out-of-range index rather than answering zero, so a caller paging the list cannot
/// mistake the end of it for a hole in the middle.
/// @param index Position in the registration-ordered list, below {accountCount}.
/// @return The account at that position.
function accountAt(uint256 index) external view returns (address) {
return _accounts[index];
}
/// @notice Every account carrying every bit in `roleMask`.
/// @dev A view, so the linear scan over the account list costs nothing to a caller reading off chain.
/// Callers that need a roster inside a transaction pass the member list explicitly instead — see
/// `FinalPqQuorum`, which takes signers rather than searching for them, so a quorum's cost does not
/// grow with the size of the registry.
/// @param roleMask The capability to filter on.
/// @return found The matching accounts, in registration order.
function accountsWithRole(uint256 roleMask) external view returns (address[] memory found) {
uint256 n = _accounts.length;
address[] memory buf = new address[](n);
uint256 count;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (hasRole(_accounts[i], roleMask)) {
buf[count++] = _accounts[i];
}
}
found = new address[](count);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < count; i++) {
found[i] = buf[i];
}
}
/**
* @notice How many accounts could satisfy a quorum for `roleMask` right now.
* @dev The number a threshold has to be reachable against. A threshold above it is not a strict quorum,
* it is a quorum that cannot be met — and the way that presents is an operation reverting forever
* with nothing naming the roster as the cause. Counts standing alone; use {sealableMemberCount} for
* a quorum that also needs a seal.
* @param roleMask The capability the quorum is over.
* @return live How many standing accounts carry the whole mask.
*/
function liveMemberCount(uint256 roleMask) public view returns (uint256 live) {
uint256 n = _accounts.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (hasRole(_accounts[i], roleMask)) live++;
}
}
/**
* @notice Whether `account` currently carries every bit in `roleMask`.
* @dev Every gate in this system asks this one question, so every gate gets the same answer: registered,
* not revoked, inside its validity window, and holding the capability. A caller that checked only
* the role bit would accept an expired certificate.
*
* `roleMask == 0` is false. A zero mask asks nothing and must not read as "yes" — that is the shape
* of an uninitialised configuration variable, and the one reading it must not be a universal pass.
*
* Every bit in the mask must be present, so a mask naming two capabilities asks for both rather than
* either.
* @param account The account to test.
* @param roleMask One or more `ROLE_*` bits, OR-ed together.
* @return Whether the account stands and carries the whole mask.
*/
function hasRole(address account, uint256 roleMask) public view returns (bool) {
if (roleMask == 0) return false;
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered || id.revoked) return false;
if (id.roles & roleMask != roleMask) return false;
return _withinValidity(id);
}
/// @notice Whether `account` is registered, unrevoked and in date, regardless of capability.
/// @dev The standing half of {hasRole}, for callers that care that a party is honoured at all rather
/// than that it holds a particular capability. {lmsSignerIsLive} asks this rather than spelling the
/// three conditions out a second time, because a second spelling is how two answers drift apart.
/// @param account The account to test. An address no record claims answers false.
/// @return Whether the identity currently stands.
function isActive(address account) public view returns (bool) {
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
return id.registered && !id.revoked && _withinValidity(id);
}
/// @notice Whether a record's certificate is inside its validity window right now.
/// @dev Both bounds are milliseconds on this chain's clock and both are optional: a zero `notBefore`
/// means valid from issuance and a zero `notAfter` means never expires, which the certificate
/// schema allows and personal identity certificates use. The upper bound is exclusive, so a
/// certificate stops being honoured on the millisecond it names rather than after it.
/// @param id The record to test, taken as a storage pointer so no copy of a multi-word struct is made.
/// @return Whether the window admits the current block time.
function _withinValidity(Identity storage id) private view returns (bool) {
if (id.notBefore != 0 && FinalChainTime.nowMs() < id.notBefore) return false;
if (id.notAfter != 0 && FinalChainTime.nowMs() >= id.notAfter) return false;
return true;
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ sweep
/// @inheritdoc FinalSweep
/// @dev The registry's own configuration gate, in the `msg.sender` form a no-argument seam can express:
/// the bootstrap admin alone while the window is open, a live registrar afterwards.
///
/// The rest of the state plane inherits this rule from `FinalPlaneSweep`, which reads it off a
/// registry pointer. This contract answers it from its own storage because it IS that registry, and
/// importing the shared mixin here would make this file import a file that imports it back.
///
/// The sealed half of the gate is a K-of-N over `ROLE_REGISTRAR` whose approvals arrive in calldata,
/// which `sweepAsset`'s shared signature has no room for; what survives is membership in that same
/// roster. The narrowing is safe because the other two gates hold regardless: a sweep moves surplus
/// only, this contract owes nothing, so there is nothing behind the line to reach — and the
/// destination is not the caller's to invent.
function _requireSweepAuthority() internal view override {
if (!bootstrapSealed && msg.sender == bootstrapAdmin) return;
if (hasRole(msg.sender, ROLE_REGISTRAR)) return;
revert SweepUnauthorized(msg.sender);
}
/// @inheritdoc FinalSweep
/// @dev The bootstrap admin, and the proven authority that called. The first of those is zero once the
/// window is sealed, which `FinalSweep` refuses as a destination, so a sealed registry can only
/// sweep to the registrar that authorised the sweep.
function _sweepDestinations() internal view override returns (address, address) {
return (bootstrapAdmin, msg.sender);
}
/// @dev Nothing is reserved because nothing is owed: the registry holds
/// certificates and role bits, has no payable entrypoint and no custody
/// line. Anything it carries arrived by accident.
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalPlaneSweep.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may inherit this mixin from a contract deployed as
// part of a Final DeFi Protocol state plane, and may operate the asset-rescue
// surface it completes.
// 2. Integrators, indexers and operators may call the resulting rescue surface
// where the state plane's own configuration authority permits it, and may
// read the authority and destination answers it gives.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this mixin or a competing state-plane rescue
// authority without permission prior to the Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalSweep} from "../utils/FinalSweep.sol";
import {FinalIdentityRegistry} from "./FinalIdentityRegistry.sol";
/**
* @title Final Plane Sweep
* @notice The authority and destination halves of the shared asset-rescue surface, answered once for every
* contract of the protocol's own state plane.
* @dev `FinalSweep` gives every contract that can end up holding a stray asset one rescue surface and leaves two
* questions for the inheritor: who may call it, and where the value may go. Every contract on this state
* plane answers both the same way — the registry's bootstrap admin alone while that window is open, and the
* sealed registrar authority afterwards — and stating that once per contract would be one chance per
* contract to state it differently. An inheritor of this mixin answers a single question instead: which
* registry is mine.
*
* **The authority is the plane's own configuration gate, narrowed to what a fixed signature can carry.**
* The sealed half of that gate is a K-of-N over the registrar role, and its approvals arrive in CALLDATA.
* The rescue entrypoint's signature is shared across every contract on the plane and cannot grow a
* per-contract quorum argument, so what survives into a no-argument `internal view` is MEMBERSHIP: the
* bootstrap admin while the window is open, and afterwards any account the registry currently attests as a
* live registrar.
*
* That is a narrowing — one registrar rather than K of them — and it is deliberate rather than overlooked.
* Two other gates make it safe, and a registrar can widen neither:
*
* - a rescue moves SURPLUS only. Every contract that owes something declares the debt as a reservation,
* and no key reaches behind that line: an intent log's bonds, a billing plane's prepaid credit and a gas
* well's entire float are all unreachable by this surface however it is called.
* - the destination is not the caller's to invent.
*
* A registrar already configures tree writers, thresholds and consumers. An account that can decide who may
* write the account tree is not meaningfully restrained from moving a stray token, so demanding a quorum
* ceremony for the rescue lane would buy nothing and would instead guarantee the lane is never used when it
* is needed. No new role and no new authority pointer is introduced here: the registrar role is the
* registry's own, and membership in it moves in the registry rather than in any contract that reads it.
*
* **The destination is the authority that ordered the rescue.** This state plane has no treasury pointer,
* and adding one would be exactly the new authority this mixin is not allowed to invent — a per-contract
* treasury setter would need its own quorum action on every contract of the plane, to configure something
* the plane has never needed. So the two legitimate destinations are the two addresses already proven: the
* bootstrap admin, and the caller.
*
* The caller is not a free parameter. The rescue entrypoint proves the authority BEFORE it resolves
* destinations, so by the time this mixin is asked, the sender is already either the bootstrap admin or a
* live registrar. Every service on this chain is a Final Wallet with a registered identity and no EOA
* signing key, so the value lands on an account the chain itself attests to. What the gate rules out is the
* thing worth ruling out: a rescue paying an address the plane knows nothing about.
*
* Once the bootstrap window is sealed the admin address is zero, and the base contract refuses a zero
* destination, so the pair collapses to the caller alone — one legitimate destination, which is the case the
* base contract already handles.
*/
abstract contract FinalPlaneSweep is FinalSweep {
/// @notice The membership registry an inheriting contract's configuration gate reads.
/// @dev The one question this mixin leaves open, and the only line an inheritor has to supply. It exists
/// because some contracts of the plane hold the registry directly while others reach it through another
/// contract they already hold, and both must resolve to the SAME registry their configuration answers
/// to — a rescue authority read from a different source would be a second authority in disguise.
/// @return The registry whose bootstrap admin and registrar membership decide this contract's rescue
/// authority and destinations.
function _sweepRegistry() internal view virtual returns (FinalIdentityRegistry);
/// @notice The plane's configuration gate, in the caller-only form the shared rescue surface can express.
/// @dev Two accepting branches, checked in order: the bootstrap admin while the window is open, and any live
/// registrar once it is sealed. The bootstrap branch is guarded on the seal as well as on the address,
/// so it closes the moment the window does rather than depending on the admin field being cleared.
/// Membership is read live from the registry on every call, so revoking a registrar there revokes this
/// authority everywhere on the plane at once. Anything else reverts.
function _requireSweepAuthority() internal view virtual override {
FinalIdentityRegistry reg = _sweepRegistry();
if (!reg.bootstrapSealed() && msg.sender == reg.bootstrapAdmin()) return;
if (reg.hasRole(msg.sender, reg.ROLE_REGISTRAR())) return;
revert SweepUnauthorized(msg.sender);
}
/// @notice The two addresses a rescue on this plane may pay.
/// @dev The bootstrap admin, and the authority that called — which the base contract has already proven by
/// the time this is read, so the second is never an address of the caller's choosing. After the seal the
/// admin half is the zero address, which the base contract refuses as a destination, leaving the proven
/// caller as the single legitimate target.
/// @return The bootstrap admin, and the proven caller.
function _sweepDestinations() internal view virtual override returns (address, address) {
return (_sweepRegistry().bootstrapAdmin(), msg.sender);
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalPqQuorum.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may deploy and operate this quorum as part of a
// Final DeFi Protocol chain, and may inherit it to gate an action behind a
// post-quantum K-of-N.
// 2. Integrators, auditors, and node operators may read its membership and
// thresholds and independently re-verify any approval it recorded, as part
// of their integration with the Final DeFi Protocol.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this quorum or a competing identity or
// authorization plane derived from it without permission prior to the
// Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalChainPrecompiles} from "./FinalChainPrecompiles.sol";
import {FinalIdentityRegistry} from "./FinalIdentityRegistry.sol";
/**
* @title FinalPqQuorum
* @notice K-of-N approval where the signatures are post-quantum and the chain
* is what checks them.
*
* @dev This library is the reason Final Chain exists in this design.
*
* `FinalBackend/src/pq/credential.js` carries a rule it had to enforce in code
* because nothing else could: **a surface whose signature is verified on chain
* cannot be PQ.** A co-signer approval reaching `FinalRootAuthority` is checked
* by ECDSA/ERC-1271 in Solidity, so a PQ co-signer would produce approvals the
* contract cannot read, and the quorum would stop reaching threshold with
* nothing in any log naming the cause. `PQ_SURFACE` and `assertBackendVerified`
* exist to keep anyone from crossing that line by accident.
*
* Here the line is gone. The precompiles verify ML-DSA-87 and
* SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s natively, so a quorum can be PQ *and* on chain, and
* "the backend says these four signatures verified" becomes "these four
* signatures verify, and any node re-derives that independently".
*
* ## Three rules, each closing a specific hole
*
* 1. **Keys come from the registry, never from calldata.** A key passed as an
* argument proves nothing — anyone with a keypair can sign under it. This is
* the difference between a 4-of-5 quorum and a 1-of-1 held by whoever built
* the transaction.
*
* 2. **Signers strictly ascending.** One comparison per entry rejects duplicates
* outright, so a single member cannot supply four approvals and satisfy a
* threshold of four. The alternative — an O(n²) seen-check — is the same
* guarantee with more ways to get it wrong.
*
* 3. **The digest binds chain id and verifying contract.** Without both, an
* approval collected for one contract is replayable against another with the
* same payload shape, and an approval from the test chain is replayable on
* the production one. These co-signers hold one key across environments.
*
* ## Which algorithm
*
* The stack splits its keys by hardness assumption, not by convenience:
* ML-DSA-87 (lattice) signs transactions, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s (hash-based) signs
* identity. Two families, so one cryptanalytic result cannot take both.
*
* So an action inherits the class of what it authorizes. Advancing a state root
* is operational and high-cadence: transaction class. Registering or revoking
* an identity is the thing the access class exists for. `ALG_ANY` is available
* and should be used sparingly — accepting either means a break in one family
* takes the quorum.
*
* A MEMBERSHIP action — the registrar quorum that admits, re-roles or revokes
* an identity and upgrades a plane contract — takes both: the ML-DSA-87
* approval and a `seal`, an SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature over the same digest
* by the member's `activeSeal` key. The seal key is its own slot — never the
* access key — so the process that seals cannot also rotate the identity it
* seals for. Every OPERATIONAL action — a bundle root or payload appended to
* the log, a settlement leaf, an account-state write, a tree write, a PHI
* movement — takes the ML-DSA-87 approval alone (the user's ruling of 12 Sep
* 2026, arch/quorum-signing-ml-dsa.md Q1/Q4): the SLH-DSA family is exercised
* at the boundary where a member JOINS — the joiner's own proof of possession
* over the admission digest, verified here through `0x0205` — and by a holder
* on its ledger actions, not on every bundle. An SLH-DSA seal costs a Cloud Run
* co-signer about forty seconds per digest, and the fleet paid it once per
* member per bundle; ML-DSA-87 signs in milliseconds under the key the member
* already votes with.
*
* Every digest binds an `anchorBlock`: the block at which the members read
* tree 1 to decide who is in the round. Binding it means every approval in a
* round was made against ONE roster view, and the window in `require_` means a
* view older than `ANCHOR_WINDOW` blocks is refused rather than honoured.
*
* The practical cost is worth stating: an SLH-DSA signature is 29,792 bytes, so
* a 4-of-5 membership-class quorum is ~119 KB of calldata. That is affordable
* here only because this is our own chain and membership changes are rare. Do
* not carry this pattern to a chain where it is not.
*/
library FinalPqQuorum {
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 — FIPS 204. Algorithm ids are the FIPS numbers: the
/// same ids `FinalCertificate` and the backend registry use, and the numbers
/// the precompile addresses end in (`0x0204`).
uint8 internal constant ALG_ML_DSA_87 = 4;
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s — FIPS 205 (`0x0205`).
uint8 internal constant ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S = 5;
/// @notice Either scheme is acceptable for this action.
uint8 internal constant ALG_ANY = 0;
/// @notice How far behind the chain head an approval's anchor may sit.
/// @dev Members evaluate roster membership against tree 1 AT the anchor
/// block. 600 blocks is ten minutes at the chain's one-second cadence —
/// generous against a round that takes seconds, and short enough that a
/// roster rotated away is refused rather than counted.
uint64 internal constant ANCHOR_WINDOW = 600;
/// @dev Domain separator for every quorum digest. Distinct from any
/// EIP-712 domain in the stack: these are not typed-data signatures and
/// must not be confusable with one.
bytes32 internal constant DOMAIN_PQ_QUORUM = keccak256("FINAL_CHAIN_PQ_QUORUM_v01");
/// @notice One member's approval.
struct Approval {
/// The member's account, which is also the key it is looked up by.
address signer;
/// `ALG_ML_DSA_87` or `ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S`.
uint8 algorithm;
/// Over the 32-byte digest from `digest()`, verbatim. Both schemes
/// hash internally, so the digest is not re-hashed before signing.
bytes signature;
/// SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s over the same digest, by the member's `activeSeal`
/// key. Required by the membership class (the registrar quorum); an
/// operational action never reads it, so it is empty there.
bytes seal;
}
/// @notice Thrown when fewer valid approvals were supplied than the action requires.
/// @param valid Approvals that verified.
/// @param required Approvals the action demands.
error ThresholdNotMet(uint256 valid, uint256 required);
/// @notice Thrown when approvals are not in strictly ascending signer order.
/// @dev Ascending order is what makes duplicate detection a single comparison instead of a quadratic scan,
/// so it is the rule that stops one signer being counted twice toward a threshold.
/// @param previous The preceding signer.
/// @param next The signer that failed to exceed it.
error SignersNotAscending(address previous, address next);
/// @notice Thrown when an approving signer does not hold the role this action is gated on.
/// @param signer The approving signer.
/// @param roleMask The role the action requires.
error SignerLacksRole(address signer, uint256 roleMask);
/// @notice Thrown when an approval is signed under an algorithm this action does not accept.
/// @param signer The approving signer.
/// @param got The algorithm the approval declared.
/// @param required The algorithm the action demands.
error WrongAlgorithm(address signer, uint8 got, uint8 required);
/// @notice Thrown when an approval's signature fails verification in the precompile.
/// @param signer The approving signer.
/// @param algorithm The algorithm it was verified under.
error BadSignature(address signer, uint8 algorithm);
/// @notice Thrown when an approval's access seal fails verification.
/// @param signer The approving signer.
error BadSeal(address signer);
/// @notice Thrown when an approval anchors to a block this chain has not reached.
/// @param anchorBlock The block the approval anchored to.
/// @param blockNumber The current block.
error AnchorAhead(uint64 anchorBlock, uint256 blockNumber);
/// @notice Thrown when an approval's anchor is older than the accepted window.
/// @dev Bounding the window is what stops an approval collected once being replayed indefinitely later.
/// @param anchorBlock The block the approval anchored to.
/// @param blockNumber The current block.
error AnchorStale(uint64 anchorBlock, uint256 blockNumber);
/// @notice Thrown when an action is gated on a threshold of zero.
/// @dev Refused rather than treated as "no approvals needed": a zero threshold is always a
/// misconfiguration, and reading it as permissive would silently remove the quorum.
error ThresholdIsZero();
/**
* @notice The message every member of this quorum signs.
* @param verifyingContract The contract consuming the approvals. Binding it
* stops an approval collected for one contract being replayed
* against another with the same payload shape.
* @param actionDomain What is being authorized — a per-action constant, so
* an approval for "advance the accounts tree" cannot be replayed as
* one for "revoke an identity".
* @param anchorBlock The Final Chain block the members read tree 1 at to
* decide the roster. Bound here so every approval in a round names
* the same view; checked against `ANCHOR_WINDOW` by `require_`.
* @param payloadDigest The action's own committed content. Callers MUST
* include a nonce or a monotonic counter in it; nothing here can
* tell a replay of round 7 from a fresh round 7.
*/
function digest(
address verifyingContract,
bytes32 actionDomain,
uint64 anchorBlock,
bytes32 payloadDigest
) internal view returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_PQ_QUORUM,
block.chainid,
verifyingContract,
actionDomain,
anchorBlock,
payloadDigest
)
);
}
/**
* @notice Reverts unless at least `threshold` distinct members holding
* `roleMask` have signed `quorumDigest`.
* @param registry Where public keys and roles come from. Not a parameter
* for flexibility — a parameter so the caller's own immutable
* registry address is what is used, rather than one from calldata.
* @param requiredAlgorithm `ALG_ANY` to accept either scheme.
* @param anchorBlock The anchor the digest was built over. Refused if it is
* ahead of this block or more than `ANCHOR_WINDOW` behind it.
* @param requireSeal Whether every approval must also carry a valid `seal`
* by the member's `activeSeal` key — the membership class (the
* registrar quorum). Operational actions pass `false`.
* @return valid The number of approvals that verified, which is at least
* `threshold` if this returns at all.
*
* @dev Every failure reverts with the offending signer named. A quorum that
* silently skipped bad approvals and counted the rest would let a
* misconfigured co-signer sit broken indefinitely: the threshold would keep
* being met by the others and nothing would say one member had stopped
* contributing. That is exactly the failure this program has already had,
* in `fanOut`, where a per-chain advance failure was recorded and execution
* continued.
*/
function require_(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval[] calldata approvals,
bytes32 quorumDigest,
uint256 roleMask,
uint256 threshold,
uint8 requiredAlgorithm,
uint64 anchorBlock,
bool requireSeal
) internal view returns (uint256 valid) {
if (threshold == 0) revert ThresholdIsZero();
if (anchorBlock > block.number) revert AnchorAhead(anchorBlock, block.number);
if (block.number - anchorBlock > ANCHOR_WINDOW) revert AnchorStale(anchorBlock, block.number);
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(quorumDigest);
address previous = address(0);
uint256 n = approvals.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
Approval calldata a = approvals[i];
// Strictly ascending. `address(0)` as the initial value works
// because it can never be a registered signer.
if (a.signer <= previous) revert SignersNotAscending(previous, a.signer);
previous = a.signer;
if (!registry.hasRole(a.signer, roleMask)) revert SignerLacksRole(a.signer, roleMask);
if (requiredAlgorithm != ALG_ANY && a.algorithm != requiredAlgorithm) {
revert WrongAlgorithm(a.signer, a.algorithm, requiredAlgorithm);
}
if (!_verify(registry, a, message)) revert BadSignature(a.signer, a.algorithm);
if (requireSeal && !_verifySeal(registry, a, message)) revert BadSeal(a.signer);
valid++;
}
if (valid < threshold) revert ThresholdNotMet(valid, threshold);
}
/// @notice Non-reverting form, for views and for callers that want to
/// report rather than refuse.
function count(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval[] calldata approvals,
bytes32 quorumDigest,
uint256 roleMask,
uint8 requiredAlgorithm,
uint64 anchorBlock,
bool requireSeal
) internal view returns (uint256 valid) {
if (anchorBlock > block.number || block.number - anchorBlock > ANCHOR_WINDOW) return 0;
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(quorumDigest);
address previous = address(0);
uint256 n = approvals.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
Approval calldata a = approvals[i];
if (a.signer <= previous) return valid;
previous = a.signer;
if (!registry.hasRole(a.signer, roleMask)) continue;
if (requiredAlgorithm != ALG_ANY && a.algorithm != requiredAlgorithm) continue;
if (!_verify(registry, a, message)) continue;
if (requireSeal && !_verifySeal(registry, a, message)) continue;
valid++;
}
}
/// @dev The seal: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s by the member's `activeSeal` key over
/// the same digest. A member with no seal key on record cannot seal, and an
/// approval with no seal bytes is not one.
function _verifySeal(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval calldata a,
bytes memory message
) private view returns (bool) {
bytes memory key = registry.activeSealKeyOf(a.signer);
if (key.length == 0 || a.seal.length == 0) return false;
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(key, message, a.seal);
}
/// @dev Verifies one approval against the key the REGISTRY holds for that signer, never against a key
/// supplied in the approval. A key passed as an argument proves nothing, because anyone holding a
/// keypair can sign under it; reading from storage is what makes the verdict re-derivable from public
/// state rather than a claim by whoever assembled the call.
/// @param registry The identity registry that holds each signer's live keys.
/// @param a The approval being verified.
/// @param message The exact bytes the approval must cover.
/// @return valid True when the signature verifies under the signer's live key for the declared algorithm.
function _verify(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval calldata a,
bytes memory message
) private view returns (bool) {
// The LIVE pair, always. The recovery pair authorizes rotating this
// account's own credentials and NOTHING else — a quorum that accepted
// it would hand the recovery keys everyday authority, which is exactly
// the separation the two stages exist to draw.
if (a.algorithm == ALG_ML_DSA_87) {
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(
registry.activeTransactionKeyOf(a.signer), message, a.signature
);
}
if (a.algorithm == ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S) {
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(
registry.activeAccessKeyOf(a.signer), message, a.signature
);
}
// Any other id is a refusal, never a default — including the KEM ids
// (3, 7) and the reserved FN-DSA id (6), none of which is a signature
// scheme this quorum verifies.
return false;
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalSlotKeyRegistry.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may deploy this slot-key registry as part of a Final
// DeFi Protocol chain, and may operate that chain.
// 2. Co-signers may publish their per-slot encapsulation keys through it, and
// integrators, indexers and end users may read those keys and seal to them,
// as part of their integration with the Final DeFi Protocol.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this slot-key registry or a competing sealing
// directory derived from it without permission prior to the Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalIdentityRegistry} from "./FinalIdentityRegistry.sol";
import {FinalStateTrees, ISlotKeySource} from "./FinalStateTrees.sol";
import {FinalPlaneSweep} from "./FinalPlaneSweep.sol";
/**
* @title Final Slot Key Registry
* @notice The co-signers' per-slot ML-KEM publics — what a private intent is
* sealed to.
*
* @dev Time is cut into slots of `SLOT_SECONDS`. A member publishes, ahead of
* time, one KEM public key per slot it will serve; a sealer picks the slot of
* the intent's scheduled time and encrypts to K members' keys for that slot;
* shortly before execution those members decapsulate off chain. What lives here
* is the HASH of each key with its algorithm and window — the bytes ride the
* `SlotKeyPublished` event and the co-signer's own endpoint, and a sealer
* checks what it fetched against tree 8 branch 3, which {FinalStateTrees.
* syncSlotKeyLeaves} projects from {slotKeyLeafOf} in the same transaction.
*
* Storing the hash rather than the key is what keeps the directory honest
* without making this contract a key server: a sealer may fetch the bytes from
* anywhere, but it can only trust them once they hash to the leaf the tree
* proves.
*
* Who may publish: the identity behind `msg.sender`. Every transaction on this
* chain is a 0x46 envelope signed by an identity's ML-DSA-87 transaction key,
* so the sender IS the authenticated identity; the registry resolves it to its
* account (`accountOfSender`) and checks `publisherRole`. No second signature.
*
* A slot goes COLD `GRACE_SECONDS` after it ends: {slotKeyLeafOf} answers zero
* and anyone may {retire} it so the tree forgets the key. A key cannot be
* swapped once its slot has started — a sealer that already encrypted to it
* must be able to be opened.
*
* **The chain's clock is in milliseconds.** `block.timestamp` on the Final Chain
* counts milliseconds (the intent log's `executeNotBefore` and `deadline` follow
* the same convention). Every window here is in SECONDS, so the contract reads
* its own "now" through {nowSeconds} and never compares `block.timestamp`
* directly; `slotOf` takes wall-clock seconds and answers the slot index, so the
* fleet, the wallet and this contract name the same slot.
*
* **Where this runs.** The project's own reth-based chains and nowhere else.
* Sender authentication depends on those chains' post-quantum transaction
* envelope and on a registry that verifies signatures in precompiles they alone
* provide, so `accountOfSender` has no meaning anywhere else. Nothing under
* `contracts/` outside the Final Chain directory imports this contract, and it
* takes part in no CREATE2 derivation. Gas is deliberately NOT a design
* constraint here: the published key bytes ride an event in full rather than
* being trimmed, so the directory is reconstructible from chain data alone.
*
* **Immutable, and behind no proxy.** The registry, the trees and the publisher
* role are all fixed at construction, so any change to this surface is a
* redeploy at a new address; the trees must then be repointed through
* `setSlotKeySource`, and keys published here do not travel — the publishers
* republish, and until they do, branch 3 projects zero.
*/
contract FinalSlotKeyRegistry is ISlotKeySource, FinalPlaneSweep {
/// @notice One slot: ten minutes (ruled 2026-09-03). The tree's ring
/// (`SLOT_KEY_RING` = 1024) therefore spans ~7 days, past `MAX_AHEAD_SECONDS`.
uint64 public constant SLOT_SECONDS = 600;
/// @notice How far ahead a key may be published: the two-day generation
/// lead a publisher works to, plus a day of margin.
/// @dev Bounded rather than open-ended so a compromised publisher cannot
/// claim years of future slots in one transaction and leave the
/// directory pinned to keys it no longer controls.
uint64 public constant MAX_AHEAD_SECONDS = 72 hours;
/// @notice A key stays usable this long after its slot ends — the window a
/// late execution still opens in.
uint64 public constant GRACE_SECONDS = 3600;
/// @notice The one algorithm today: ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203).
/// @dev The only value `publishSlotKeys` accepts. It is a field on the
/// stored key and inside the leaf, so a directory that ever carries a
/// second scheme stays unambiguous about which key is which — a sealer
/// never has to infer the scheme from a key's length.
uint8 public constant ALGORITHM_ML_KEM_1024 = 1;
/// @notice Domain the tree-8 branch-3 leaf is hashed under.
/// @dev Binds the member, the slot and the algorithm alongside the key
/// hash, so a key published for one slot cannot be presented as the
/// key for another, and a leaf cannot be lifted between members.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_SLOT_KEY_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_SLOT_KEY_LEAF_v01");
/// @notice The registry a publisher's identity and role are resolved through.
/// @dev `immutable`, so the roster behind `publisherRole` cannot be swapped
/// for one an attacker controls.
FinalIdentityRegistry public immutable registry;
/// @notice The state trees whose branch 3 this registry's verdict feeds.
/// @dev `immutable` for the same reason. The trees must in turn name this
/// contract as their `slotKeySource`, or the projection call reverts
/// and no key ever reaches a sealer.
FinalStateTrees public immutable trees;
/// @notice Role mask a publishing identity must hold (the co-signers).
uint256 public immutable publisherRole;
/// @notice One member's key for one slot, as this contract records it.
/// @dev The KEY BYTES are deliberately not here — only their hash. The
/// bytes ride `SlotKeyPublished` and the member's own endpoint, so
/// this contract stays a directory rather than a key server.
struct SlotKey {
/// @dev `keccak256` of the published encapsulation public key.
bytes32 keyHash;
/// @dev Which scheme the key belongs to; one of the `ALGORITHM_*` values.
uint8 algorithm;
/// @dev When the key was published, for operators auditing lead times.
uint64 publishedAt;
}
/// @notice Published keys, by member and slot.
/// @dev Never cleared. A slot past its grace window simply projects zero
/// through {slotKeyLeafOf}, so the tree forgets the key while the
/// record of what was published stays readable.
mapping(address member => mapping(uint64 slotIndex => SlotKey)) private _keys;
/// @notice A member published its encapsulation key for one slot.
/// @dev Carries the FULL key bytes, which is how a sealer obtains them
/// without trusting an endpoint: fetch from anywhere, then check the
/// hash against the tree.
/// @param member The publishing identity's account.
/// @param slotIndex The slot the key serves.
/// @param algorithm The key's scheme.
/// @param keyHash `keccak256` of the key bytes — what the leaf commits to.
/// @param kemPublic The encapsulation public key, in full.
event SlotKeyPublished(
address indexed member, uint64 indexed slotIndex, uint8 algorithm, bytes32 keyHash, bytes kemPublic
);
/// @notice The sender resolves to no identity, or to one without the publisher role.
/// @param sender The transaction sender that was refused.
error NotASlotKeyPublisher(address sender);
/// @notice A scheme this registry does not accept was offered.
/// @param algorithm The rejected scheme id.
error UnsupportedAlgorithm(uint8 algorithm);
/// @notice The slot list and the key list were not the same length.
error LengthMismatch();
/// @notice A zero-length key was offered for a slot.
/// @dev Refused rather than stored: an empty key hashes to a value a leaf
/// would carry perfectly happily, and a sealer would encrypt to
/// nothing.
/// @param slotIndex The slot the empty key was offered for.
error EmptyKey(uint64 slotIndex);
/// @notice The slot has already ended and passed its grace window.
/// @param slotIndex The expired slot.
error SlotInThePast(uint64 slotIndex);
/// @notice The slot begins beyond `MAX_AHEAD_SECONDS` from now.
/// @param slotIndex The over-distant slot.
error SlotTooFarAhead(uint64 slotIndex);
/// @notice The slot has already begun and this member already published for it.
/// @dev A key may be replaced only before its slot opens. Once a sealer may
/// have encrypted to it, swapping it would leave an intent nobody can
/// open.
/// @param member The publishing identity's account.
/// @param slotIndex The slot already in progress.
error SlotAlreadyLive(address member, uint64 slotIndex);
/// @notice Pin the registry, the trees and the role a publisher must hold.
/// @dev All three are `immutable`: this contract's whole authority model is
/// "the identity behind the sender holds this role in that registry",
/// and a mutable pointer on either side would be a way to replace the
/// roster rather than to join it.
/// @param registry_ The identity registry senders are resolved through.
/// @param trees_ The state trees this registry projects into.
/// @param publisherRole_ Role mask a publishing identity must hold.
constructor(FinalIdentityRegistry registry_, FinalStateTrees trees_, uint256 publisherRole_) {
registry = registry_;
trees = trees_;
publisherRole = publisherRole_;
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------- slots
/// @notice The slot a timestamp falls in.
/// @dev The one definition of the slot grid, on chain so a sealer and a
/// publisher cannot disagree about which slot an instant belongs to.
/// @param timestamp The instant, in seconds.
/// @return The slot index containing it.
function slotOf(uint64 timestamp) public pure returns (uint64) {
return timestamp / SLOT_SECONDS;
}
/// @notice `[start, end)` of a slot.
/// @dev Half-open, so consecutive slots neither overlap nor leave a gap.
/// A key stays usable until `end + GRACE_SECONDS`, which is a separate
/// question from the window itself.
/// @param slotIndex The slot to bound.
/// @return start First instant in the slot, in seconds.
/// @return end First instant after the slot, in seconds.
function slotWindow(uint64 slotIndex) public pure returns (uint64 start, uint64 end) {
start = slotIndex * SLOT_SECONDS;
end = start + SLOT_SECONDS;
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------- publish
/**
* @notice Publish (or, before the slot starts, replace) this identity's
* KEM public for each slot. Projects the leaves in the same
* transaction.
* @dev The caller carries no arguments naming itself: the member is derived
* from the authenticated sender, so a publisher can only ever write its own
* slots. The projection runs in the same transaction, so the directory and
* the tree are never observably out of step.
*
* Four bounds per slot, each refusing rather than clamping: a slot past its
* grace window, a slot beyond `MAX_AHEAD_SECONDS`, an empty key, and a
* replacement for a slot that has already opened. The last is the one that
* protects sealers — a key swapped mid-slot leaves an intent nobody can
* open — and it deliberately permits a FIRST publication into a live slot,
* which is late but not dangerous.
*
* A batch is all-or-nothing: one bad slot reverts the whole call rather
* than leaving a publisher unsure which of its slots landed.
* @param slotIndexes The slots being published for.
* @param kemPublics The encapsulation public keys, one per slot, in order.
* @param algorithm The scheme the keys belong to.
*/
function publishSlotKeys(uint64[] calldata slotIndexes, bytes[] calldata kemPublics, uint8 algorithm) external {
address member = registry.accountOfSender(msg.sender);
if (member == address(0) || !registry.hasRole(member, publisherRole)) revert NotASlotKeyPublisher(msg.sender);
if (algorithm != ALGORITHM_ML_KEM_1024) revert UnsupportedAlgorithm(algorithm);
if (slotIndexes.length != kemPublics.length) revert LengthMismatch();
uint64 now_ = nowSeconds();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < slotIndexes.length; i++) {
uint64 slot = slotIndexes[i];
(uint64 start, uint64 end) = slotWindow(slot);
if (end + GRACE_SECONDS <= now_) revert SlotInThePast(slot);
if (start > now_ + MAX_AHEAD_SECONDS) revert SlotTooFarAhead(slot);
if (kemPublics[i].length == 0) revert EmptyKey(slot);
if (start <= now_ && _keys[member][slot].keyHash != bytes32(0)) revert SlotAlreadyLive(member, slot);
bytes32 keyHash = keccak256(kemPublics[i]);
_keys[member][slot] = SlotKey({keyHash: keyHash, algorithm: algorithm, publishedAt: now_});
emit SlotKeyPublished(member, slot, algorithm, keyHash, kemPublics[i]);
}
trees.syncSlotKeyLeaves(member, slotIndexes);
}
/// @notice Re-project a member's slots — permissionless, because the leaf
/// value is this contract's own verdict: a lapsed slot projects to
/// zero and the tree forgets the key.
/// @dev Open on purpose. A slot lapses by TIME, which moves no storage
/// here, so no mutation hook can fire for it and something has to be
/// able to push the retirement. The strongest thing any caller can do
/// is copy the verdict {slotKeyLeafOf} already gives, which is why
/// opening it costs nothing.
/// @param member The identity whose slots are re-projected.
/// @param slotIndexes The slots to re-project. Live ones are simply
/// rewritten with the value they already carry.
function retire(address member, uint64[] calldata slotIndexes) external {
trees.syncSlotKeyLeaves(member, slotIndexes);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------- views
/// @notice The chain's clock in SECONDS — `block.timestamp` on the Final Chain is in milliseconds.
/// @dev The one place this contract reads time. Every window (`SLOT_SECONDS`,
/// `GRACE_SECONDS`, `MAX_AHEAD_SECONDS`) and the slot grid (`slotOf`) are
/// in seconds, so this is what they are compared against. Reading the raw
/// stamp made every slot "in the past" (the 2026-09-04 deploy).
function nowSeconds() public view returns (uint64) {
return uint64(block.timestamp / 1000);
}
/// @notice The stored key for a slot (hash, algorithm, when published).
/// @dev The raw record, WITHOUT the freshness verdict: a slot long past its
/// grace window still answers the key it was given. Ask {isUsable} or
/// {slotKeyLeafOf} before sealing to it.
/// @param member The identity that published.
/// @param slotIndex The slot to read.
/// @return The stored record; zeroed when nothing was published.
function slotKeyOf(address member, uint64 slotIndex) external view returns (SlotKey memory) {
return _keys[member][slotIndex];
}
/// @notice Whether the slot's key can still be sealed to / opened with.
/// @dev Exactly the leaf verdict, so this view and the tree can never
/// disagree about whether a key is live.
/// @param member The identity that published.
/// @param slotIndex The slot to check.
/// @return True while the key stands, false once it has lapsed or was never set.
function isUsable(address member, uint64 slotIndex) external view returns (bool) {
return slotKeyLeafOf(member, slotIndex) != bytes32(0);
}
/// @inheritdoc ISlotKeySource
/// @dev This contract's whole verdict, in one place: zero when nothing was
/// published and zero once the slot's grace window has passed,
/// otherwise the leaf binding member, slot, algorithm and key hash. The
/// tree copies whatever this answers, so retirement needs no separate
/// write path and no authority — time alone decides it.
function slotKeyLeafOf(address member, uint64 slotIndex) public view returns (bytes32) {
SlotKey storage k = _keys[member][slotIndex];
if (k.keyHash == bytes32(0)) return bytes32(0);
(, uint64 end) = slotWindow(slotIndex);
if (nowSeconds() > end + GRACE_SECONDS) return bytes32(0);
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SLOT_KEY_LEAF, member, slotIndex, k.algorithm, k.keyHash));
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ sweep
/// @notice The registry the inherited sweep authority resolves members through.
/// @dev This contract's configuration gate reads the membership registry it
/// was constructed against, so the sweep authority reads the same one. One
/// registry for both means a member removed from the roster loses the sweep
/// at the same instant it loses the right to publish.
/// @return The immutable identity registry pinned at construction.
function _sweepRegistry() internal view override returns (FinalIdentityRegistry) {
return registry;
}
/// @dev Nothing is reserved because nothing is owed: this contract has no
/// payable entrypoint and no custody line — it records, it does not hold.
/// Anything it carries arrived by accident and is sweepable in full.
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalStateTrees.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may deploy this state-tree contract as the state
// plane of a Final DeFi Protocol chain, and may operate that chain.
// 2. Integrators, indexers, operators and end users may read every tree, take
// inclusion proofs, branch roots, tree roots and round roots from it, and
// write into a tree they hold the quorum, the writer seat or the
// configuration authority for, as part of their integration with the Final
// DeFi Protocol.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this state-tree contract or a competing state
// plane derived from it without permission prior to the Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalIdentityRegistry} from "./FinalIdentityRegistry.sol";
import {FinalChainTime} from "./FinalChainTime.sol";
import {FinalPqQuorum} from "./FinalPqQuorum.sol";
import {FinalPlaneSweep} from "./FinalPlaneSweep.sol";
import {FinalChainInitializable} from "./FinalChainInitializable.sol";
/// @title Chain Source
/// @notice The one question `syncIdentities` asks the asset registry.
/// @dev An interface rather than an import of `FinalAssetRegistry`, which
/// imports this file: the registry is tree 6's writer and holds the trees
/// as an immutable, so the dependency runs that way and this is the one
/// read that runs the other.
interface IChainSource {
/// @notice Every chain reference the asset registry currently has enabled.
/// @dev Read once per `syncIdentities` batch, so a service account's
/// `deployedChains` table is DERIVED from registry state instead of
/// being supplied by the caller. A caller-chosen table would let
/// anyone place a service identity on a chain of their choosing,
/// which is why the projection reads and never accepts.
/// @return The enabled chain references, in the registry's own order.
function enabledChainRefs() external view returns (bytes32[] memory);
}
/// @title Slot Key Source
/// @notice The one question {FinalStateTrees.syncSlotKeyLeaves} asks the
/// slot-key registry: the leaf value for one member's slot — the
/// registry's own verdict, zero when the slot holds nothing usable.
interface ISlotKeySource {
/// @notice The leaf value one member's slot-key ring position carries.
/// @dev The registry decides; this contract only copies. Zero is the
/// answer for a slot that never held a key and for one whose window
/// has passed, so re-projecting a lapsed slot retires its leaf.
/// @param member The co-signer whose slot key is being read.
/// @param slotIndex The slot the key belongs to, before the ring modulus.
/// @return The registry's leaf value, or zero when the slot holds nothing usable.
function slotKeyLeafOf(address member, uint64 slotIndex) external view returns (bytes32);
}
/// @title Endpoint Source
/// @notice The one question {FinalStateTrees.syncEndpointLeaves} asks the
/// endpoint registry: the leaf value for one tunnel endpoint — the
/// registry's own verdict (certificate hash, status, expiry, region),
/// zero when nothing is registered under the id.
interface IEndpointSource {
/// @notice The leaf value one tunnel endpoint carries.
/// @dev The registry admitted the certificate under its own quorum with
/// the holder's proof of possession, so this read carries a verdict
/// rather than a claim. Zero means nothing stands under the id.
/// @param endpointId The endpoint's certificate subject key id.
/// @return The registry's leaf value, or zero when nothing is registered under the id.
function endpointLeafOf(bytes32 endpointId) external view returns (bytes32);
}
/**
* @title Final State Trees
* @notice Final Chain's state plane: eight fixed-depth Merkle trees, and the rounds that publish all
* eight of their roots as one contemporaneous snapshot.
*
* @dev This contract runs on the project's own reth-based chains and nowhere else. Every signer is
* resolved through an identity registry that verifies post-quantum signatures in precompiles those chains
* alone provide, so a deployment anywhere else cannot authorize a single write. Nothing under
* `contracts/` outside the Final Chain directory imports it, and it takes part in no CREATE2 derivation —
* its address is whatever its deploy transaction produced, never a mined constant that other code pins.
* Gas is deliberately NOT a design constraint here and must not be optimised for: full sibling paths are
* stored, every branch enumerates on chain, and a configuration row keeps its value beside its hash,
* precisely so that no reader ever has to rebuild anything off chain to be sure of it.
*
* **Immutable, and behind no proxy.** There is no upgrade path and no authority that can replace this
* code. Any change to the surface below is a REDEPLOY at a new address, and everything holding the old
* address — the account ledger, the registries, the records contract, every service configured against
* it, every consumer pinning a root — is orphaned the moment that happens and has to be repointed. The
* registry projections into trees 1 and 8 do not travel with a redeploy either: they are derived from the
* registry, so a fresh deployment re-derives them rather than migrating anything.
*
* ## What each tree carries
*
* One tree per domain, because they change at unrelated cadences and a combined tree invalidates every
* outstanding proof on every tick:
*
* | # | tree | holds | cadence |
* |---|---|---|---|
* | 1 | accounts | every Final Wallet's public state | per rotation / creation |
* | 2 | phi | the PHI record: per (wallet, chain) balances, the lock, exposures | per publisher round |
* | 3 | vasset | issued vAsset supply and backing, per (asset, chain) | per settlement |
* | 4 | oracle | published prices and their inputs | ~10 s; 1 s for morph and fee assets |
* | 5 | settlement | chain and asset registry roots | rarely |
* | 6 | allowlist | assets, chains, policy, price sources, DEX deployments | rarely |
* | 7 | intents | intent status, ring-keyed over the posting sequence | per posting |
* | 8 | identity | the wallet-creation admission set, projected from the registry | per identity mutation |
*
* ## Tree 1 is READ, never rebuilt
*
* Tree 1 is a Final Wallet's public state and the SOURCE OF TRUTH every execution chain projects from.
* The sanctioned way to ask it a question is {proofFor} for the sibling path and {liveRoot} for the root
* each chain republishes — {branchProofFor} with {branchRoot} to prove against a branch instead,
* {roundProofFor} with {roundRootAt} to prove against a published round. Those entrypoints are the whole
* interface, and their answers are the only ones that verify.
*
* Do NOT fold the same leaves off chain. This tree is FIXED DEPTH — `DEPTH` levels, with a branch subtree
* at `BRANCH_DEPTH` — zero-padded to that depth, and INSERTION-ORDERED: a key keeps the slot it was first
* handed, permanently, and empty slots hash as the empty subtree rather than being skipped. A rebuild
* that sorts its leaves, or sizes itself `log2(n)` to the number of leaves present, is a DIFFERENT tree.
* Its root is not this root, no proof against it verifies anywhere, and nothing in the failure names the
* cause: the execution chain simply refuses a proof that looks perfectly well formed.
*
* ## Who may write which tree
*
* Four kinds of door, and every tree sits on exactly one of the first three:
*
* - **A service quorum.** {setLeaves} for trees 5 and 6, {setAccountStates} for tree 1: at least
* `threshold[treeId]` approvals from members holding `writerRole[treeId]`, each an ML-DSA-87 vote over
* a digest binding the tree, its nonce and the whole batch. Tree 1's round additionally carries each
* member's SLH-DSA seal, because a leaf there states who an account IS on every chain.
* - **A typed writer.** Trees 2, 3 and 4 are reachable only through {writeTyped}, from the records
* contract, which holds the preimage behind each leaf and computes the hash from it. {setLeaves}
* refuses those three outright, so a stored value can never drift from the commitment beside it.
* - **A writer contract.** `treeWriter[treeId]` writes its tree with no quorum at all: the account ledger
* for tree 1, the intent log for tree 7, the ledger again for tree 8's user admissions. Trees 7 and 8
* have no quorum path whatsoever — {setLeaves} refuses both.
* - **The configuration authority.** Branch 0 of every tree through {setConfig}, plus the pointers,
* rosters and thresholds themselves. Never a tree's own writer or quorum: what a service states is not
* authority over how that service is configured.
*
* `treeWriter[1]` being the account ledger, with no service quorum layered on top, is the design and not
* a gap. A writer contract is not a key: its rules are its bytecode, it has no owner and no proxy, and it
* authorizes every transition by verifying the ACCOUNT HOLDER'S own SLH-DSA credential against the
* commitment this chain holds. That is stronger evidence than a K-of-N of our own services attesting to
* what they read. A quorum on top would be strictly worse than nothing — it would let operators withhold
* approval from a user rotating a stolen key, which is a censorship power over the exact operation the
* account plane exists to make possible.
*
* ## Seeding the chain and asset trees
*
* Trees 5 and 6 are the two a fresh plane cannot infer. Tree 5 carries the settlement chain and asset
* registry roots; tree 6 carries the allowlist those roots stand over — supported chains, supported
* assets, policy, price sources, DEX deployments. Both are quorum-written, and both are expected to be
* SEEDED before the plane is usable: an execution chain copies its chain set and its asset set from these
* roots, so an unseeded pair means every settlement toward a chain is refused at the source and no vAsset
* ever registers. A test plane seeds the test chains; a production plane seeds the production chains and
* their assets. `chainSource` belongs in the same window, because `syncIdentities` derives a service
* account's `deployedChains` table from the enabled chain set, and an unset source quietly produces
* service leaves that exist on Final Chain alone.
*
* The bootstrap ordering is load bearing in one more place: {configureTree} refuses a threshold no live
* roster can meet, so members are registered first and trees configured after. A plane whose trees were
* never configured accepts no quorum write at all while looking perfectly healthy from outside.
*
* ## The hash shape is not a choice
*
* Leaves hash as `keccak256(0x00 ‖ leaf)` and internal nodes as
* `keccak256(0x01 ‖ lo ‖ hi)` with the pair sorted. That is
* `FinalMerkle.verifyTaggedSortedProof`, verbatim, which is what
* `FinalWalletFactory.syncAccountState` and `FinalSettlement` already run on
* every supported chain. A proof produced here is consumed there with no
* translation and no contract change, and tree 1's leaf preimage is exactly
* `FinalWalletFactory.accountStateLeafHash` — same fields, same order, the
* `deployedChains` table `abi.encode`d like every other field.
*
* Getting this wrong is not a compile error anywhere. It is a root every chain
* silently rejects, with nothing pointing at the cause.
*
* ## Positional slots under a sorted-pair tree
*
* Sorted pairs make a proof position-agnostic, which is why it carries no
* direction bits. That does not stop the TREE from being positional, and here
* it is: every key gets a permanent slot, so a single leaf update is `DEPTH`
* hashes instead of a rebuild over every leaf. The verifier neither knows nor
* needs to know that a slot exists.
*
* ## Branches
*
* The slot space of every tree is cut into `BRANCH_COUNT` branches by the top
* `BRANCH_BITS` of the slot: a branch is a subtree with a permanent place, its
* root is one internal node, and a leaf's path to the tree root passes through
* it. Branches hold what belongs to the same domain but not to the same rows
* — branch 0 is the owning service's CONFIGURATION on every tree, tree 8 adds
* the owner → wallets index and the co-signers' slot keys beside the admission
* set — and they are chosen over more trees because a branch shares its
* tree's authority doors and writer, while a tree would need its own. A leaf
* proves against its branch root with `BRANCH_DEPTH` siblings, against the
* tree root with `DEPTH`, against the round root with `ROUND_DEPTH`: one path,
* cut at three heights, one verifier.
*
* ## Rounds, and why the live roots are not the product
*
* `setLeaves` moves a tree. It does not publish one. A consumer that fetched
* eight roots one at a time would get a price proof from one moment and a
* roster proof from another, and something delisted in between would still
* verify.
*
* `publishRound` snapshots all eight together, and folds them into ONE round
* root — the tree roots as the level-`DEPTH` nodes of a depth-`ROUND_DEPTH`
* tree, tree `t` at position `t` — so a single word commits to the whole
* plane and any leaf in it proves against that word with four more siblings.
* A round is the unit a consumer pins, and it is the only thing this contract
* promises is contemporaneous. The execution chains keep anchoring per-tree
* roots (identity, account state, registry roots): those must move at their
* own cadence, not at the oracle's.
*/
contract FinalStateTrees is FinalPlaneSweep, FinalChainInitializable {
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- trees
/// @notice Every Final Wallet's public state. The source of truth other
/// chains copy through `syncAccountState`.
uint8 public constant TREE_ACCOUNTS = 1;
/// @notice The PHI record, per `(wallet, chain)`: balances, the lock, its
/// terms, the exposures carved from it and the accrual between reconciliations.
uint8 public constant TREE_PHI = 2;
/// @notice vAsset supply and backing.
uint8 public constant TREE_VASSET = 3;
/// @notice Oracle prices and their inputs.
uint8 public constant TREE_ORACLE = 4;
/// @notice Settlement chain and asset registry roots.
uint8 public constant TREE_SETTLEMENT = 5;
/// @notice Which assets and chains are supported.
uint8 public constant TREE_ALLOWLIST = 6;
/// @notice Intent status, keyed by a RING over the posting sequence.
/// @dev The search structure beside `FinalBundleLog`'s permanent record.
/// Written only by `FinalIntentLog` through `treeWriter[7]` — the tree-1
/// argument verbatim: the log verified the bond, the commitment, the
/// approval and the consume itself, and a service quorum on top would be a
/// censorship point over posting. Slots are permanent and intents are
/// unbounded flow, so the log recycles keys modulo `CAPACITY`: the tree is
/// an index with a ~1M-posting retention window, never the record.
uint8 public constant TREE_INTENTS = 7;
/// @notice The wallet-creation admission set — the identity leaves
/// (`keccak256(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF ‖ serial ‖ keysHash)`) every execution
/// chain's gateway verifies certificates against.
/// @dev The root the gateways anchor as `currentIdentityRoot`, CONTINUOUS
/// over this tree: an admission or a revocation is live the moment it
/// lands here, with no off-chain folding step standing between the two.
/// Two feeders, one per identity plane, and NO quorum door for either:
///
/// - SERVICE identities: {syncIdentityLeaves}, the permissionless
/// projection of `FinalIdentityRegistry`'s own verdict — the registry
/// calls it same-tx on every identity mutation, and anyone may call it
/// to retire a leaf whose standing lapsed by TIME (expiry moves no
/// registry storage, so only a projection pass can zero it).
/// - USER identities: `treeWriter[8]` — `FinalAccountLedger`, which
/// computes the leaf from the genesis certificate fields it verified
/// under its opener quorum and writes it once at `openAccount`. A user
/// admission leaf is permanent by construction: the certificate IS the
/// address, rotation never changes it, and a post-rotation creation on
/// a new chain reads PUBLISHED account state out of tree 1, never the
/// certificate's genesis keys.
///
/// A quorum of service signatures must not be able to state an identity
/// neither ruler decided, so `setLeaves` refuses this tree outright.
uint8 public constant TREE_IDENTITY = 8;
/// @notice Count, for iteration. Trees are 1-indexed; 0 is not a tree.
/// @notice Tree 9 — compliance: the approved set (branch 1), revocations (2), per-jurisdiction
/// counters (3) and minutes-lived action attestations (4); branch 0 pins the jurisdiction
/// policy in force and the attestation life. Typed-only: `FinalStateRecords` writes it under
/// the REGISTRAR quorum (an attestation is an admission) through `writeTypedInBranch`, and
/// the presale ledger mirrors its counters through the same companion; no `setLeaves` door
/// — no set of service signatures may attest what the provider and the screening did not
/// decide. Leaves are `FinalComplianceLeaves`; nothing in them names a person.
uint8 public constant TREE_COMPLIANCE = 9;
/// @notice Number of trees. The round root has room for 2**FOREST_BITS; a new tree is a redeploy.
uint8 public constant TREE_COUNT = 9;
/// @notice Tree height: 2^`DEPTH` slots per tree, laid out as 16 BRANCHES
/// of 2^20. The top `BRANCH_BITS` of a slot name the branch, the rest its
/// position inside it.
/// @dev FIXED, and baked into every root this contract produces. A tree is
/// padded to this height with the empty-subtree hash whether it holds one
/// leaf or a million, which is why an off-chain rebuild must use this
/// depth verbatim: a `log2(n)` tree over the same leaves is a different
/// tree and proves nothing here. Raising it is a migration and not a
/// parameter change — every outstanding proof and every root anchored on
/// another chain would have to be replaced in the same instant.
uint256 public constant DEPTH = 24;
/// @notice How many of a slot's top bits name the branch it lives in.
/// @dev `BRANCH_COUNT` is `1 << BRANCH_BITS` and `BRANCH_DEPTH` is
/// `DEPTH - BRANCH_BITS`; the three move together, or the branch a slot
/// belongs to stops matching the subtree its proof passes through.
uint256 public constant BRANCH_BITS = 4;
/// @notice Branches per tree. Ids run `0 .. BRANCH_COUNT - 1`.
/// @dev Sixteen is deliberately generous: an unused branch costs only the
/// empty-subtree hash it contributes, so a domain can grow a new family of
/// rows without a new tree, a new writer or a new authority.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_COUNT = 16;
/// @notice Height of a branch: a leaf proves against its branch root with
/// this many siblings.
uint256 public constant BRANCH_DEPTH = DEPTH - BRANCH_BITS;
/// @notice Slots per branch.
/// @dev The hard ceiling `_set` enforces: a branch that runs out of slots
/// reverts `BranchFull` rather than spilling into its neighbour, because a
/// key in the wrong branch would prove against the wrong branch root.
uint256 public constant BRANCH_CAPACITY = 1 << BRANCH_DEPTH;
/// @notice Slots per tree, all branches together.
uint256 public constant CAPACITY = 1 << DEPTH;
/// @notice How many of the round root's levels sit above the tree roots.
/// @dev The round root is a tree over the tree roots — position `t` holds
/// tree `t`'s root, positions 0 and 9..15 the empty tree — folded with the
/// same node hash. It is literally the root of a depth-`ROUND_DEPTH` tree
/// whose level-`DEPTH` nodes are the eight tree roots, which is what lets
/// one path prove a leaf against it.
uint256 public constant FOREST_BITS = 4;
/// @notice Height of the round tree: a leaf proves against a round root
/// with this many siblings, the last `FOREST_BITS` of them from
/// {roundProofFor}.
uint256 public constant ROUND_DEPTH = DEPTH + FOREST_BITS;
/// @notice Branch 0 of EVERY tree: the configuration of the service that
/// owns the tree — key → one word, the VALUE stored so a contract on this
/// chain reads it directly (`configValue`), the hash in the tree so it is
/// provable wherever a round root is. Written only by {setConfig} under
/// the configuration authority; every other door refuses the branch.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_CONFIG = 0;
/// @notice Branch 1 of every tree: the domain's own rows — accounts, PHI
/// records, vAssets, prices, registry roots, the allowlist, the intent
/// ring, the identity admission set.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_MAIN = 1;
/// @notice Tree 8, branch 2: the owner → wallets index. Key = the owner
/// (`ownerIndexKeyFor`), leaf = {ownerIndexLeafHash} over the ledger's
/// `walletsByOwner(owner)`. Written by tree 8's writer, the ledger, beside
/// every open and every owner transfer — the tree is the search structure,
/// the ledger holds the readable array it proves.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_OWNER_INDEX = 2;
/// @notice Tree 8, branch 3: the co-signers' per-slot KEM publics — a RING
/// of `SLOT_KEY_RING` positions per member, projected from
/// `slotKeySource` by {syncSlotKeyLeaves} exactly as identities are.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_SLOT_KEYS = 3;
/// @notice Tree 8, branch 4: the tunnel endpoints — the Final Node
/// identities a wallet's FNP session terminates at. Key = the endpoint id
/// (`endpointKeyFor`, the certificate's subject key id), leaf = the
/// endpoint registry's verdict, projected from `endpointSource` by
/// {syncEndpointLeaves} exactly as slot keys are. An execution chain never
/// parses an endpoint certificate; it anchors this tree's root and a client
/// proves the leaf against it.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_ENDPOINTS = 4;
/// @notice Slot-key positions per member. A slot index wraps modulo this,
/// so the branch is an index over the recent slots and never fills; 1024
/// members × 1024 positions is the branch exactly.
uint64 public constant SLOT_KEY_RING = 1024;
/// @notice The domain every tree-1 leaf is hashed under.
/// @dev Must equal `FinalWalletFactory.DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF` byte for
/// byte, and the leaf's fields must be encoded in the same order on both
/// sides. A field reordered on one side only is not a compile error
/// anywhere: it is a root every execution chain rejects, with nothing
/// pointing at the cause.
///
/// The version suffix is part of the domain, so a leaf built under a
/// different account-state shape hashes into a different domain and cannot
/// verify against this one by accident.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF =
keccak256("FINAL_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF_v03");
/// @dev The quorum action every leaf write is approved under — {setLeaves},
/// {setAccountStates} and {writeTyped} share it, so a member recomputes one
/// digest whichever door a batch came through and there is no second
/// approval shape to get wrong.
bytes32 private constant ACTION_SET_LEAVES = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.setLeaves.v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: set a tree's writer role and threshold.
/// @dev Registrar-quorum actions, verified by the registry with this
/// contract as the verifying contract. See `FinalIdentityRegistry.requireRegistrarQuorum`.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_CONFIGURE_TREE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_CONFIGURE_TREE_v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: point a tree at its writer contract.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_TREE_WRITER = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_TREE_WRITER_v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: point `syncIdentities` at the chain set.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_CHAIN_SOURCE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_CHAIN_SOURCE_v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: point tree 8's branch 3 at the slot-key registry.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_SLOT_KEY_SOURCE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_SLOT_KEY_SOURCE_v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: point tree 8's branch 4 at the endpoint registry.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_ENDPOINT_SOURCE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_ENDPOINT_SOURCE_v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: adopt a preceding plane's version and round counters.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SEED_COUNTERS = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SEED_COUNTERS_v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: install the records contract that writes the typed trees.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_TYPED_WRITER = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_TYPED_WRITER_v01");
/// @notice Configuration action: write rows into a tree's branch 0.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_CONFIG = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_CONFIG_v01");
/// @dev Tree-1 key domain. A full-width hash rather than the packed address
/// it came from, which matters: an address key occupies only the low 160
/// bits, so a hashed key colliding with one needs ~2^96 work rather than a
/// full collision. That is expensive but not comfortable, and the
/// consequence would be a service identity landing in a wallet's slot.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.account.v01");
/// @dev Tree-8 admission key domain, separated from the tree-1 domain for
/// the same reason: one account's two keys must never be the same word.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_IDENTITY_TREE_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.identity.v01");
/// @dev Tree 8, branches 2 and 3, and branch 0 of every tree. Each is its
/// own domain so a key can never land in another branch's slot by
/// construction — `_set` refuses a key whose slot sits in a different
/// branch, and the domain is what makes that refusal unreachable.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.ownerIndex.v01");
/// @dev Tree 8, branch 3: one key per `(member, ring position)` pair.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_SLOT_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.slotKey.v01");
/// @dev Tree 8, branch 4: one key per tunnel endpoint id.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_ENDPOINT_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.endpoint.v01");
/// @dev Branch 0 of every tree: one key per `(name, sub)` configuration row.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_CONFIG_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.config.v01");
/// @notice Leaf domain for the owner index in tree 8, branch 2.
/// @dev Separate from the key domain above so the leaf and the slot it
/// occupies can never be confused for one another by a reader that has
/// only one of the two.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_OWNER_INDEX_LEAF_v01");
/// @notice Leaf domain for configuration rows in branch 0 of every tree.
/// @dev The leaf binds the tree id as well as the key and value, so the
/// same row written into two trees produces two different leaves and a
/// proof cannot be carried from one tree's branch 0 to another's.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_CONFIG_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_CONFIG_LEAF_v01");
// -------------------------------------------------------------- storage
/// @notice The registry every signer is resolved through. Immutable so the
/// quorum can never be pointed at a registry supplied in calldata.
FinalIdentityRegistry public immutable registry;
/// @notice Approvals required per tree.
///
/// @dev Per-tree and not a scalar, because each tree is gated by a
/// DIFFERENT role — account co-signers, PHI, vAsset and oracle
/// publishers, registry publishers — so K is a property of that
/// tree's roster, not of the contract. All six read 2 today; that is
/// a deploy-time default, not an invariant, and collapsing them would
/// put the oracle roster's quorum on the account co-signers'.
///
/// The VALUE is a full word: it is a quantity compared against a live
/// member count, and every other threshold in the system is `uint256`.
/// The KEY is `uint8` because that is what a tree id is here — six
/// `uint8` constants, every parameter, every event, every error,
/// `_assertTree`, and the ten sibling mappings below. Widening it
/// would buy nothing (a narrow key is padded to 32 bytes before
/// hashing, so the slot is identical) and cost the getter's selector
/// on a contract that is live on both Final Chains.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint256) public threshold;
/// @notice Role a signer must hold to write to a tree.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint256) public writerRole;
/// @notice Raw (untagged) leaf value by tree and slot.
/// @dev The tag is applied when the leaf is hashed, never when it is
/// stored, so what a caller wrote is what {leafOf} hands back.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint256 => bytes32)) private _leaf;
/// @notice Internal nodes, levels 1..`DEPTH`, by tree, level and index.
/// @dev Level 0 is DERIVED from `_leaf` rather than duplicated here, so a
/// leaf lives in exactly one place and the two can never disagree. An
/// unwritten position reads zero and falls through to `_zero[level]`.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint256 => bytes32))) private _node;
/// @notice Empty-subtree hash per level, computed once at construction.
/// @dev Sized to the ROUND root's height, not the tree's, because the
/// round tree's unused positions are themselves empty trees. Built in
/// the constructor rather than declared as constants: it depends on
/// the tagging, and a constant table that drifted from the tagging
/// would produce roots nothing can verify, silently, since both sides
/// would still be internally consistent.
bytes32[ROUND_DEPTH + 1] private _zero;
/// @notice Permanent slot for a key, stored 1-based so 0 means unassigned.
/// @dev The slot's top `BRANCH_BITS` are the branch the key lives in, and
/// the assignment is permanent: a key handed a slot keeps it for the
/// life of the contract. This is what makes an update `DEPTH` hashes
/// rather than a rebuild, and what makes the tree insertion-ordered.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(bytes32 => uint256)) private _slotPlusOne;
/// @notice The key a slot was handed to — the reverse of `_slotPlusOne`.
/// @dev Lets any branch enumerate on chain ({keyAt} over
/// `0 .. branchSlotsUsed`) with no log window and no indexer. Costs
/// one extra word per NEW key, never one per update.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint256 => bytes32)) private _keyAt;
/// @notice Slots handed out per tree, all branches together.
mapping(uint8 => uint256) public slotsUsed;
/// @notice Slots handed out per branch — the next free position in it.
/// @dev Per branch and not per tree, because a branch is a fixed region of
/// the slot space: positions are allocated from the branch's own base
/// so a key can never be handed a slot outside the branch it belongs
/// to, and `BranchFull` is raised rather than spilling into the next.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint8 => uint256)) private _branchSlotsUsed;
/// @notice The VALUE behind a configuration row (branch 0), by tree and key.
/// @dev Kept beside the leaf hash so a contract on this chain reads the row
/// directly through {configValue} while the same row stays provable
/// off chain against a round root — one source for the fleet, the
/// contracts and any explorer, rather than one per reader.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(bytes32 => bytes32)) private _configValue;
/// @notice Live root per tree. Moves on every `setLeaves`.
mapping(uint8 treeId => bytes32) public liveRoot;
/// @notice Writes applied per tree, for change detection between rounds.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint64) public treeVersion;
/// @notice A contemporaneous snapshot of all eight roots, and the one
/// round root that folds them.
struct Round {
/// @dev Live root per tree at the instant of the snapshot, indexed by
/// the `TREE_*` constants. Index 0 is unused, so a tree id needs
/// no translation.
bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] roots;
/// @dev The single word committing to all eight — the roots folded as
/// the level-`DEPTH` nodes of a depth-`ROUND_DEPTH` tree.
bytes32 roundRoot;
/// @dev Block the snapshot was taken in, for a consumer reconciling a
/// round against chain history.
uint64 blockNumber;
/// @dev Snapshot instant in MILLISECONDS, like every instant on this
/// chain, so a reader never has to guess the unit.
uint64 timestamp;
}
/// @notice Published rounds, 1-indexed. Round 0 is "nothing published".
/// @dev Kept forever: a consumer pinning an old round can still fetch the
/// roots it verified against. Only rounds this deployment published
/// are here — {seedCounters} moves the counter, never the history.
mapping(uint64 => Round) private _rounds;
/// @notice Highest published round.
uint64 public round;
/// @notice Tree versions as of the last published round.
/// @dev The change detector {publishRound} reads: a round that would carry
/// nothing new is refused, so the round number cannot be advanced by
/// anyone with gas to spend.
mapping(uint8 => uint64) private _publishedVersion;
/// @notice Per-tree nonce, bound into every quorum digest.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint64) public nonce;
/**
* @notice A CONTRACT allowed to write one tree without a quorum.
*
* @dev Exactly one per tree, and today exactly one exists: tree 1's is
* `FinalAccountLedger`.
*
* This looks like a hole and is the opposite. The quorum on `setLeaves`
* exists because a tree's writer is otherwise one key deciding what the
* chain states. A writer contract is not a key — its rules are its
* bytecode, it has no owner and no proxy, and tree 1's writer authorizes
* every change by verifying the ACCOUNT HOLDER'S own post-quantum signature
* in this chain's precompiles. That is strictly stronger evidence than a
* K-of-N of our own services attesting to what they read.
*
* Keeping the quorum on top of it would be actively worse: our fleet could
* then withhold approval from a user rotating a stolen key, which is a
* censorship power over the exact operation the account plane exists to
* make possible.
*
* The writer is set on the same bootstrap window as `configureTree` and can
* be moved by a registrar afterwards — an immutable pointer would mean a
* ledger upgrade abandons the tree it writes.
*/
mapping(uint8 treeId => address) public treeWriter;
/**
* @notice Where `syncIdentities` reads the chain set from — the asset
* registry, which is also tree 6's writer.
*
* @dev A service identity is a Final Wallet whose address is the same on
* every EVM chain, so its tree-1 `deployedChains` table is derivable: one
* `(chainRef, itself)` row per chain the registry has enabled. The table
* is DERIVED from state rather than supplied by the caller precisely so
* that `syncIdentities` can stay permissionless — a caller-chosen table
* would let anyone place a service identity on a chain of their choosing.
*
* Unset (zero) means services carry an empty table and exist on Final
* Chain alone, which is what a plane looks like before its registry is
* seeded. Same configuration gate as `setTreeWriter`, because pointing this
* at a different contract changes what every service leaf says.
*/
address public chainSource;
/// @notice Where {syncSlotKeyLeaves} reads the co-signers' slot keys from
/// — the slot-key registry, whose verdict tree 8's branch 3
/// projects. Same configuration gate as `chainSource`; unset means
/// the branch cannot be written.
address public slotKeySource;
/// @notice The endpoint registry whose verdict tree 8's branch 4 projects.
address public endpointSource;
/// @notice The one contract admitted to {writeTyped}: `FinalStateRecords`,
/// which holds the preimages behind trees 2, 3 and 4 and computes
/// their keys and hashes. Same configuration gate as `treeWriter`.
address public typedWriter;
// --------------------------------------------------------------- events
/// @notice A batch of leaves landed in a tree and moved its live root.
/// @dev Emitted once per write door call, not once per leaf, and always
/// after the root has settled — so `newRoot` is the value {liveRoot}
/// answers from that block onward.
/// @param treeId The tree that moved.
/// @param count Leaves in the batch. Zero is possible for an empty call.
/// @param newRoot The tree's live root after the batch.
/// @param treeVersion The tree's write counter after the batch.
event LeavesSet(uint8 indexed treeId, uint256 count, bytes32 newRoot, uint64 treeVersion);
/// @notice Every tree's root was snapshotted into a new round.
/// @param round The round number, one above its predecessor.
/// @param blockNumber Block the snapshot was taken in.
/// @param timestamp Snapshot instant, in milliseconds.
event RoundPublished(uint64 indexed round, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp);
/// @notice A tree's writer role and approval threshold were installed.
/// @param treeId The tree configured.
/// @param writerRole Role a signer must hold to approve a write to it.
/// @param threshold Approvals a write needs; zero leaves the tree closed.
event TreeConfigured(uint8 indexed treeId, uint256 writerRole, uint256 threshold);
/// @notice A tree's quorum-free writer contract was installed or moved.
/// @param treeId The tree whose writer changed.
/// @param writer The contract now allowed to write it; zero removes the path.
event TreeWriterSet(uint8 indexed treeId, address writer);
/// @notice The contract `syncIdentities` reads the enabled chain set from was set.
/// @param source The asset registry now consulted; zero means no chain set.
event ChainSourceSet(address source);
/// @notice The registry tree 8's branch 3 projects slot keys from was set.
/// @param source The slot-key registry now consulted; zero closes the branch.
event SlotKeySourceSet(address source);
/// @notice The registry tree 8's branch 4 projects endpoints from was set.
/// @param source The endpoint registry now consulted; zero closes the branch.
event EndpointSourceSet(address source);
/// @notice A fresh plane adopted a preceding plane's counters.
/// @dev Carries the counters only. The roots behind those rounds stay with
/// the plane that published them, so {roundRootAt} below the seed
/// answers zero on this one.
/// @param round The round number this plane continues from.
/// @param versions Per-tree write counters, indexed by tree id; index 0 unused.
event CountersSeeded(uint64 round, uint64[] versions);
/// @notice The records contract admitted to the typed trees was installed.
/// @param writer The contract now allowed through {writeTyped}.
event TypedWriterSet(address writer);
/// @notice One configuration row was written into a tree's branch 0.
/// @param treeId The tree whose owning service the row configures.
/// @param key The row's branch-0 key, as {configKey} computes it.
/// @param value The row's single word of value.
event ConfigSet(uint8 indexed treeId, bytes32 indexed key, bytes32 value);
// --------------------------------------------------------------- errors
/// @notice A tree id outside `1 .. TREE_COUNT` was supplied. Zero is not a tree.
/// @param treeId The rejected id.
error UnknownTree(uint8 treeId);
/// @notice Two parallel arrays did not have the same length, or a batch was empty
/// where at least one row is required.
/// @param keys Length of the key array.
/// @param leaves Length of the value array.
error LengthMismatch(uint256 keys, uint256 leaves);
/// @notice A branch has handed out every slot it owns and cannot take a new key.
/// @dev Raised rather than spilling into the neighbouring branch: a key in
/// the wrong branch would prove against the wrong branch root.
/// @param treeId The tree the branch belongs to.
/// @param branch The exhausted branch.
error BranchFull(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch);
/// @notice A branch id at or above `BRANCH_COUNT` was supplied.
/// @param branch The rejected id.
error UnknownBranch(uint8 branch);
/// @notice A key already holds a slot in another branch of this tree.
/// @dev Slots are permanent, so a key cannot be moved between branches.
/// Reaching this means two callers disagree about where a row lives.
/// @param treeId The tree involved.
/// @param key The key whose slot is already assigned.
/// @param have The branch the key's slot actually sits in.
/// @param want The branch the caller tried to write it into.
error BranchMismatch(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key, uint8 have, uint8 want);
/// @notice Branch 0 is written by `setConfig` alone.
/// @dev Every other door refuses it, so a tree's writer or quorum can never
/// restate the configuration of the service that feeds it.
/// @param treeId The tree whose branch 0 was targeted.
error ConfigBranchReserved(uint8 treeId);
/// @notice Tree 8's branch 3 was written while no slot-key registry is installed.
error SlotKeySourceUnset();
/// @notice Tree 8's branch 4 was written while no endpoint registry is installed.
error EndpointSourceUnset();
/// @notice Counters can be seeded only into a plane that has published nothing.
/// @dev Seeding a plane that already moved would rewind counters consumers
/// have compared against, so it is refused rather than reconciled.
error NotFresh();
/// @notice The seeded version array was not one entry per tree plus the unused index 0.
/// @param given The length supplied.
error VersionCountMismatch(uint256 given);
/// @notice The tree has no threshold installed, so no quorum write can be authorized.
/// @param treeId The unconfigured tree.
error TreeNotConfigured(uint8 treeId);
/// @notice A round was requested while no tree has moved since the last one.
/// @dev The round number is therefore not advanceable by anyone with gas
/// to spend, and a round always means something changed.
error NothingToPublish();
/// @notice The key holds no slot in this tree, so there is nothing to prove or read.
/// @param treeId The tree searched.
/// @param key The key with no slot.
error UnknownKey(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key);
/// @notice The caller is not the writer seat or typed writer this door requires.
/// @param caller The rejected address.
error NotAuthorized(address caller);
/// @notice A round was asked for on a plane that has published none, or one above the latest.
error NoRounds();
/// @notice A threshold was configured above the number of members who could meet it.
/// @dev Refused at configuration time so a tree is never installed already
/// unwritable. Register the roster first; that ordering is the point.
/// Revocation can still walk a live tree into this state later, which
/// is what {quorumHealth} exists for — revocation must never be
/// blocked on quorum arithmetic.
/// @param treeId The tree being configured.
/// @param live Members currently holding the role.
/// @param required Approvals the rejected configuration would demand.
error ThresholdUnreachable(uint8 treeId, uint256 live, uint256 required);
/// @notice Trees 7 and 8 take no quorum writes — only their writer
/// contract (and, for tree 8, the registry projection).
/// @dev An intent's status is what the intent log verified and an identity
/// is what the registry or the ledger verified. No set of service
/// signatures can make a different answer true, so there is no quorum
/// door to refuse at — the door does not exist.
/// @param treeId The writer-only tree a quorum write was aimed at.
error WriterOnlyTree(uint8 treeId);
/// @notice `setLeaves` was called on a tree that has a typed writer.
/// @dev Trees 2, 3 and 4 keep the leaf's preimage beside its hash so a
/// consumer can read the VALUE. An untyped write sets the hash and
/// cannot set the preimage — the pair would disagree, and the stored
/// value would look authoritative while committing to nothing. The
/// typed entrypoint is not a convenience over this one; it is the
/// only door.
/// @param treeId The typed tree an untyped write was aimed at.
error TypedTreeOnly(uint8 treeId);
/// @notice A `deployedChains` row names the zero chain or the zero account,
/// or repeats a chain. A table with either proves nothing about
/// where the account exists.
/// @dev Checked wherever the leaf is hashed, so no door — quorum, writer
/// contract, identity projection — can publish a table a resolver on
/// another chain would read two ways.
/// @param chainRef The offending row's chain reference.
/// @param account The offending row's account on that chain.
error InvalidChainAccount(bytes32 chainRef, bytes32 account);
// ---------------------------------------------------------- constructor
/**
* @notice Pin the identity registry and bring all eight trees up empty.
* @param registry_ The identity registry. Every signer, key and role is
* resolved through it.
* @dev The registry is `immutable`, so no later call can point the quorum
* at a registry supplied in calldata — a roster chosen by the caller is a
* roster that approves whatever the caller wants.
*
* The empty-subtree table is built here rather than as constants because it
* depends on the tagging, and a constant table that drifted from the
* tagging would produce roots nothing can verify — silently, since both
* sides would still be self-consistent.
*
* Every tree starts at the empty root rather than zero, so a consumer can
* tell "this tree holds nothing" from "this contract has never run".
*/
constructor(FinalIdentityRegistry registry_) {
registry = registry_;
_setUp();
}
/**
* @notice The constructor's storage writes, for a deployment behind `FinalChainProxy`: the proxy's
* constructor runs this once in the proxy's storage. Reverts `AlreadyInitialized` on a direct
* deploy (its constructor ran it) and on a second call.
*/
function initialize() external {
_setUp();
}
/// @dev The empty-subtree ladder and every tree's empty root — storage, so a proxy needs it replayed.
function _setUp() internal initializer {
// Level 0: the tagged hash of an empty (zero) leaf.
_zero[0] = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x00), bytes32(0)));
for (uint256 l = 0; l < ROUND_DEPTH; l++) {
// Both children equal, so the sort is a no-op and the order is
// irrelevant — which is the only reason this table is one value per
// level rather than one per position.
_zero[l + 1] = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x01), _zero[l], _zero[l]));
}
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
liveRoot[t] = _zero[DEPTH];
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------- configuration
/**
* @notice The gate every configuration entrypoint on this contract passes through.
* @dev The registry's bootstrap admin alone while its window is open, the
* sealed `ROLE_REGISTRAR` quorum afterwards. The same window the registry
* uses, for the same reason — every roster has to be installed by someone
* before it can install itself — and the same quorum, because a threshold
* is membership by another name: whoever can set K to one owns the tree.
*
* Not `view`: the registrar path burns the registry's own nonce, so an
* approved configuration payload cannot be replayed at a later block.
* @param actionDomain The `ACTION_*` constant naming what is being configured.
* @param payloadDigest Hash of the arguments this call would apply.
* @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
*/
function _requireConfigurationAuthority(
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) private {
if (!registry.bootstrapSealed() && msg.sender == registry.bootstrapAdmin()) return;
registry.requireRegistrarQuorum(actionDomain, payloadDigest, anchorBlock, approvals);
}
/**
* @notice Set which role may write a tree and how many approvals it needs.
* @dev The configuration authority, never the tree's own quorum: a roster
* that could raise or lower its own threshold is a roster with no
* threshold. A tree left at `k == 0` refuses every quorum write with
* `TreeNotConfigured`, which is the state a fresh plane starts in.
* @param treeId The tree being configured.
* @param role Role a signer must hold for an approval to count.
* @param k Approvals a write needs; `0` leaves the tree unconfigured.
* @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
*/
function configureTree(
uint8 treeId,
uint256 role,
uint256 k,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_CONFIGURE_TREE, keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, role, k)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
// Refuse a threshold nobody can meet. Register the members first; that
// ordering is the point, not an inconvenience. A 4-of-5 configured
// against three registered co-signers is a tree that reverts on every
// write, and the revert names the threshold rather than the roster.
if (k != 0) {
uint256 live = registry.liveMemberCount(role);
if (live < k) revert ThresholdUnreachable(treeId, live, k);
}
writerRole[treeId] = role;
threshold[treeId] = k;
emit TreeConfigured(treeId, role, k);
}
/**
* @notice Point a tree at the contract allowed to write it directly.
* @dev Same gate as `configureTree`, for the same reason. Setting it to the
* zero address removes the path entirely and leaves the tree quorum-only.
*
* Point this at a CONTRACT, never at an externally owned account. The whole
* argument for a quorum-free writer is that its rules are its bytecode; an
* account holding a key is exactly the single-key authority the quorum on
* {setLeaves} exists to prevent.
*
* Movable rather than immutable on purpose: an immutable pointer would mean
* a ledger redeploy abandons the tree it writes, with no way back.
* @param treeId The tree whose writer seat is being set.
* @param writer The contract admitted to it; zero removes the seat.
* @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
*/
function setTreeWriter(
uint8 treeId,
address writer,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_TREE_WRITER, keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, writer)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
treeWriter[treeId] = writer;
emit TreeWriterSet(treeId, writer);
}
/**
* @notice Point `syncIdentities` at the contract that knows the chain set.
* @dev Same gate as `setTreeWriter`. Zero removes the source, after which
* service leaves carry an empty `deployedChains` table — which is what a
* plane looks like before its asset registry is seeded, and is why this
* pointer belongs in the same bootstrap window as the seed itself.
* @param source The asset registry to read the enabled chain set from.
* @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
*/
function setChainSource(
address source,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_CHAIN_SOURCE, keccak256(abi.encode(source)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
chainSource = source;
emit ChainSourceSet(source);
}
/// @notice Point tree 8's branch 3 at the slot-key registry it projects.
/// @dev Same gate as `setChainSource`. Zero closes the branch entirely:
/// {syncSlotKeyLeaves} reverts `SlotKeySourceUnset` rather than
/// writing leaves whose value nothing vouched for.
/// @param source The slot-key registry whose verdict the branch projects.
/// @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
/// @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
function setSlotKeySource(
address source,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_SLOT_KEY_SOURCE, keccak256(abi.encode(source)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
slotKeySource = source;
emit SlotKeySourceSet(source);
}
/// @notice Point tree 8's branch 4 at the endpoint registry it projects.
/// @dev Same gate as `setSlotKeySource`, and the same fail-closed shape:
/// zero makes {syncEndpointLeaves} revert `EndpointSourceUnset`.
/// @param source The endpoint registry whose verdict the branch projects.
/// @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
/// @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
function setEndpointSource(
address source,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_ENDPOINT_SOURCE, keccak256(abi.encode(source)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
endpointSource = source;
emit EndpointSourceSet(source);
}
/**
* @notice Adopt a preceding plane's counters — one `treeVersion` per tree
* (index = treeId, 0 unused) and the published `round` — so a
* redeploy stays monotonic for every consumer that compares them:
* rings, explorers, the round feed.
* @dev This contract is immutable, so replacing it means a new address, and
* a fresh address would otherwise restart every counter at zero. A consumer
* that treats a counter as monotonic would then read the new plane as
* older than the state it already holds, and quietly ignore live data.
*
* It carries the counters and nothing else. The roots behind those rounds
* stay with the plane that published them, so {roundRootAt} below the seed
* answers zero here — pin a round on the plane that produced it.
*
* Configuration authority (bootstrap admin before the seal, registrar
* quorum after), and only while this plane has published nothing:
* `NotFresh` otherwise, because rewinding a counter a consumer has already
* compared against is worse than never seeding at all.
* @param versions Per-tree write counters to adopt, indexed by tree id;
* index 0 is unused and must still be present.
* @param round_ The round number this plane continues from.
* @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
*/
function seedCounters(
uint64[] calldata versions,
uint64 round_,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SEED_COUNTERS, keccak256(abi.encode(versions, round_)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
if (versions.length != TREE_COUNT + 1) revert VersionCountMismatch(versions.length);
if (round != 0) revert NotFresh();
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
if (treeVersion[t] != 0) revert NotFresh();
}
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
treeVersion[t] = versions[t];
}
round = round_;
emit CountersSeeded(round_, versions);
}
/// @notice Install the records contract that writes the typed trees.
/// @dev Trees 2, 3 and 4 have no other door at all — {setLeaves} refuses
/// them outright — so leaving this unset closes those three
/// completely. Same gate as `setTreeWriter`, and the same rule: a
/// contract, never an account holding a key.
/// @param writer The records contract admitted to {writeTyped}.
/// @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
/// @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
function setTypedWriter(
address writer,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_TYPED_WRITER, keccak256(abi.encode(writer)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
typedWriter = writer;
emit TypedWriterSet(writer);
}
/**
* @notice Write configuration rows into a tree's branch 0.
* @param treeId The tree whose owning service the rows configure.
* @param keys `configKey(name, sub)` per row.
* @param values One word per row — a duration, a count, an address, a
* flag; the reader knows the shape from the name.
* @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
*
* @dev The configuration authority, not the tree's writer or quorum: a
* tree's writer states what its domain verified, its quorum attests to
* what it read, and neither is the authority over how the service that
* feeds it is configured.
*
* The value is stored beside the hash so a contract on this chain reads it
* in one call ({configValue}) while the same row is provable off chain
* against a round root. That is one source of truth for the fleet, the
* contracts and any explorer at once — a service reading its own
* environment instead would be a second source, free to disagree with this
* one and with nothing on chain able to notice.
*/
function setConfig(
uint8 treeId,
bytes32[] calldata keys,
bytes32[] calldata values,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
if (keys.length != values.length || keys.length == 0) revert LengthMismatch(keys.length, values.length);
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_CONFIG, keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, keys, values)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_configValue[treeId][keys[i]] = values[i];
_set(treeId, BRANCH_CONFIG, keys[i], configLeafHash(treeId, keys[i], values[i]));
emit ConfigSet(treeId, keys[i], values[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------- writing
/**
* @notice Write leaves into one branch of one tree under a PQ quorum.
* @param treeId Which tree.
* @param branch Which branch — never 0, which `setConfig` alone writes.
* @param keys Domain keys — a wallet address for accounts, an asset id for
* the allowlist, whatever identifies a row in that domain. Each gets
* a permanent slot in the branch on first write.
* @param leaves The raw (untagged) leaf values.
* @param anchorBlock The block the approving roster is read as of.
* @param approvals At least `threshold[treeId]` of them, ascending by signer.
*
* @dev The digest binds the tree, its nonce, and the full batch. Binding the
* nonce is what stops the same approved batch being replayed: without it,
* an approval to set a price is an approval to set that price again at any
* later block, which for an oracle is the whole attack.
*
* ML-DSA-87 is required rather than accepted. These are operational,
* high-cadence writes — the transaction class — and leaving the choice open
* would mean a break in either scheme takes the tree.
*
* Three tree classes are refused here outright, each with its own error:
* the typed trees (2, 3 and 4) because their preimage has to be built by
* the records contract, and the writer-only trees (7 and 8) because no set
* of service signatures can make a different answer true about an intent's
* status or an identity's standing.
*/
function setLeaves(
uint8 treeId,
uint8 branch,
bytes32[] calldata keys,
bytes32[] calldata leaves,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
_assertDataBranch(treeId, branch);
if (treeId == TREE_PHI || treeId == TREE_VASSET || treeId == TREE_ORACLE || treeId == TREE_COMPLIANCE) {
revert TypedTreeOnly(treeId);
}
// Trees 7 and 8 have their own rulers and NO quorum path at all: an
// intent's status is what `FinalIntentLog` verified, an identity is
// what the registry or the ledger verified, and no set of service
// signatures can make a different answer true.
if (treeId == TREE_INTENTS || treeId == TREE_IDENTITY) revert WriterOnlyTree(treeId);
if (keys.length != leaves.length) revert LengthMismatch(keys.length, leaves.length);
uint256 k = threshold[treeId];
if (k == 0) revert TreeNotConfigured(treeId);
uint64 n = nonce[treeId];
FinalPqQuorum.require_(
registry,
approvals,
FinalPqQuorum.digest(
address(this),
ACTION_SET_LEAVES,
anchorBlock,
keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, branch, n, keys, leaves))
),
writerRole[treeId],
k,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
false
);
nonce[treeId] = n + 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_set(treeId, branch, keys[i], leaves[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
/// @notice One chain an account exists on, and as what.
/// @dev `chainRef` is the registry's CAIP-derived chain reference — the one
/// identifier that names an EVM chain and a non-EVM one alike — and
/// `account` is the wallet's account there, in that chain's own account
/// space (an EVM address right-aligned, a 32-byte key filling the
/// width). Field-for-field with `IWalletTypes.ChainAccount`.
struct ChainAccount {
/// @dev The registry's CAIP-derived reference for the chain.
bytes32 chainRef;
/// @dev The account on that chain, in that chain's own account space.
bytes32 account;
}
/// @notice `FinalWalletFactory.AccountStateLeaf`, field for field.
/// @dev The preimage of every tree-1 leaf. The field set, the field ORDER
/// and the domain must match the factory's exactly on every supported
/// chain; a field added, removed or reordered on one side alone is a
/// root every execution chain rejects with nothing naming the cause.
struct AccountStateLeaf {
/// @dev The Final Wallet this leaf describes. Also what `accountKeyFor`
/// hashes into the tree-1 key, so one wallet holds one slot.
address wallet;
/// @dev Active-stage access-key commitment — the credential the account
/// ledger checks a state transition against.
bytes32 liveAccess;
/// @dev Active-stage transaction-key commitment.
bytes32 liveTransaction;
/// @dev Pre-committed successor to `liveAccess`, so a rotation reveals a
/// key that was already committed rather than one chosen after.
bytes32 recoveryAccess;
/// @dev Pre-committed successor to `liveTransaction`.
bytes32 recoveryTransaction;
/// @dev Active-stage encapsulation commitment and its pre-committed
/// successor. Field-for-field with `FinalWalletFactory.AccountStateLeaf`;
/// a field added on one side and not the other is a root every execution
/// chain rejects, with nothing pointing at the cause.
bytes32 liveKem;
/// @dev Pre-committed successor to `liveKem`.
bytes32 recoveryKem;
/// @dev Who may authorize for this account. This is the PROVEN owner an
/// execution chain resolves authority from; a copy stored there is
/// wrong for as long as nobody has pushed to that chain, and
/// nothing there can tell.
address owner;
/// @dev Whether the account authorizes post-quantum. One-way once set.
bool pqEnabled;
/// @dev Whether the account is frozen. Returned to a resolver rather
/// than enforced by it, so a reader can still learn who owns a
/// frozen account; the wallet refuses on this PROVEN value rather
/// than on a synced copy, so a chain behind on the fan-out cannot
/// let a frozen account transact.
bool frozen;
/// @dev The chains this account exists on, and its account on each —
/// including chains whose accounts are not EVM addresses. Decided HERE
/// (set by the holder through the ledger) and enforced there: an
/// execution chain refuses to create the account unless the table has a
/// row for it, and a settlement toward a chain with no row is refused at
/// the source. This is also what a zero beneficiary resolves through: a
/// table naming the account on each chain answers "as what", which a
/// bare membership flag never could. `_assertChainAccounts` rejects a
/// zero chain, a zero account and a repeated chain, so no door can
/// publish a table a resolver would read two ways.
ChainAccount[] deployedChains;
/// @dev Per-chain dormancy verdict, one bit per asset-registry chain
/// slot, so the bit positions are the registry's slot numbering rather
/// than this table's row order.
uint32 dormantChains;
/// @dev Commitment to the recovery credential the account enrols at creation
/// (`keccak256(abi.encode(FINAL_RECOVERY_ENROLMENT_v01, validator, keccak256(registrationData)))`);
/// zero = none. Declared through the ledger, bound here so creation cannot be front-run with another
/// credential. Field-for-field with `FinalWalletFactory.AccountStateLeaf`.
bytes32 recoveryCredential;
/// @dev Which `deployedChains` ROWS are created with that credential enrolled: bit i is row i (not the
/// registry slot `dormantChains` uses). A set bit needs a non-zero `recoveryCredential`.
uint32 guardedChains;
/// @dev Monotonic per-account revision. Lets a reader holding two
/// proofs tell which one is newer without consulting a round.
uint64 version;
}
/**
* @notice Write account state into tree 1 from the typed leaf.
* @dev The typed form exists so the leaf preimage is built HERE rather than
* by whoever assembles the calldata. Tree 1 is the source of truth for every
* other chain, and `syncAccountState` will accept any 32 bytes that carry a
* valid proof — so if the publisher chose the preimage, the publisher could
* write an account state that no wallet record on this chain agrees with,
* and the proof would still verify everywhere.
*
* The round takes the ML-DSA-87 vote alone, as every tree write does (the
* user's ruling of 12 Sep 2026, arch/quorum-signing-ml-dsa.md). Who an
* account IS is decided by the holder's own SLH-DSA credential in
* `FinalAccountLedger` — the ledger is `treeWriter[1]` and writes tree 1
* with no service quorum at all — so a quorum round here re-publishes state
* the holder already authorized; it is the roster's membership, not the
* account's, that keeps the SLH-DSA seal (the registrar quorum).
* @param leaves The account states to write, one per wallet.
* @param anchorBlock The block the approving roster is read as of.
* @param approvals At least `threshold[TREE_ACCOUNTS]` of them, ascending by signer.
*/
function setAccountStates(
AccountStateLeaf[] calldata leaves,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
uint256 k = threshold[TREE_ACCOUNTS];
if (k == 0) revert TreeNotConfigured(TREE_ACCOUNTS);
bytes32[] memory keys = new bytes32[](leaves.length);
bytes32[] memory hashes = new bytes32[](leaves.length);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaves.length; i++) {
keys[i] = accountKeyFor(leaves[i].wallet);
hashes[i] = accountStateLeafHash(leaves[i]);
}
uint64 n = nonce[TREE_ACCOUNTS];
FinalPqQuorum.require_(
registry,
approvals,
FinalPqQuorum.digest(
address(this),
ACTION_SET_LEAVES,
anchorBlock,
keccak256(abi.encode(TREE_ACCOUNTS, n, keys, hashes))
),
writerRole[TREE_ACCOUNTS],
k,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
false
);
nonce[TREE_ACCOUNTS] = n + 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaves.length; i++) {
_set(TREE_ACCOUNTS, BRANCH_MAIN, keys[i], hashes[i]);
}
_bump(TREE_ACCOUNTS, leaves.length);
}
/**
* @notice Write account state into tree 1 from the contract that owns it.
* @dev No quorum, and no nonce burned: `treeWriter[1]` is the ledger, and
* the ledger already verified the holder's own signature before it called
* here. See {treeWriter} for why adding a service quorum on top would be a
* censorship power rather than a safeguard.
*
* Typed, exactly as `setAccountStates` is: the preimage is built HERE, so
* even the writer contract cannot publish a leaf whose meaning no record on
* this chain agrees with.
* @param leaves The account states to write, one per wallet.
*/
function setAccountStatesAsWriter(AccountStateLeaf[] calldata leaves) external {
if (msg.sender != treeWriter[TREE_ACCOUNTS]) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaves.length; i++) {
_set(TREE_ACCOUNTS, BRANCH_MAIN, accountKeyFor(leaves[i].wallet), accountStateLeafHash(leaves[i]));
}
_bump(TREE_ACCOUNTS, leaves.length);
}
/**
* @notice Write raw leaves into any tree from the contract that owns it.
* @dev The generic sibling of {setAccountStatesAsWriter}, for a tree whose
* writer is a contract rather than a service quorum. Same authorization —
* `treeWriter[treeId]` and nothing else — and the same reasoning: the
* writer has already verified whatever its domain requires, and layering a
* quorum on top of a contract's own rules is a censorship power rather
* than a safeguard.
*
* UNTYPED, unlike the account path, and that is the trade. Tree 1's
* preimage is built here so even the ledger cannot publish a leaf whose
* meaning no record agrees with; a generic writer supplies its own hash,
* so the leaf means whatever that contract says it means. Acceptable only
* because the writer is a specific contract this chain's operators
* installed — its rules are its bytecode, it has no owner and no proxy —
* and NOT acceptable for a role-gated key. Point `treeWriter` at a
* contract, never at an externally owned account.
* @param treeId The tree to write.
* @param branch The branch within it. Never 0, which `setConfig` alone writes.
* @param keys Domain keys, one per leaf. Each takes a permanent slot in the
* branch on first write.
* @param leaves The raw (untagged) leaf values.
*/
function setLeavesAsWriter(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch, bytes32[] calldata keys, bytes32[] calldata leaves)
external
{
if (msg.sender != treeWriter[treeId]) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
_assertDataBranch(treeId, branch);
if (keys.length != leaves.length) revert LengthMismatch(keys.length, leaves.length);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_set(treeId, branch, keys[i], leaves[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
/// @notice The leaf hash `FinalWalletFactory.accountStateLeafHash` computes.
/// @dev Identical `abi.encode`, identical field order, identical domain, and
/// that identity is the whole contract between this chain and every
/// execution chain. `deployedChains` rides through `abi.encode` like every
/// other field — head offset, then length and rows — so the table is
/// committed whole and in order. The table is validated here rather than at
/// each door, so every path into tree 1 gets the same refusal.
/// @param leaf The account state to commit to.
/// @return The tagged leaf hash, ready to be placed in tree 1.
function accountStateLeafHash(AccountStateLeaf memory leaf) public pure returns (bytes32) {
_assertChainAccounts(leaf.deployedChains);
return keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF,
leaf.wallet,
leaf.liveAccess,
leaf.liveTransaction,
leaf.recoveryAccess,
leaf.recoveryTransaction,
leaf.liveKem,
leaf.recoveryKem,
leaf.owner,
leaf.pqEnabled,
leaf.frozen,
leaf.deployedChains,
leaf.dormantChains,
leaf.recoveryCredential,
leaf.guardedChains,
leaf.version
)
);
}
/// @notice Reject a `deployedChains` table a resolver could not read.
/// @dev A well-formed table: no zero chain, no zero account, no chain twice.
/// Checked where the leaf is hashed so no door — quorum, writer
/// contract, identity projection — can publish a table a resolver
/// would read two ways. The duplicate scan is quadratic in the row
/// count, which is deliberate: gas is not a constraint on this chain,
/// and a sort or a seen-set would cost correctness or storage to save
/// something nobody is paying for.
/// @param rows The table to validate.
function _assertChainAccounts(ChainAccount[] memory rows) private pure {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < rows.length; i++) {
if (rows[i].chainRef == bytes32(0) || rows[i].account == bytes32(0)) {
revert InvalidChainAccount(rows[i].chainRef, rows[i].account);
}
for (uint256 j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (rows[j].chainRef == rows[i].chainRef) {
revert InvalidChainAccount(rows[i].chainRef, rows[i].account);
}
}
}
}
/// @notice The account `wallet`'s published table names on `chainRef`, or
/// zero if it has no row there.
/// @dev A convenience over `accountStateLeafHash`'s input for readers on
/// this chain; execution chains answer the same question from their synced
/// record (`FinalWalletFactory.addressOn`). Pure, so it reads the leaf it is
/// handed and never this contract's storage — the caller is responsible for
/// having proved that leaf first.
/// @param leaf The account state to search.
/// @param chainRef The chain being asked about.
/// @return The account on that chain, or zero when the table has no row for it.
function accountOn(AccountStateLeaf memory leaf, bytes32 chainRef) public pure returns (bytes32) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaf.deployedChains.length; i++) {
if (leaf.deployedChains[i].chainRef == chainRef) return leaf.deployedChains[i].account;
}
return bytes32(0);
}
/**
* @notice The typed trees' write door — `FinalStateRecords` alone.
* @dev The quorum, the nonce and the write, shared by every typed record.
* The records contract computed the keys and hashes from the structs it
* stores; this contract admits nobody else to trees 2, 3 and 4
* (`setLeaves` refuses them), so the value there can never drift from
* the commitment here.
*
* The digest is byte-identical to `setLeaves`' over the same keys and
* hashes, deliberately: the typed entrypoints choose the PREIMAGE, not the
* authorization. A member recomputes one digest whichever door the batch
* came through, and there is no second approval shape to get wrong.
*
* Always branch 1: a typed record is a domain row, and branch 0 belongs to
* the configuration authority on every tree without exception.
* @param treeId The typed tree being written.
* @param keys Domain keys the records contract computed, one per leaf.
* @param hashes Leaf hashes the records contract computed from its structs.
* @param anchorBlock The block the approving roster is read as of.
* @param approvals At least `threshold[treeId]` of them, ascending by signer.
*/
function writeTyped(
uint8 treeId,
bytes32[] memory keys,
bytes32[] memory hashes,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
if (msg.sender != typedWriter) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
uint256 k = threshold[treeId];
if (k == 0) revert TreeNotConfigured(treeId);
uint64 n = nonce[treeId];
FinalPqQuorum.require_(
registry,
approvals,
FinalPqQuorum.digest(
address(this),
ACTION_SET_LEAVES,
anchorBlock,
keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, n, keys, hashes))
),
writerRole[treeId],
k,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
false
);
nonce[treeId] = n + 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_set(treeId, BRANCH_MAIN, keys[i], hashes[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
/**
* @notice The typed door for a tree whose leaves live in SEVERAL data branches — tree 9, whose
* approvals, revocations, counters and attestations are four key families, each with a
* permanent branch. Same writer, same role, same threshold and the same per-tree nonce as
* `writeTyped`; the branch is folded into the signed payload so a quorum that approved a
* revocation cannot be replayed as an approval.
* @dev `writeTyped` stays byte-for-byte what it is (trees 2–4 write `BRANCH_MAIN` and their lanes
* sign `(treeId, n, keys, hashes)`); this door signs `(treeId, branch, n, keys, hashes)`.
* Branch 0 is `setConfig`'s alone.
* @param treeId The tree.
* @param branch The data branch every key of this write lives in (`1 .. BRANCH_COUNT - 1`).
* @param keys Domain keys, as the companion derived them.
* @param hashes The leaf hashes, one per key.
* @param anchorBlock The roster anchor the approvals were made against.
* @param approvals `threshold[treeId]` ML-DSA-87 votes from `writerRole[treeId]` members.
*/
function writeTypedInBranch(
uint8 treeId,
uint8 branch,
bytes32[] memory keys,
bytes32[] memory hashes,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
if (msg.sender != typedWriter) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
_assertDataBranch(treeId, branch);
if (keys.length != hashes.length) revert LengthMismatch(keys.length, hashes.length);
uint256 k = threshold[treeId];
if (k == 0) revert TreeNotConfigured(treeId);
uint64 n = nonce[treeId];
FinalPqQuorum.require_(
registry,
approvals,
FinalPqQuorum.digest(
address(this),
ACTION_SET_LEAVES,
anchorBlock,
keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, branch, n, keys, hashes))
),
writerRole[treeId],
k,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
false
);
nonce[treeId] = n + 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_set(treeId, branch, keys[i], hashes[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
/**
* @notice Snapshot every tree's root into a new round.
* @dev Permissionless, deliberately. Every root being snapshotted was
* already authorized by its tree's quorum, so this adds no authority — it
* only fixes a moment. Requiring a signature would put a liveness
* dependency in front of publication for no security gain.
*
* A round that would change nothing is refused, so the round number cannot
* be advanced by anyone with gas to spend.
* @return published The round number just written.
*/
function publishRound() external returns (uint64 published) {
bool changed;
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
if (treeVersion[t] != _publishedVersion[t]) {
changed = true;
break;
}
}
if (!changed) revert NothingToPublish();
published = round + 1;
Round storage r = _rounds[published];
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
r.roots[t] = liveRoot[t];
_publishedVersion[t] = treeVersion[t];
}
r.roundRoot = _foldForest(_forestLeaves(r.roots));
r.blockNumber = uint64(block.number);
// MILLISECONDS, like every instant on this chain.
r.timestamp = FinalChainTime.nowMs();
round = published;
emit RoundPublished(published, r.blockNumber, r.timestamp);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- views
/// @notice Every root from one round. Index by the `TREE_*` constants;
/// index 0 is unused.
/// @dev An unpublished round answers all zeros rather than reverting, so a
/// caller scanning forward can tell where the history ends.
/// @param which The round number.
/// @return The eight tree roots at that round, indexed by tree id.
function rootsAt(uint64 which) external view returns (bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] memory) {
return _rounds[which].roots;
}
/// @notice One tree's root at one round.
/// @param which The round number.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @return That tree's root at that round; zero if the round is unpublished.
function rootAt(uint64 which, uint8 treeId) external view returns (bytes32) {
_assertTree(treeId);
return _rounds[which].roots[treeId];
}
/// @notice The one word that commits to every tree at one round.
/// @dev The value a consumer pins. Everything in the plane at that instant
/// proves against it, which is the only contemporaneity this contract
/// offers — the live roots move independently and do not.
/// @param which The round number.
/// @return The round root; zero if the round is unpublished on this plane.
function roundRootAt(uint64 which) external view returns (bytes32) {
return _rounds[which].roundRoot;
}
/**
* @notice The `FOREST_BITS` siblings that take a tree's root at one round
* up to that round's root — appended to `proofFor`, they make a
* leaf provable against `roundRootAt(which)` by the same verifier.
* @dev Folds the round's stored roots in memory rather than keeping the
* upper levels in storage: the fold is cheap, and one stored copy of a
* value is one fewer place for two copies to disagree.
* @param which The round number. Must be published on this plane.
* @param treeId The tree whose root is being lifted to the round root.
* @return path The `FOREST_BITS` siblings, lowest level first.
*/
function roundProofFor(uint64 which, uint8 treeId) external view returns (bytes32[] memory path) {
_assertTree(treeId);
if (which == 0 || which > round) revert NoRounds();
bytes32[] memory level = _forestLeaves(_rounds[which].roots);
path = new bytes32[](FOREST_BITS);
uint256 idx = treeId;
uint256 n = level.length;
for (uint256 l = 0; l < FOREST_BITS; l++) {
path[l] = level[idx ^ 1];
n >>= 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
level[i] = _pair(level[2 * i], level[2 * i + 1]);
}
idx >>= 1;
}
}
/// @notice The latest round's roots, with the block it was taken at.
/// @dev Reverts `NoRounds` on a plane that has published nothing, rather
/// than answering an empty round that a caller could mistake for a
/// real snapshot of an empty plane.
/// @return which The round number.
/// @return roots The eight tree roots, indexed by tree id; index 0 unused.
/// @return blockNumber Block the snapshot was taken in.
/// @return timestamp Snapshot instant, in milliseconds.
function latestRound()
external
view
returns (uint64 which, bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] memory roots, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp)
{
which = round;
if (which == 0) revert NoRounds();
Round storage r = _rounds[which];
return (which, r.roots, r.blockNumber, r.timestamp);
}
/// @notice The raw leaf stored for a key, and whether it has a slot.
/// @dev The UNTAGGED value, as it was written. The tag is applied when the
/// leaf is hashed into the tree, so a caller reproducing a leaf hash
/// applies it themselves. A key with no slot answers `(0, false)`
/// rather than reverting, so presence is a question this view can be
/// asked directly.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @param key The domain key.
/// @return leaf The stored value, or zero when the key has no slot.
/// @return present Whether the key holds a slot in this tree.
function leafOf(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32 leaf, bool present) {
uint256 s = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key];
if (s == 0) return (bytes32(0), false);
return (_leaf[treeId][s - 1], true);
}
/// @notice The permanent slot for a key. Reverts if it has none. The
/// slot's top `BRANCH_BITS` are its branch.
/// @dev Stored one-based internally so an unassigned key is distinguishable
/// from slot 0, and returned zero-based here — slot 0 of branch 0 is a
/// real position.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @param key The domain key.
/// @return The key's zero-based slot index within the tree.
function slotOf(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 s = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key];
if (s == 0) revert UnknownKey(treeId, key);
return s - 1;
}
/// @notice The key a slot was handed to, or zero if it is still free —
/// the enumeration every branch offers: slots `branch << BRANCH_DEPTH`
/// through `+ branchSlotsUsed(treeId, branch) - 1`.
/// @dev Because slots are handed out in order and never reused, that range
/// is exactly the branch's contents: a reader enumerates a branch on
/// chain without an event window and without an indexer.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @param slot The slot index.
/// @return The key holding that slot, or zero when it was never handed out.
function keyAt(uint8 treeId, uint256 slot) external view returns (bytes32) {
return _keyAt[treeId][slot];
}
/// @notice Slots handed out in one branch.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @param branch The branch to read.
/// @return How many slots of that branch are in use — its enumeration bound.
function branchSlotsUsed(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch) external view returns (uint256) {
return _branchSlotsUsed[treeId][branch];
}
/// @notice One branch's root: the level-`BRANCH_DEPTH` node at its position.
/// @dev A branch that has never been written answers the empty-subtree hash
/// at that level, not zero, because that is genuinely its root.
/// @param treeId The tree the branch belongs to.
/// @param branch The branch to read.
/// @return The branch's root node.
function branchRoot(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch) external view returns (bytes32) {
_assertTree(treeId);
_assertBranch(branch);
return _nodeAt(treeId, BRANCH_DEPTH, branch);
}
/// @notice The first `BRANCH_DEPTH` siblings of `proofFor` — a proof
/// against the leaf's branch root rather than the tree root.
/// @dev The same path cut lower. A consumer that only ever needs one
/// branch can pin `branchRoot` and verify with fewer siblings; the
/// verifier is unchanged, since sorted pairs carry no direction bits.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @param key The domain key. Must already hold a slot.
/// @return The sibling path from the leaf up to its branch root.
function branchProofFor(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32[] memory) {
_assertTree(treeId);
return _path(treeId, slotOf(treeId, key), BRANCH_DEPTH);
}
/// @notice A configuration row's value, and whether the row exists.
/// @dev Presence is read from the slot table, not from the value: a row
/// deliberately set to zero exists and answers `present`.
/// @param treeId The tree whose branch 0 holds the row.
/// @param key The row key, as {configKey} computes it.
/// @return value The row's single word of value.
/// @return present Whether the row has ever been written.
function configValue(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32 value, bool present) {
present = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key] != 0;
value = _configValue[treeId][key];
}
/// @notice The branch-0 key of a configuration row: a name the owning
/// service defines, and a sub-key (a chain reference, an asset, zero).
/// @dev Its own key domain, so a configuration row can never be handed a
/// slot that a domain row of the same tree would want.
/// @param name The row's name, defined by the service that owns the tree.
/// @param sub The row's sub-key, or zero when the name stands alone.
/// @return The branch-0 key.
function configKey(bytes32 name, bytes32 sub) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_CONFIG_KEY, name, sub));
}
/// @notice The leaf a configuration row hashes to.
/// @dev Binds the tree id as well as the key and the value, so the same row
/// in two trees is two different leaves and a proof cannot be carried
/// from one tree's branch 0 to another's.
/// @param treeId The tree the row belongs to.
/// @param key The row key.
/// @param value The row value.
/// @return The untagged leaf value for that row.
function configLeafHash(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key, bytes32 value) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_CONFIG_LEAF, treeId, key, value));
}
/// @notice The tree-8 branch-2 key an owner occupies.
/// @param owner The owner whose wallet list the row indexes.
/// @return The branch-2 key.
function ownerIndexKeyFor(address owner) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_KEY, owner));
}
/// @notice The owner-index leaf: a commitment to the ledger's ordered
/// `walletsByOwner(owner)`.
/// @dev A commitment, not the list. The tree is the search structure; the
/// ledger holds the readable array this leaf proves, so ORDER matters
/// — the same wallets in a different order are a different leaf.
/// @param owner The owner the index row belongs to.
/// @param wallets The owner's wallets, in the ledger's own order.
/// @return The untagged leaf value for that row.
function ownerIndexLeafHash(address owner, address[] memory wallets) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_LEAF, owner, wallets));
}
/// @notice The tree-8 branch-3 key of one member's slot — a ring position.
/// @dev The index is reduced modulo `SLOT_KEY_RING` here, so the branch is
/// an index over the recent slots and never fills. A caller passes the
/// real slot number and does not do the reduction itself.
/// @param member The co-signer the slot key belongs to.
/// @param slotIndex The slot number, before the ring modulus.
/// @return The branch-3 key.
function slotKeyFor(address member, uint64 slotIndex) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SLOT_KEY, member, slotIndex % SLOT_KEY_RING));
}
/**
* @notice Project slot keys into tree 8's branch 3 — the co-signers'
* per-slot KEM publics the private option seals to.
* @dev Permissionless, for {syncIdentityLeaves}' reason: the leaf VALUE
* is `slotKeySource`'s own verdict (the registry verified the member's
* signature when the key was published, and answers zero once the slot's
* window has passed), so this adds no authority and only projects. The
* registry calls it same-tx on publication; anyone may call it to retire a
* slot that lapsed by time.
* @param member The co-signer whose ring positions are being projected.
* @param slotIndexes The slots to project. Reduced modulo `SLOT_KEY_RING`.
*/
function syncSlotKeyLeaves(address member, uint64[] calldata slotIndexes) external {
address source = slotKeySource;
if (source == address(0)) revert SlotKeySourceUnset();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < slotIndexes.length; i++) {
_set(
TREE_IDENTITY,
BRANCH_SLOT_KEYS,
slotKeyFor(member, slotIndexes[i]),
ISlotKeySource(source).slotKeyLeafOf(member, slotIndexes[i])
);
}
_bump(TREE_IDENTITY, slotIndexes.length);
}
/// @notice The tree-8 branch-4 key of one tunnel endpoint.
/// @param endpointId The endpoint's certificate subject key id.
/// @return The branch-4 key.
function endpointKeyFor(bytes32 endpointId) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_ENDPOINT_KEY, endpointId));
}
/**
* @notice Project tunnel endpoints into tree 8's branch 4.
* @dev Permissionless, for {syncSlotKeyLeaves}' reason: the leaf VALUE is
* `endpointSource`'s own verdict — the registry admitted the certificate
* under the registrar quorum with the holder's proof of possession, and
* answers the revoked status once it is revoked — so this adds no authority
* and only projects. The registry calls it same-tx on registration and
* revocation; anyone may call it to re-project.
* @param endpointIds The endpoint ids to project.
*/
function syncEndpointLeaves(bytes32[] calldata endpointIds) external {
address source = endpointSource;
if (source == address(0)) revert EndpointSourceUnset();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < endpointIds.length; i++) {
_set(
TREE_IDENTITY,
BRANCH_ENDPOINTS,
endpointKeyFor(endpointIds[i]),
IEndpointSource(source).endpointLeafOf(endpointIds[i])
);
}
_bump(TREE_IDENTITY, endpointIds.length);
}
/**
* @notice The sibling path for a key, ready for
* `FinalMerkle.verifyTaggedSortedProof` on any chain.
* @dev The sanctioned way to ask any tree a question, tree 1 above all: a
* view, so a caller fetches a proof with one `eth_call` and never rebuilds
* the tree off chain. Rebuilding is where a divergence between what the
* chain holds and what a service believes it holds would come from, and
* this removes the second implementation entirely.
*
* A rebuild is not merely redundant, it is wrong. This tree is fixed depth,
* zero-padded and insertion-ordered; a fold that sorts its leaves or sizes
* itself to the leaf count produces a different root, and a proof against
* that root verifies nowhere while looking perfectly well formed.
*
* Pair the path with {liveRoot} for the current root, or append
* {roundProofFor} and verify against {roundRootAt} to pin a whole round.
* @param treeId The tree to read.
* @param key The domain key. Must already hold a slot.
* @return The `DEPTH` siblings from the leaf up to the tree root, lowest first.
*/
function proofFor(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32[] memory) {
_assertTree(treeId);
return _path(treeId, slotOf(treeId, key), DEPTH);
}
/// @notice The empty-subtree hash at a level. Level `DEPTH` is the root of
/// a tree with nothing in it.
/// @dev What an off-chain verifier needs to reproduce the padding this tree
/// uses. Levels run `0 .. ROUND_DEPTH`; anything above reverts on the
/// array bound.
/// @param level The level to read.
/// @return The hash of an empty subtree of that height.
function emptyRoot(uint256 level) external view returns (bytes32) {
return _zero[level];
}
/// @notice The tree-1 key a wallet occupies.
/// @dev A full-width hash rather than the packed address, so a hashed key
/// cannot be steered onto a slot an address key would take.
/// @param wallet The Final Wallet.
/// @return The tree-1 key.
function accountKeyFor(address wallet) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_KEY, wallet));
}
/**
* @notice Copy a registered identity into tree 1 as an account-state leaf.
* @dev Services are Final Wallets, so a service's leaf is the SAME leaf a
* user's wallet gets — `FinalWalletFactory.AccountStateLeaf`, four key
* commitments and all. There is no second shape and no second domain,
* which is what lets every chain that already consumes account state
* consume a co-signer's identity with no contract change.
*
* `owner` is the account itself: a service wallet is its own owner, having
* no separate holder to speak for it.
*
* Permissionless, and for the same reason `publishRound` is: every fact it
* writes was already authorized when it entered the registry, so this adds
* no authority and only projects. Gating it would put a liveness dependency
* in front of publishing a revocation, which is the one thing that must
* never wait.
* @param accounts The registered service identities to project. Each must
* already be registered; an unknown account reverts `UnknownKey`.
*/
function syncIdentities(address[] calldata accounts) external {
// One table for the batch: a service is its own canonical address on
// every enabled chain, so the rows differ only in `account`.
bytes32[] memory chainRefs = _enabledChainRefs();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {
address who = accounts[i];
FinalIdentityRegistry.Identity memory id = registry.identityOf(who);
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownKey(TREE_ACCOUNTS, accountKeyFor(who));
(bytes32 la, bytes32 lt, bytes32 ra, bytes32 rt) = registry.keyCommitments(who);
(bytes32 lk, bytes32 rk) = registry.kemCommitments(who);
ChainAccount[] memory table = new ChainAccount[](chainRefs.length);
for (uint256 c = 0; c < chainRefs.length; c++) {
table[c] = ChainAccount({chainRef: chainRefs[c], account: bytes32(uint256(uint160(who)))});
}
AccountStateLeaf memory leaf = AccountStateLeaf({
wallet: who,
liveAccess: la,
liveTransaction: lt,
recoveryAccess: ra,
recoveryTransaction: rt,
liveKem: lk,
recoveryKem: rk,
// A service reaches every chain the registry has enabled, at
// its own address, and is never dormant: dormancy measures an
// ABSENT holder, and these identities have no holder to be
// absent.
deployedChains: table,
dormantChains: 0,
recoveryCredential: bytes32(0),
guardedChains: 0,
owner: who,
// Every identity here is PQ by construction — there is no other
// kind of key in this registry.
pqEnabled: true,
// Revocation is a leaf that CHANGES, not one that disappears.
// A consumer holding an old proof gets a stale `false`, which is
// why the round is the thing to pin.
frozen: id.revoked,
version: id.version
});
_set(TREE_ACCOUNTS, BRANCH_MAIN, accountKeyFor(who), accountStateLeafHash(leaf));
}
_bump(TREE_ACCOUNTS, accounts.length);
}
/// @notice The tree-8 slot key an identity occupies.
/// @dev Its own domain, separate from the tree-1 account key, so one
/// account's admission row and its state row can never collide.
/// @param account The identity.
/// @return The tree-8 branch-1 key.
function identityKeyFor(address account) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_TREE_KEY, account));
}
/**
* @notice Project identities into tree 8 — the wallet-creation admission
* set whose live root every execution chain anchors as its
* `currentIdentityRoot`.
*
* @dev The leaf VALUE is the registry's own verdict —
* `FinalIdentityRegistry.identityTreeLeafOf`: the execution chains'
* identity leaf while the identity stands, zero once it does not. Derived
* there rather than here because every input (serial, the six key
* commitments, standing, the CA depth pair) is registry storage, and this
* contract sits against EIP-170 while the registry does not.
*
* Permissionless, for exactly {syncIdentities}' reason: every fact
* written here was authorized when it entered the registry, so this adds
* no authority and only projects. The registry itself calls it same-tx on
* every identity mutation (register, rotate, roles, revoke, LMS-key ops),
* which is what makes the root CONTINUOUS; the open door additionally lets
* anyone retire a leaf whose standing lapsed by TIME — expiry moves no
* registry storage, so no mutation hook can ever fire for it.
*
* There is no quorum door and no writer seat (both raw doors refuse this
* tree), so the strongest thing any caller can do here is copy the
* registry's own verdict.
* @param accounts The identities to project. An unregistered account
* projects the registry's zero verdict, which retires its leaf.
*/
function syncIdentityLeaves(address[] calldata accounts) external {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {
_set(TREE_IDENTITY, BRANCH_MAIN, identityKeyFor(accounts[i]), registry.identityTreeLeafOf(accounts[i]));
}
_bump(TREE_IDENTITY, accounts.length);
}
/**
* @notice Per-tree quorum health: can each configured tree still be written?
* @dev A threshold above the live member count is not a strict quorum, it is
* a tree that reverts forever with nothing naming the roster as the cause.
* `configureTree` refuses to create that state, but revocation can arrive at
* it later — revocation must never be blocked on quorum arithmetic, so the
* check has to be something monitoring reads rather than something the
* contract enforces after the fact.
* @return live Members currently holding each tree's writer role; zero for
* an unconfigured tree, which is not the same as a starved one.
* @return required Each tree's threshold, indexed by tree id.
* @return ok Whether each tree can still be written. An unconfigured tree
* reports `true`: it is closed, not starved.
*/
function quorumHealth()
external
view
returns (uint256[] memory live, uint256[] memory required, bool[] memory ok)
{
live = new uint256[](TREE_COUNT + 1);
required = new uint256[](TREE_COUNT + 1);
ok = new bool[](TREE_COUNT + 1);
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
required[t] = threshold[t];
live[t] = required[t] == 0 ? 0 : registry.liveMemberCount(writerRole[t]);
ok[t] = required[t] == 0 || live[t] >= required[t];
}
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------- internal
/// @notice The chain set a service account's `deployedChains` table is built from.
/// @dev The enabled chain references `chainSource` knows, or none if it is
/// unset. Read through the narrow interface so this contract need not
/// import the registry that imports it. An unset source answers an
/// empty list rather than reverting, because a plane whose registry is
/// not yet seeded must still be able to project its identities.
/// @return The enabled chain references, or an empty list when unset.
function _enabledChainRefs() private view returns (bytes32[] memory) {
address source = chainSource;
if (source == address(0)) return new bytes32[](0);
return IChainSource(source).enabledChainRefs();
}
/// @notice Refuse a tree id outside `1 .. TREE_COUNT`.
/// @dev Trees are 1-indexed so a tree id doubles as its position in the
/// round tree; id 0 is the unused position there and not a tree here.
/// @param treeId The id to check.
function _assertTree(uint8 treeId) private pure {
if (treeId == 0 || treeId > TREE_COUNT) revert UnknownTree(treeId);
}
/// @notice Refuse a branch id no slot can encode.
/// @dev The bound is the branch COUNT, not the count of branches in use: an
/// unused branch is a legal, empty subtree.
/// @param branch The id to check.
function _assertBranch(uint8 branch) private pure {
if (branch >= BRANCH_COUNT) revert UnknownBranch(branch);
}
/// @notice Refuse a branch a quorum or a writer contract may not write.
/// @dev A branch a quorum or a writer may write: any but the config branch.
/// Branch 0 belongs to the configuration authority on every tree, so
/// the refusal is structural rather than per-tree.
/// @param treeId The tree, carried so the revert names it.
/// @param branch The branch being written.
function _assertDataBranch(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch) private pure {
_assertBranch(branch);
if (branch == BRANCH_CONFIG) revert ConfigBranchReserved(treeId);
}
/// @notice Advance a tree's write counter and announce the new root.
/// @dev Version + event, the tail of every write door. Called AFTER the
/// leaves have settled, so the event carries the root a reader will
/// see, and the counter is what {publishRound} compares to decide
/// whether a round would carry anything new.
/// @param treeId The tree that moved.
/// @param count Leaves in the batch, for the event.
function _bump(uint8 treeId, uint256 count) private {
uint64 v = treeVersion[treeId] + 1;
treeVersion[treeId] = v;
emit LeavesSet(treeId, count, liveRoot[treeId], v);
}
/// @notice The one internal-node hash every tree, branch and round shares.
/// @dev `keccak256(0x01 ‖ lo ‖ hi)`, the pair sorted — the one node hash.
/// Sorting is what makes a proof position-agnostic, so it carries no
/// direction bits; the 0x01 tag is what keeps an internal node from
/// ever colliding with a leaf, which is hashed under 0x00.
/// @param a One child.
/// @param b The other child.
/// @return The parent node.
function _pair(bytes32 a, bytes32 b) private pure returns (bytes32) {
(bytes32 lo, bytes32 hi) = a < b ? (a, b) : (b, a);
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x01), lo, hi));
}
/// @notice Collect the siblings from a slot up a given number of levels.
/// @dev The sibling path from a slot up `height` levels. One routine serves
/// the branch proof and the tree proof; only the height differs, which
/// is why the two can never disagree about a shared prefix.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @param idx The starting slot. Consumed as the walk climbs.
/// @param height How many levels to climb.
/// @return path The siblings, lowest level first.
function _path(uint8 treeId, uint256 idx, uint256 height) private view returns (bytes32[] memory path) {
path = new bytes32[](height);
for (uint256 l = 0; l < height; l++) {
path[l] = _nodeAt(treeId, l, idx ^ 1);
idx >>= 1;
}
}
/// @notice Lay the tree roots out as the leaves of the round tree.
/// @dev The forest's leaves: the tree roots at their positions, the
/// empty tree at the rest. Tree `t` sits at position `t`, so the
/// round proof's index is the tree id with no translation, and the
/// unused positions hold the empty TREE root rather than zero — they
/// are genuinely empty trees, and hashing them as zero would make the
/// round root unreproducible off chain.
/// @param roots The round's tree roots, indexed by tree id.
/// @return level The `1 << FOREST_BITS` leaves of the round tree.
function _forestLeaves(bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] memory roots) private view returns (bytes32[] memory level) {
level = new bytes32[](1 << FOREST_BITS);
for (uint256 p = 0; p < level.length; p++) {
level[p] = (p >= 1 && p <= TREE_COUNT) ? roots[p] : _zero[DEPTH];
}
}
/// @notice Fold the round tree's leaves down to the round root.
/// @dev Fold a power-of-two level to its root, in place. The input array is
/// overwritten, so the caller must not reuse it afterwards.
/// @param level The level to fold. Length must be a power of two.
/// @return The root of that level.
function _foldForest(bytes32[] memory level) private pure returns (bytes32) {
for (uint256 n = level.length; n > 1; n >>= 1) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n / 2; i++) {
level[i] = _pair(level[2 * i], level[2 * i + 1]);
}
}
return level[0];
}
/// @notice Place one leaf, assigning the key a permanent slot on first sight.
/// @dev The single point every write door funnels through, which is what
/// makes the slot discipline unconditional: a key is handed the next
/// free position in its branch, remembered in both directions, and
/// keeps it for the life of the contract. A key that already holds a
/// slot in a DIFFERENT branch is refused rather than moved — moving it
/// would silently invalidate every proof anyone holds for it.
///
/// The update then rehashes exactly `DEPTH` nodes up the leaf's own
/// path, so the cost of a write is the height of the tree and not the
/// number of leaves in it. This is also where the tree's shape comes
/// from: fixed height, zero-padded siblings, insertion-ordered slots.
/// @param treeId The tree to write.
/// @param branch The branch the key belongs to.
/// @param key The domain key.
/// @param leaf The raw (untagged) value to store.
function _set(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch, bytes32 key, bytes32 leaf) private {
uint256 s = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key];
uint256 idx;
if (s == 0) {
uint256 used = _branchSlotsUsed[treeId][branch];
if (used >= BRANCH_CAPACITY) revert BranchFull(treeId, branch);
idx = (uint256(branch) << BRANCH_DEPTH) | used;
_branchSlotsUsed[treeId][branch] = used + 1;
slotsUsed[treeId] += 1;
_slotPlusOne[treeId][key] = idx + 1;
_keyAt[treeId][idx] = key;
} else {
idx = s - 1;
uint8 have = uint8(idx >> BRANCH_DEPTH);
if (have != branch) revert BranchMismatch(treeId, key, have, branch);
}
_leaf[treeId][idx] = leaf;
bytes32 cursor = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x00), leaf));
for (uint256 l = 0; l < DEPTH; l++) {
cursor = _pair(cursor, _nodeAt(treeId, l, idx ^ 1));
idx >>= 1;
_node[treeId][l + 1][idx] = cursor;
}
liveRoot[treeId] = cursor;
}
/// @notice One node of a tree, at any level, with empty positions filled in.
/// @dev Level 0 is derived from the leaf store rather than duplicated into
/// `_node`, so there is one place a leaf lives and no way for the two to
/// disagree. Unset positions fall through to the empty-subtree hash — the
/// zero padding that gives the tree its fixed height, and the reason an
/// off-chain rebuild must pad to the same height to reach the same root.
/// @param treeId The tree to read.
/// @param level The level, 0 being the leaves.
/// @param index The position at that level.
/// @return The node, or the empty-subtree hash when nothing was written there.
function _nodeAt(uint8 treeId, uint256 level, uint256 index) private view returns (bytes32) {
if (level == 0) {
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x00), _leaf[treeId][index]));
}
bytes32 v = _node[treeId][level][index];
return v == bytes32(0) ? _zero[level] : v;
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ sweep
/// @notice The registry the inherited sweep authority resolves members through.
/// @dev This contract's configuration gate reads the membership registry it
/// was constructed against, so the sweep authority reads the same one. One
/// registry for both means a member removed from the roster loses the sweep
/// at the same instant it loses everything else.
/// @return The immutable identity registry pinned at construction.
function _sweepRegistry() internal view override returns (FinalIdentityRegistry) {
return registry;
}
/// @dev Nothing is reserved because nothing is owed: this contract has no
/// payable entrypoint and no custody line — it records, it does not hold.
/// Anything it carries arrived by accident and is sweepable in full.
}
contracts/utils/FinalSweep.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// Additional Use Grant:
// 1. Any person or entity may inherit this sweep surface into contracts that
// integrate with the Final DeFi Protocol, in order to recover assets sent to
// them by mistake.
// 2. Protocol operators and integrators may call the sweep entrypoints it
// declares, subject to each inheriting contract's own authority and reserved
// balance rules, as part of their integration with the Final DeFi Protocol.
// 3. For the avoidance of doubt, this Grant does NOT permit the commercial
// deployment of a Fork of this sweep surface or a competing asset-recovery
// plane derived from it without permission prior to the Change Date.
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
/// @notice The asset kinds a sweep can move. `Native` ignores `asset` and
/// `id`; `Erc20` ignores `id`; `Erc721` reads `id` as the token id and moves
/// exactly one; `Erc1155` reads both.
enum SweepKind { Native, Erc20, Erc721, Erc1155 }
/**
* @title Final Sweep
* @notice One sweep surface, on every contract of ours that can end up holding
* an asset it does not owe to anybody.
*
* @dev Assets arrive at protocol contracts that were never meant to hold them:
* a bridge delivers to the wrong leg, a user sends an ERC-20 to a registry, an
* airdrop lands on the gateway, an NFT is safe-transferred into the vault. Left
* alone that value is destroyed. The sweep is how it comes back — and the
* single rule it must never break is that a sweep moves SURPLUS and nothing
* else.
*
* Three seams make that rule per-contract:
*
* - `_requireSweepAuthority()` — the treasury role, expressed in whatever
* access plane the host contract already has (`FinalAccessController` roles,
* a cross-chain authority, a quorum). No new authority is introduced.
* - `_sweepDestinations()` — where a sweep may pay. Ours is a two-address
* answer because a contract normally has exactly two legitimate ones (the
* gateway and the treasury); a contract with one returns it twice.
* `FinalGateway` overrides `_requireSweepDestination` outright: the gateway
* is the drain of the whole system and sweeps ONWARD to anywhere.
* - `_sweepReserved(kind, asset, id)` — the part of the raw balance that is
* NOT surplus: fee deposits, the pending-settlement bucket, searcher
* collateral, settlement custody, vaulted entries, locked PHI. The default
* is zero, which is correct for a contract that custodies nothing; every
* contract that custodies something overrides it and is the one place the
* liability is stated.
*
* The surplus is measured LIVE against the raw balance at call time, so a
* re-entrant destination re-measures against a balance that already fell —
* there is no cached figure to double-spend. Nothing here writes storage, so
* there is no state for a callback to observe half-updated either.
*
* The three ERC-721/ERC-1155 receiver hooks are part of the same surface and
* for the same reason: `safeTransferFrom` reverts into a contract that does not
* answer them, so without these an NFT sent to one of ours does not land at
* all — which is not safety, it is a different way to lose it.
*/
abstract contract FinalSweep {
/// @notice `msg.sender` does not hold this contract's sweep authority.
error SweepUnauthorized(address caller);
/// @notice `to` is neither of this contract's sweep destinations.
error SweepDestinationNotAllowed(address to);
/// @notice The requested amount is above the surplus: the difference is
/// owed to somebody (a deposit, a custody total, a vaulted entry).
error SweepAboveSurplus(address asset, uint256 requested, uint256 surplus);
/// @notice A sweep of nothing.
error SweepZeroAmount();
/// @notice The transfer leg failed, or the token returned `false`.
error SweepTransferFailed(address asset);
/// @notice `amount` of `asset` (`id` for the non-fungible kinds) left this
/// contract for `to` under the sweep authority.
event AssetSwept(SweepKind indexed kind, address indexed asset, address indexed to, uint256 id, uint256 amount);
// ─────────────────────────────── seams ───────────────────────────────
/// @dev Reverts unless `msg.sender` may sweep. The host contract's own
/// treasury role — never a new one.
function _requireSweepAuthority() internal view virtual;
/// @dev The (at most two) addresses a sweep may pay. A contract with one
/// legitimate destination returns it twice.
function _sweepDestinations() internal view virtual returns (address a, address b);
/// @dev The part of the raw balance that is owed and therefore never
/// sweepable. Zero for a contract that custodies nothing.
function _sweepReserved(SweepKind, address, uint256) internal view virtual returns (uint256) {
return 0;
}
/// @dev Destination policy. Overridden by `FinalGateway`, which may sweep
/// onward to anywhere.
function _requireSweepDestination(address to) internal view virtual {
(address a, address b) = _sweepDestinations();
if (to == address(0) || (to != a && to != b)) revert SweepDestinationNotAllowed(to);
}
// ────────────────────────────── surface ──────────────────────────────
/// @notice The surplus of `asset` (`id` for the non-fungible kinds) — the
/// raw balance above everything this contract owes. What a sweep may move,
/// readable before calling one.
function sweepableSurplus(SweepKind kind, address asset, uint256 id) public view returns (uint256 surplus) {
uint256 raw = _rawBalance(kind, asset, id);
uint256 reserved = _sweepReserved(kind, asset, id);
return raw > reserved ? raw - reserved : 0;
}
/// @notice Move `amount` of an asset this contract does not owe to `to`.
/// @dev Role-gated, destination-gated and bounded by the live surplus. The
/// three gates are independent: a treasury key cannot pay a destination
/// the contract does not recognize, and neither key nor destination can
/// reach a wei that backs a liability.
/// @param kind Which asset kind is being moved.
/// @param asset Token contract; ignored for `Native`.
/// @param id Token id for `Erc721` / `Erc1155`; ignored otherwise.
/// @param amount Amount to move. `type(uint256).max` means the whole
/// surplus, which is what an operator draining a stray balance wants and
/// what avoids a race with an inflow landing between the read and the call.
/// @param to Destination.
/// @return moved Amount actually moved.
function sweepAsset(SweepKind kind, address asset, uint256 id, uint256 amount, address to)
external
returns (uint256 moved)
{
_requireSweepAuthority();
_requireSweepDestination(to);
uint256 surplus = sweepableSurplus(kind, asset, id);
moved = amount == type(uint256).max ? surplus : amount;
if (moved == 0) revert SweepZeroAmount();
if (moved > surplus) revert SweepAboveSurplus(asset, moved, surplus);
if (kind == SweepKind.Native) {
(bool ok,) = payable(to).call{value: moved}("");
if (!ok) revert SweepTransferFailed(address(0));
} else if (kind == SweepKind.Erc20) {
_callToken(asset, abi.encodeWithSelector(0xa9059cbb, to, moved)); // transfer(address,uint256)
} else if (kind == SweepKind.Erc721) {
// `transferFrom`, not `safeTransferFrom`: a rescue must not fail
// because the treasury destination declines a hook. Which
// destination is legitimate is already decided above.
moved = 1;
_callToken(asset, abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd, address(this), to, id)); // transferFrom
} else {
_callToken(
asset,
abi.encodeWithSelector(0xf242432a, address(this), to, id, moved, "") // safeTransferFrom(...)
);
}
emit AssetSwept(kind, asset, to, id, moved);
}
// ───────────────────────────── receivers ─────────────────────────────
/// @notice Accept safe ERC-721 transfers, so one sent here is recoverable
/// rather than rejected at the door.
function onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes calldata) external pure virtual returns (bytes4) {
return 0x150b7a02;
}
/// @notice Accept safe ERC-1155 single transfers.
function onERC1155Received(address, address, uint256, uint256, bytes calldata)
external
pure
virtual
returns (bytes4)
{
return 0xf23a6e61;
}
/// @notice Accept safe ERC-1155 batch transfers.
function onERC1155BatchReceived(address, address, uint256[] calldata, uint256[] calldata, bytes calldata)
external
pure
virtual
returns (bytes4)
{
return 0xbc197c81;
}
// ───────────────────────────── internals ─────────────────────────────
/// @dev The raw held amount, before anything owed is subtracted.
function _rawBalance(SweepKind kind, address asset, uint256 id) internal view returns (uint256) {
if (kind == SweepKind.Native) return address(this).balance;
if (kind == SweepKind.Erc20) {
(bool ok, bytes memory ret) = asset.staticcall(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x70a08231, address(this)));
return (ok && ret.length >= 32) ? abi.decode(ret, (uint256)) : 0;
}
if (kind == SweepKind.Erc721) {
(bool ok, bytes memory ret) = asset.staticcall(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x6352211e, id)); // ownerOf
return (ok && ret.length >= 32 && abi.decode(ret, (address)) == address(this)) ? 1 : 0;
}
(bool ok1155, bytes memory ret1155) =
asset.staticcall(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x00fdd58e, address(this), id)); // balanceOf(address,uint256)
return (ok1155 && ret1155.length >= 32) ? abi.decode(ret1155, (uint256)) : 0;
}
/// @dev One transfer leg, tolerant of the legacy no-return ERC-20 shape the
/// way `FinalDeployer`'s rescue helpers are: success is "the call did not
/// revert AND it did not return `false`".
function _callToken(address token, bytes memory data) private {
if (token.code.length == 0) revert SweepTransferFailed(token);
(bool ok, bytes memory ret) = token.call(data);
if (!ok || (ret.length != 0 && !abi.decode(ret, (bool)))) revert SweepTransferFailed(token);
}
}
node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/StorageSlot.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v5.1.0) (utils/StorageSlot.sol)
// This file was procedurally generated from scripts/generate/templates/StorageSlot.js.
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
/**
* @dev Library for reading and writing primitive types to specific storage slots.
*
* Storage slots are often used to avoid storage conflict when dealing with upgradeable contracts.
* This library helps with reading and writing to such slots without the need for inline assembly.
*
* The functions in this library return Slot structs that contain a `value` member that can be used to read or write.
*
* Example usage to set ERC-1967 implementation slot:
* ```solidity
* contract ERC1967 {
* // Define the slot. Alternatively, use the SlotDerivation library to derive the slot.
* bytes32 internal constant _IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT = 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc;
*
* function _getImplementation() internal view returns (address) {
* return StorageSlot.getAddressSlot(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT).value;
* }
*
* function _setImplementation(address newImplementation) internal {
* require(newImplementation.code.length > 0);
* StorageSlot.getAddressSlot(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT).value = newImplementation;
* }
* }
* ```
*
* TIP: Consider using this library along with {SlotDerivation}.
*/
library StorageSlot {
struct AddressSlot {
address value;
}
struct BooleanSlot {
bool value;
}
struct Bytes32Slot {
bytes32 value;
}
struct Uint256Slot {
uint256 value;
}
struct Int256Slot {
int256 value;
}
struct StringSlot {
string value;
}
struct BytesSlot {
bytes value;
}
/**
* @dev Returns an `AddressSlot` with member `value` located at `slot`.
*/
function getAddressSlot(bytes32 slot) internal pure returns (AddressSlot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns a `BooleanSlot` with member `value` located at `slot`.
*/
function getBooleanSlot(bytes32 slot) internal pure returns (BooleanSlot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns a `Bytes32Slot` with member `value` located at `slot`.
*/
function getBytes32Slot(bytes32 slot) internal pure returns (Bytes32Slot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns a `Uint256Slot` with member `value` located at `slot`.
*/
function getUint256Slot(bytes32 slot) internal pure returns (Uint256Slot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns a `Int256Slot` with member `value` located at `slot`.
*/
function getInt256Slot(bytes32 slot) internal pure returns (Int256Slot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns a `StringSlot` with member `value` located at `slot`.
*/
function getStringSlot(bytes32 slot) internal pure returns (StringSlot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns an `StringSlot` representation of the string storage pointer `store`.
*/
function getStringSlot(string storage store) internal pure returns (StringSlot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := store.slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns a `BytesSlot` with member `value` located at `slot`.
*/
function getBytesSlot(bytes32 slot) internal pure returns (BytesSlot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := slot
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns an `BytesSlot` representation of the bytes storage pointer `store`.
*/
function getBytesSlot(bytes storage store) internal pure returns (BytesSlot storage r) {
assembly ("memory-safe") {
r.slot := store.slot
}
}
}
abi
[
{
"type": "constructor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "registry_",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "contract FinalIdentityRegistry"
},
{
"name": "trees_",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "contract FinalStateTrees"
},
{
"name": "publisherRole_",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ALGORITHM_ML_KEM_1024",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "DOMAIN_SLOT_KEY_LEAF",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "GRACE_SECONDS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "MAX_AHEAD_SECONDS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "SLOT_SECONDS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "isUsable",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "nowSeconds",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "onERC1155BatchReceived",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256[]",
"internalType": "uint256[]"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256[]",
"internalType": "uint256[]"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes4",
"internalType": "bytes4"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "onERC1155Received",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes4",
"internalType": "bytes4"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "onERC721Received",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes4",
"internalType": "bytes4"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "publishSlotKeys",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "slotIndexes",
"type": "uint64[]",
"internalType": "uint64[]"
},
{
"name": "kemPublics",
"type": "bytes[]",
"internalType": "bytes[]"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "publisherRole",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "registry",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "contract FinalIdentityRegistry"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "retire",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndexes",
"type": "uint64[]",
"internalType": "uint64[]"
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotKeyLeafOf",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotKeyOf",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "tuple",
"internalType": "struct FinalSlotKeyRegistry.SlotKey",
"components": [
{
"name": "keyHash",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "publishedAt",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotOf",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "timestamp",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotWindow",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "start",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "end",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "sweepAsset",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "kind",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "enum SweepKind"
},
{
"name": "asset",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "id",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "amount",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "to",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "moved",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "sweepableSurplus",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "kind",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "enum SweepKind"
},
{
"name": "asset",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "id",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "surplus",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "trees",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "contract FinalStateTrees"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "AssetSwept",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "kind",
"type": "uint8",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "enum SweepKind"
},
{
"name": "asset",
"type": "address",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "to",
"type": "address",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "id",
"type": "uint256",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "amount",
"type": "uint256",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "SlotKeyPublished",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "keyHash",
"type": "bytes32",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "kemPublic",
"type": "bytes",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "bytes"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "EmptyKey",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "LengthMismatch",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "NotASlotKeyPublisher",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "sender",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SlotAlreadyLive",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SlotInThePast",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SlotTooFarAhead",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SweepAboveSurplus",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "asset",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "requested",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "surplus",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SweepDestinationNotAllowed",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "to",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SweepTransferFailed",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "asset",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SweepUnauthorized",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "caller",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SweepZeroAmount",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "UnsupportedAlgorithm",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
}
]read contract
bytecode · 5,531 bytes
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No CBOR metadata tail — this bytecode was built with cbor_metadata off, the setting our own contracts pin for CREATE2 address invariance.
disassembly
| pc | op | operand |
|---|---|---|
| 0000 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 0002 | DUP1 | |
| 0003 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0005 | MSTORE | |
| 0006 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0008 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0009 | LT | |
| 000a | ISZERO | |
| 000b | PUSH2 | 0x0012 |
| 000e | JUMPI | |
| 000f | PUSH0 | |
| 0010 | DUP1 | |
| 0011 | REVERT | |
| 0012 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0013 | PUSH0 | |
| 0014 | SWAP1 | |
| 0015 | PUSH0 | |
| 0016 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0017 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0019 | SHR | |
| 001a | SWAP1 | |
| 001b | DUP2 | |
| 001c | PUSH4 | 0x150b7a02 |
| 0021 | EQ | |
| 0022 | PUSH2 | 0x0e35 |
| 0025 | JUMPI | |
| 0026 | POP | |
| 0027 | DUP1 | |
| 0028 | PUSH4 | 0x16007f7e |
| 002d | EQ | |
| 002e | PUSH2 | 0x0dfc |
| 0031 | JUMPI | |
| 0032 | DUP1 | |
| 0033 | PUSH4 | 0x178bcc93 |
| 0038 | EQ | |
| 0039 | PUSH2 | 0x0db8 |
| 003c | JUMPI | |
| 003d | DUP1 | |
| 003e | PUSH4 | 0x3dd28fbf |
| 0043 | EQ | |
| 0044 | PUSH2 | 0x0cf8 |
| 0047 | JUMPI | |
| 0048 | DUP1 | |
| 0049 | PUSH4 | 0x60a18008 |
| 004e | EQ | |
| 004f | PUSH2 | 0x0cc2 |
| 0052 | JUMPI | |
| 0053 | DUP1 | |
| 0054 | PUSH4 | 0x7b103999 |
| 0059 | EQ | |
| 005a | PUSH2 | 0x0c7d |
| 005d | JUMPI | |
| 005e | DUP1 | |
| 005f | PUSH4 | 0x96f51f3a |
| 0064 | EQ | |
| 0065 | PUSH2 | 0x0990 |
| 0068 | JUMPI | |
| 0069 | DUP1 | |
| 006a | PUSH4 | 0x9d49cc77 |
| 006f | EQ | |
| 0070 | PUSH2 | 0x0972 |
| 0073 | JUMPI | |
| 0074 | DUP1 | |
| 0075 | PUSH4 | 0xa261c8cd |
| 007a | EQ | |
| 007b | PUSH2 | 0x0949 |
| 007e | JUMPI | |
| 007f | DUP1 | |
| 0080 | PUSH4 | 0xa2b85173 |
| 0085 | EQ | |
| 0086 | PUSH2 | 0x092c |
| 0089 | JUMPI | |
| 008a | DUP1 | |
| 008b | PUSH4 | 0xaffada67 |
| 0090 | EQ | |
| 0091 | PUSH2 | 0x03f4 |
| 0094 | JUMPI | |
| 0095 | DUP1 | |
| 0096 | PUSH4 | 0xb4f9ea67 |
| 009b | EQ | |
| 009c | PUSH2 | 0x0346 |
| 009f | JUMPI | |
| 00a0 | DUP1 | |
| 00a1 | PUSH4 | 0xb953a918 |
| 00a6 | EQ | |
| 00a7 | PUSH2 | 0x0329 |
| 00aa | JUMPI | |
| 00ab | DUP1 | |
| 00ac | PUSH4 | 0xbc197c81 |
| 00b1 | EQ | |
| 00b2 | PUSH2 | 0x0290 |
| 00b5 | JUMPI | |
| 00b6 | DUP1 | |
| 00b7 | PUSH4 | 0xbf35cb62 |
| 00bc | EQ | |
| 00bd | PUSH2 | 0x025b |
| 00c0 | JUMPI | |
| 00c1 | DUP1 | |
| 00c2 | PUSH4 | 0xc37df164 |
| 00c7 | EQ | |
| 00c8 | PUSH2 | 0x023f |
| 00cb | JUMPI | |
| 00cc | DUP1 | |
| 00cd | PUSH4 | 0xc57bcaaa |
| 00d2 | EQ | |
| 00d3 | PUSH2 | 0x0204 |
| 00d6 | JUMPI | |
| 00d7 | DUP1 | |
| 00d8 | PUSH4 | 0xefc1544f |
| 00dd | EQ | |
| 00de | PUSH2 | 0x01c7 |
| 00e1 | JUMPI | |
| 00e2 | DUP1 | |
| 00e3 | PUSH4 | 0xf23a6e61 |
| 00e8 | EQ | |
| 00e9 | PUSH2 | 0x016c |
| 00ec | JUMPI | |
| 00ed | DUP1 | |
| 00ee | PUSH4 | 0xf4e885db |
| 00f3 | EQ | |
| 00f4 | PUSH2 | 0x0131 |
| 00f7 | JUMPI | |
| 00f8 | PUSH4 | 0xf9091ec7 |
| 00fd | EQ | |
| 00fe | PUSH2 | 0x0105 |
| 0101 | JUMPI | |
| 0102 | PUSH0 | |
| 0103 | DUP1 | |
| 0104 | REVERT | |
| 0105 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0106 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0107 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 010a | JUMPI | |
| 010b | DUP1 | |
| 010c | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 010e | NOT | |
| 010f | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0110 | ADD | |
| 0111 | SLT | |
| 0112 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0115 | JUMPI | |
| 0116 | POP | |
| 0117 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0119 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 011b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 011d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 011f | SHL | |
| 0120 | SUB | |
| 0121 | PUSH2 | 0x03e8 |
| 0124 | TIMESTAMP | |
| 0125 | DIV | |
| 0126 | AND | |
| 0127 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0129 | MLOAD | |
| 012a | SWAP1 | |
| 012b | DUP2 | |
| 012c | MSTORE | |
| 012d | RETURN | |
| 012e | JUMPDEST | |
| 012f | DUP1 | |
| 0130 | REVERT | |
| 0131 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0132 | POP | |
| 0133 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0134 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0137 | JUMPI | |
| 0138 | DUP1 | |
| 0139 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 013b | NOT | |
| 013c | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 013d | ADD | |
| 013e | SLT | |
| 013f | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0142 | JUMPI | |
| 0143 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0145 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0147 | MLOAD | |
| 0148 | PUSH32 | 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 |
| 0169 | DUP2 | |
| 016a | MSTORE | |
| 016b | RETURN | |
| 016c | JUMPDEST | |
| 016d | POP | |
| 016e | CALLVALUE | |
| 016f | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0172 | JUMPI | |
| 0173 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0175 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0176 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0178 | NOT | |
| 0179 | ADD | |
| 017a | SLT | |
| 017b | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 017e | JUMPI | |
| 017f | PUSH2 | 0x0186 |
| 0182 | PUSH2 | 0x0e88 |
| 0185 | JUMP | |
| 0186 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0187 | POP | |
| 0188 | PUSH2 | 0x018f |
| 018b | PUSH2 | 0x0e9e |
| 018e | JUMP | |
| 018f | JUMPDEST | |
| 0190 | POP | |
| 0191 | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 0193 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0194 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0196 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0198 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 019a | SHL | |
| 019b | SUB | |
| 019c | DUP2 | |
| 019d | GT | |
| 019e | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 01a1 | JUMPI | |
| 01a2 | PUSH2 | 0x01af |
| 01a5 | SWAP1 | |
| 01a6 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 01a7 | SWAP1 | |
| 01a8 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 01aa | ADD | |
| 01ab | PUSH2 | 0x0eb4 |
| 01ae | JUMP | |
| 01af | JUMPDEST | |
| 01b0 | POP | |
| 01b1 | POP | |
| 01b2 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 01b4 | MLOAD | |
| 01b5 | PUSH4 | 0xf23a6e61 |
| 01ba | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 01bc | SHL | |
| 01bd | DUP2 | |
| 01be | MSTORE | |
| 01bf | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 01c1 | SWAP1 | |
| 01c2 | RETURN | |
| 01c3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 01c4 | POP | |
| 01c5 | DUP1 | |
| 01c6 | REVERT | |
| 01c7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 01c8 | POP | |
| 01c9 | CALLVALUE | |
| 01ca | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 01cd | JUMPI | |
| 01ce | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 01d0 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 01d1 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 01d3 | NOT | |
| 01d4 | ADD | |
| 01d5 | SLT | |
| 01d6 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 01d9 | JUMPI | |
| 01da | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 01dc | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 01de | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 01e0 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 01e2 | SHL | |
| 01e3 | SUB | |
| 01e4 | PUSH2 | 0x01f3 |
| 01e7 | PUSH2 | 0x01ee |
| 01ea | PUSH2 | 0x0ee1 |
| 01ed | JUMP | |
| 01ee | JUMPDEST | |
| 01ef | PUSH2 | 0x11d0 |
| 01f2 | JUMP | |
| 01f3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 01f4 | DUP4 | |
| 01f5 | MLOAD | |
| 01f6 | SWAP2 | |
| 01f7 | DUP4 | |
| 01f8 | AND | |
| 01f9 | DUP3 | |
| 01fa | MSTORE | |
| 01fb | SWAP1 | |
| 01fc | SWAP2 | |
| 01fd | AND | |
| 01fe | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0200 | DUP3 | |
| 0201 | ADD | |
| 0202 | MSTORE | |
| 0203 | RETURN | |
| 0204 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0205 | POP | |
| 0206 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0207 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 020a | JUMPI | |
| 020b | DUP1 | |
| 020c | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 020e | NOT | |
| 020f | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0210 | ADD | |
| 0211 | SLT | |
| 0212 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0215 | JUMPI | |
| 0216 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0218 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 021a | MLOAD | |
| 021b | PUSH32 | 0x950ffa6ffe5372ffbba1d3c001d1b4dde1b251b8f53aa8d8bb11cc9691ac6c17 |
| 023c | DUP2 | |
| 023d | MSTORE | |
| 023e | RETURN | |
| 023f | JUMPDEST | |
| 0240 | POP | |
| 0241 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0242 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0245 | JUMPI | |
| 0246 | DUP1 | |
| 0247 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0249 | NOT | |
| 024a | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 024b | ADD | |
| 024c | SLT | |
| 024d | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0250 | JUMPI | |
| 0251 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0253 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0255 | MLOAD | |
| 0256 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0258 | DUP2 | |
| 0259 | MSTORE | |
| 025a | RETURN | |
| 025b | JUMPDEST | |
| 025c | POP | |
| 025d | CALLVALUE | |
| 025e | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0261 | JUMPI | |
| 0262 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0264 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0265 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0267 | NOT | |
| 0268 | ADD | |
| 0269 | SLT | |
| 026a | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 026d | JUMPI | |
| 026e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0270 | PUSH2 | 0x0288 |
| 0273 | PUSH2 | 0x027a |
| 0276 | PUSH2 | 0x0e88 |
| 0279 | JUMP | |
| 027a | JUMPDEST | |
| 027b | PUSH2 | 0x0282 |
| 027e | PUSH2 | 0x0ef7 |
| 0281 | JUMP | |
| 0282 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0283 | SWAP1 | |
| 0284 | PUSH2 | 0x1109 |
| 0287 | JUMP | |
| 0288 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0289 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 028b | MLOAD | |
| 028c | SWAP1 | |
| 028d | DUP2 | |
| 028e | MSTORE | |
| 028f | RETURN | |
| 0290 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0291 | POP | |
| 0292 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0293 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0296 | JUMPI | |
| 0297 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0299 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 029a | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 029c | NOT | |
| 029d | ADD | |
| 029e | SLT | |
| 029f | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 02a2 | JUMPI | |
| 02a3 | PUSH2 | 0x02aa |
| 02a6 | PUSH2 | 0x0e88 |
| 02a9 | JUMP | |
| 02aa | JUMPDEST | |
| 02ab | POP | |
| 02ac | PUSH2 | 0x02b3 |
| 02af | PUSH2 | 0x0e9e |
| 02b2 | JUMP | |
| 02b3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 02b4 | POP | |
| 02b5 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 02b7 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 02b8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 02ba | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 02bc | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 02be | SHL | |
| 02bf | SUB | |
| 02c0 | DUP2 | |
| 02c1 | GT | |
| 02c2 | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 02c5 | JUMPI | |
| 02c6 | PUSH2 | 0x02d3 |
| 02c9 | SWAP1 | |
| 02ca | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 02cb | SWAP1 | |
| 02cc | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 02ce | ADD | |
| 02cf | PUSH2 | 0x0f0d |
| 02d2 | JUMP | |
| 02d3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 02d4 | POP | |
| 02d5 | POP | |
| 02d6 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 02d8 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 02d9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 02db | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 02dd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 02df | SHL | |
| 02e0 | SUB | |
| 02e1 | DUP2 | |
| 02e2 | GT | |
| 02e3 | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 02e6 | JUMPI | |
| 02e7 | PUSH2 | 0x02f4 |
| 02ea | SWAP1 | |
| 02eb | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 02ec | SWAP1 | |
| 02ed | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 02ef | ADD | |
| 02f0 | PUSH2 | 0x0f0d |
| 02f3 | JUMP | |
| 02f4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 02f5 | POP | |
| 02f6 | POP | |
| 02f7 | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 02f9 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 02fa | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 02fc | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 02fe | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0300 | SHL | |
| 0301 | SUB | |
| 0302 | DUP2 | |
| 0303 | GT | |
| 0304 | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 0307 | JUMPI | |
| 0308 | PUSH2 | 0x0315 |
| 030b | SWAP1 | |
| 030c | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 030d | SWAP1 | |
| 030e | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0310 | ADD | |
| 0311 | PUSH2 | 0x0eb4 |
| 0314 | JUMP | |
| 0315 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0316 | POP | |
| 0317 | POP | |
| 0318 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 031a | MLOAD | |
| 031b | PUSH4 | 0xbc197c81 |
| 0320 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0322 | SHL | |
| 0323 | DUP2 | |
| 0324 | MSTORE | |
| 0325 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0327 | SWAP1 | |
| 0328 | RETURN | |
| 0329 | JUMPDEST | |
| 032a | POP | |
| 032b | CALLVALUE | |
| 032c | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 032f | JUMPI | |
| 0330 | DUP1 | |
| 0331 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0333 | NOT | |
| 0334 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0335 | ADD | |
| 0336 | SLT | |
| 0337 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 033a | JUMPI | |
| 033b | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 033d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 033f | MLOAD | |
| 0340 | PUSH2 | 0x0258 |
| 0343 | DUP2 | |
| 0344 | MSTORE | |
| 0345 | RETURN | |
| 0346 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0347 | POP | |
| 0348 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0349 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 034c | JUMPI | |
| 034d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 034f | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0350 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0352 | NOT | |
| 0353 | ADD | |
| 0354 | SLT | |
| 0355 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0358 | JUMPI | |
| 0359 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 035b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 035d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 035f | SHL | |
| 0360 | SUB | |
| 0361 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0363 | PUSH2 | 0x036a |
| 0366 | PUSH2 | 0x0e88 |
| 0369 | JUMP | |
| 036a | JUMPDEST | |
| 036b | SWAP3 | |
| 036c | PUSH2 | 0x0373 |
| 036f | PUSH2 | 0x0ef7 |
| 0372 | JUMP | |
| 0373 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0374 | SWAP4 | |
| 0375 | DUP2 | |
| 0376 | DUP4 | |
| 0377 | DUP1 | |
| 0378 | MLOAD | |
| 0379 | PUSH2 | 0x0381 |
| 037c | DUP2 | |
| 037d | PUSH2 | 0x0f3d |
| 0380 | JUMP | |
| 0381 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0382 | DUP3 | |
| 0383 | DUP2 | |
| 0384 | MSTORE | |
| 0385 | DUP3 | |
| 0386 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0388 | DUP3 | |
| 0389 | ADD | |
| 038a | MSTORE | |
| 038b | ADD | |
| 038c | MSTORE | |
| 038d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 038f | DUP1 | |
| 0390 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0392 | SHL | |
| 0393 | SUB | |
| 0394 | AND | |
| 0395 | DUP2 | |
| 0396 | MSTORE | |
| 0397 | DUP1 | |
| 0398 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 039a | MSTORE | |
| 039b | KECCAK256 | |
| 039c | SWAP2 | |
| 039d | AND | |
| 039e | PUSH0 | |
| 039f | MSTORE | |
| 03a0 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 03a2 | MSTORE | |
| 03a3 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 03a5 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 03a7 | PUSH0 | |
| 03a8 | KECCAK256 | |
| 03a9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 03ab | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 03ad | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 03af | SHL | |
| 03b0 | SUB | |
| 03b1 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 03b3 | MLOAD | |
| 03b4 | PUSH2 | 0x03bc |
| 03b7 | DUP2 | |
| 03b8 | PUSH2 | 0x0f3d |
| 03bb | JUMP | |
| 03bc | JUMPDEST | |
| 03bd | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 03bf | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 03c1 | DUP5 | |
| 03c2 | SLOAD | |
| 03c3 | SWAP5 | |
| 03c4 | DUP6 | |
| 03c5 | DUP5 | |
| 03c6 | MSTORE | |
| 03c7 | ADD | |
| 03c8 | SLOAD | |
| 03c9 | SWAP2 | |
| 03ca | DUP4 | |
| 03cb | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 03cd | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 03cf | DUP4 | |
| 03d0 | ADD | |
| 03d1 | SWAP3 | |
| 03d2 | DUP5 | |
| 03d3 | DUP7 | |
| 03d4 | AND | |
| 03d5 | DUP5 | |
| 03d6 | MSTORE | |
| 03d7 | ADD | |
| 03d8 | SWAP4 | |
| 03d9 | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 03db | SHR | |
| 03dc | AND | |
| 03dd | DUP4 | |
| 03de | MSTORE | |
| 03df | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 03e1 | MLOAD | |
| 03e2 | SWAP5 | |
| 03e3 | DUP6 | |
| 03e4 | MSTORE | |
| 03e5 | MLOAD | |
| 03e6 | AND | |
| 03e7 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 03e9 | DUP5 | |
| 03ea | ADD | |
| 03eb | MSTORE | |
| 03ec | MLOAD | |
| 03ed | AND | |
| 03ee | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 03f0 | DUP3 | |
| 03f1 | ADD | |
| 03f2 | MSTORE | |
| 03f3 | RETURN | |
| 03f4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 03f5 | POP | |
| 03f6 | CALLVALUE | |
| 03f7 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 03fa | JUMPI | |
| 03fb | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 03fd | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 03fe | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0400 | NOT | |
| 0401 | ADD | |
| 0402 | SLT | |
| 0403 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0406 | JUMPI | |
| 0407 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0409 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 040a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 040c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 040e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0410 | SHL | |
| 0411 | SUB | |
| 0412 | DUP2 | |
| 0413 | GT | |
| 0414 | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 0417 | JUMPI | |
| 0418 | PUSH2 | 0x0425 |
| 041b | SWAP1 | |
| 041c | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 041d | SWAP1 | |
| 041e | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0420 | ADD | |
| 0421 | PUSH2 | 0x0f0d |
| 0424 | JUMP | |
| 0425 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0426 | SWAP1 | |
| 0427 | SWAP2 | |
| 0428 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 042a | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 042b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 042d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 042f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0431 | SHL | |
| 0432 | SUB | |
| 0433 | DUP2 | |
| 0434 | GT | |
| 0435 | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 0438 | JUMPI | |
| 0439 | PUSH2 | 0x0446 |
| 043c | SWAP1 | |
| 043d | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 043e | SWAP1 | |
| 043f | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0441 | ADD | |
| 0442 | PUSH2 | 0x0f0d |
| 0445 | JUMP | |
| 0446 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0447 | SWAP1 | |
| 0448 | SWAP3 | |
| 0449 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 044b | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 044c | SWAP1 | |
| 044d | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 044f | DUP3 | |
| 0450 | AND | |
| 0451 | DUP3 | |
| 0452 | SUB | |
| 0453 | PUSH2 | 0x0928 |
| 0456 | JUMPI | |
| 0457 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0459 | MLOAD | |
| 045a | PUSH4 | 0x1de47f3f |
| 045f | PUSH1 | 0xe3 |
| 0461 | SHL | |
| 0462 | DUP2 | |
| 0463 | MSTORE | |
| 0464 | CALLER | |
| 0465 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0467 | DUP3 | |
| 0468 | ADD | |
| 0469 | MSTORE | |
| 046a | SWAP5 | |
| 046b | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000c19d888a2f7ba65a8dcf8d03ad8f1af5cdc66430 |
| 048c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 048e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0490 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0492 | SHL | |
| 0493 | SUB | |
| 0494 | AND | |
| 0495 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0497 | DUP8 | |
| 0498 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 049a | DUP2 | |
| 049b | DUP5 | |
| 049c | GAS | |
| 049d | STATICCALL | |
| 049e | SWAP7 | |
| 049f | DUP8 | |
| 04a0 | ISZERO | |
| 04a1 | PUSH2 | 0x08ec |
| 04a4 | JUMPI | |
| 04a5 | DUP7 | |
| 04a6 | SWAP8 | |
| 04a7 | PUSH2 | 0x08f7 |
| 04aa | JUMPI | |
| 04ab | JUMPDEST | |
| 04ac | POP | |
| 04ad | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04af | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04b1 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 04b3 | SHL | |
| 04b4 | SUB | |
| 04b5 | DUP8 | |
| 04b6 | AND | |
| 04b7 | ISZERO | |
| 04b8 | SWAP1 | |
| 04b9 | DUP2 | |
| 04ba | ISZERO | |
| 04bb | PUSH2 | 0x0857 |
| 04be | JUMPI | |
| 04bf | JUMPDEST | |
| 04c0 | POP | |
| 04c1 | PUSH2 | 0x0844 |
| 04c4 | JUMPI | |
| 04c5 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04c7 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 04c9 | DUP5 | |
| 04ca | AND | |
| 04cb | SUB | |
| 04cc | PUSH2 | 0x082e |
| 04cf | JUMPI | |
| 04d0 | DUP4 | |
| 04d1 | DUP3 | |
| 04d2 | SUB | |
| 04d3 | PUSH2 | 0x081c |
| 04d6 | JUMPI | |
| 04d7 | DUP5 | |
| 04d8 | SWAP7 | |
| 04d9 | SWAP2 | |
| 04da | SWAP7 | |
| 04db | POP | |
| 04dc | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04de | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04e0 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 04e2 | SHL | |
| 04e3 | SUB | |
| 04e4 | PUSH2 | 0x03e8 |
| 04e7 | TIMESTAMP | |
| 04e8 | DIV | |
| 04e9 | AND | |
| 04ea | SWAP4 | |
| 04eb | DUP6 | |
| 04ec | SWAP3 | |
| 04ed | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04ef | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04f1 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 04f3 | SHL | |
| 04f4 | SUB | |
| 04f5 | PUSH3 | 0x03f480 |
| 04f9 | DUP8 | |
| 04fa | ADD | |
| 04fb | GT | |
| 04fc | SWAP4 | |
| 04fd | JUMPDEST | |
| 04fe | DUP10 | |
| 04ff | DUP2 | |
| 0500 | LT | |
| 0501 | ISZERO | |
| 0502 | PUSH2 | 0x0791 |
| 0505 | JUMPI | |
| 0506 | DUP1 | |
| 0507 | PUSH1 | 0x05 |
| 0509 | SHL | |
| 050a | DUP3 | |
| 050b | ADD | |
| 050c | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 050d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 050f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0511 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0513 | SHL | |
| 0514 | SUB | |
| 0515 | DUP2 | |
| 0516 | AND | |
| 0517 | DUP2 | |
| 0518 | SUB | |
| 0519 | PUSH2 | 0x078d |
| 051c | JUMPI | |
| 051d | PUSH2 | 0x0539 |
| 0520 | DUP9 | |
| 0521 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0523 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0525 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0527 | SHL | |
| 0528 | SUB | |
| 0529 | PUSH2 | 0x0531 |
| 052c | DUP5 | |
| 052d | PUSH2 | 0x11d0 |
| 0530 | JUMP | |
| 0531 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0532 | SWAP4 | |
| 0533 | SWAP1 | |
| 0534 | SWAP4 | |
| 0535 | PUSH2 | 0x1081 |
| 0538 | JUMP | |
| 0539 | JUMPDEST | |
| 053a | AND | |
| 053b | GT | |
| 053c | ISZERO | |
| 053d | PUSH2 | 0x0771 |
| 0540 | JUMPI | |
| 0541 | DUP7 | |
| 0542 | PUSH2 | 0x075d |
| 0545 | JUMPI | |
| 0546 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0548 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 054a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 054c | SHL | |
| 054d | SUB | |
| 054e | AND | |
| 054f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0551 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0553 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0555 | SHL | |
| 0556 | SUB | |
| 0557 | PUSH3 | 0x03f480 |
| 055b | DUP11 | |
| 055c | ADD | |
| 055d | AND | |
| 055e | DUP2 | |
| 055f | GT | |
| 0560 | PUSH2 | 0x0741 |
| 0563 | JUMPI | |
| 0564 | PUSH2 | 0x056e |
| 0567 | DUP4 | |
| 0568 | DUP7 | |
| 0569 | DUP9 | |
| 056a | PUSH2 | 0x10b4 |
| 056d | JUMP | |
| 056e | JUMPDEST | |
| 056f | SWAP1 | |
| 0570 | POP | |
| 0571 | ISZERO | |
| 0572 | PUSH2 | 0x0725 |
| 0575 | JUMPI | |
| 0576 | DUP9 | |
| 0577 | LT | |
| 0578 | ISZERO | |
| 0579 | DUP1 | |
| 057a | PUSH2 | 0x06f4 |
| 057d | JUMPI | |
| 057e | JUMPDEST | |
| 057f | PUSH2 | 0x06cc |
| 0582 | JUMPI | |
| 0583 | PUSH2 | 0x058d |
| 0586 | DUP3 | |
| 0587 | DUP6 | |
| 0588 | DUP8 | |
| 0589 | PUSH2 | 0x10b4 |
| 058c | JUMP | |
| 058d | JUMPDEST | |
| 058e | PUSH2 | 0x0596 |
| 0591 | DUP2 | |
| 0592 | PUSH2 | 0x1000 |
| 0595 | JUMP | |
| 0596 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0597 | SWAP2 | |
| 0598 | PUSH2 | 0x05a4 |
| 059b | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 059d | MLOAD | |
| 059e | SWAP4 | |
| 059f | DUP5 | |
| 05a0 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 05a3 | JUMP | |
| 05a4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 05a5 | DUP2 | |
| 05a6 | DUP4 | |
| 05a7 | MSTORE | |
| 05a8 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 05a9 | DUP3 | |
| 05aa | DUP3 | |
| 05ab | ADD | |
| 05ac | GT | |
| 05ad | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 05b0 | JUMPI | |
| 05b1 | SWAP1 | |
| 05b2 | DUP1 | |
| 05b3 | DUP13 | |
| 05b4 | SWAP3 | |
| 05b5 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 05b7 | DUP6 | |
| 05b8 | ADD | |
| 05b9 | CALLDATACOPY | |
| 05ba | DUP3 | |
| 05bb | ADD | |
| 05bc | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 05be | ADD | |
| 05bf | MSTORE | |
| 05c0 | DUP1 | |
| 05c1 | MLOAD | |
| 05c2 | SWAP1 | |
| 05c3 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 05c5 | ADD | |
| 05c6 | KECCAK256 | |
| 05c7 | SWAP1 | |
| 05c8 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 05ca | MLOAD | |
| 05cb | PUSH2 | 0x05d3 |
| 05ce | DUP2 | |
| 05cf | PUSH2 | 0x0f3d |
| 05d2 | JUMP | |
| 05d3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 05d4 | DUP3 | |
| 05d5 | DUP2 | |
| 05d6 | MSTORE | |
| 05d7 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 05d9 | DUP2 | |
| 05da | ADD | |
| 05db | SWAP1 | |
| 05dc | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 05de | DUP11 | |
| 05df | AND | |
| 05e0 | DUP3 | |
| 05e1 | MSTORE | |
| 05e2 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 05e4 | DUP2 | |
| 05e5 | ADD | |
| 05e6 | SWAP1 | |
| 05e7 | DUP12 | |
| 05e8 | DUP3 | |
| 05e9 | MSTORE | |
| 05ea | DUP14 | |
| 05eb | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 05ed | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 05ef | SHL | |
| 05f0 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 05f2 | SWAP1 | |
| 05f3 | SUB | |
| 05f4 | AND | |
| 05f5 | DUP14 | |
| 05f6 | MSTORE | |
| 05f7 | DUP13 | |
| 05f8 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 05fa | MSTORE | |
| 05fb | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 05fd | DUP14 | |
| 05fe | KECCAK256 | |
| 05ff | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0601 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0603 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0605 | SHL | |
| 0606 | SUB | |
| 0607 | DUP6 | |
| 0608 | AND | |
| 0609 | PUSH0 | |
| 060a | MSTORE | |
| 060b | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 060d | MSTORE | |
| 060e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0610 | PUSH0 | |
| 0611 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0612 | SWAP1 | |
| 0613 | MLOAD | |
| 0614 | DUP2 | |
| 0615 | SSTORE | |
| 0616 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0618 | ADD | |
| 0619 | SWAP2 | |
| 061a | MLOAD | |
| 061b | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 061d | AND | |
| 061e | DUP3 | |
| 061f | SLOAD | |
| 0620 | SWAP2 | |
| 0621 | MLOAD | |
| 0622 | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 0624 | SHL | |
| 0625 | PUSH9 | 0xffffffffffffffff00 |
| 062f | AND | |
| 0630 | SWAP2 | |
| 0631 | PUSH9 | 0xffffffffffffffffff |
| 063b | NOT | |
| 063c | AND | |
| 063d | OR | |
| 063e | OR | |
| 063f | SWAP1 | |
| 0640 | SSTORE | |
| 0641 | PUSH2 | 0x064b |
| 0644 | DUP4 | |
| 0645 | DUP7 | |
| 0646 | DUP9 | |
| 0647 | PUSH2 | 0x10b4 |
| 064a | JUMP | |
| 064b | JUMPDEST | |
| 064c | DUP1 | |
| 064d | SWAP3 | |
| 064e | SWAP2 | |
| 064f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0651 | MLOAD | |
| 0652 | SWAP5 | |
| 0653 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0655 | DUP13 | |
| 0656 | AND | |
| 0657 | DUP7 | |
| 0658 | MSTORE | |
| 0659 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 065b | DUP7 | |
| 065c | ADD | |
| 065d | MSTORE | |
| 065e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0660 | DUP6 | |
| 0661 | ADD | |
| 0662 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 0664 | SWAP1 | |
| 0665 | MSTORE | |
| 0666 | DUP2 | |
| 0667 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 0669 | DUP7 | |
| 066a | ADD | |
| 066b | MSTORE | |
| 066c | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 066e | DUP6 | |
| 066f | ADD | |
| 0670 | CALLDATACOPY | |
| 0671 | DUP11 | |
| 0672 | DUP3 | |
| 0673 | DUP5 | |
| 0674 | ADD | |
| 0675 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 0677 | ADD | |
| 0678 | MSTORE | |
| 0679 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 067b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 067d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 067f | SHL | |
| 0680 | SUB | |
| 0681 | AND | |
| 0682 | SWAP2 | |
| 0683 | DUP1 | |
| 0684 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0686 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0688 | SHL | |
| 0689 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 068b | SWAP1 | |
| 068c | SUB | |
| 068d | DUP14 | |
| 068e | AND | |
| 068f | SWAP3 | |
| 0690 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0692 | NOT | |
| 0693 | SWAP1 | |
| 0694 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0696 | ADD | |
| 0697 | AND | |
| 0698 | DUP2 | |
| 0699 | ADD | |
| 069a | SUB | |
| 069b | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 069d | ADD | |
| 069e | PUSH32 | 0x7804231c79309bcdd21f79887e007cda403c0dc9c1e1b0a1913111849316a051 |
| 06bf | SWAP2 | |
| 06c0 | LOG3 | |
| 06c1 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06c3 | ADD | |
| 06c4 | PUSH2 | 0x04fd |
| 06c7 | JUMP | |
| 06c8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 06c9 | DUP12 | |
| 06ca | DUP1 | |
| 06cb | REVERT | |
| 06cc | JUMPDEST | |
| 06cd | PUSH4 | 0x01cd71d3 |
| 06d2 | PUSH1 | 0xe7 |
| 06d4 | SHL | |
| 06d5 | DUP10 | |
| 06d6 | MSTORE | |
| 06d7 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06d9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06db | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 06dd | SHL | |
| 06de | SUB | |
| 06df | DUP11 | |
| 06e0 | AND | |
| 06e1 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 06e3 | MSTORE | |
| 06e4 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06e6 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06e8 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 06ea | SHL | |
| 06eb | SUB | |
| 06ec | AND | |
| 06ed | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 06ef | MSTORE | |
| 06f0 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 06f2 | DUP9 | |
| 06f3 | REVERT | |
| 06f4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 06f5 | POP | |
| 06f6 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06f8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06fa | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 06fc | SHL | |
| 06fd | SUB | |
| 06fe | DUP11 | |
| 06ff | AND | |
| 0700 | DUP10 | |
| 0701 | MSTORE | |
| 0702 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0704 | DUP10 | |
| 0705 | DUP2 | |
| 0706 | MSTORE | |
| 0707 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0709 | DUP1 | |
| 070a | DUP12 | |
| 070b | KECCAK256 | |
| 070c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 070e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0710 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0712 | SHL | |
| 0713 | SUB | |
| 0714 | DUP5 | |
| 0715 | AND | |
| 0716 | PUSH0 | |
| 0717 | SWAP1 | |
| 0718 | DUP2 | |
| 0719 | MSTORE | |
| 071a | SWAP3 | |
| 071b | MSTORE | |
| 071c | SWAP1 | |
| 071d | KECCAK256 | |
| 071e | SLOAD | |
| 071f | ISZERO | |
| 0720 | ISZERO | |
| 0721 | PUSH2 | 0x057e |
| 0724 | JUMP | |
| 0725 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0726 | PUSH4 | 0x4953003d |
| 072b | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 072d | SHL | |
| 072e | DUP11 | |
| 072f | MSTORE | |
| 0730 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0732 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0734 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0736 | SHL | |
| 0737 | SUB | |
| 0738 | DUP3 | |
| 0739 | AND | |
| 073a | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 073c | MSTORE | |
| 073d | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 073f | DUP11 | |
| 0740 | REVERT | |
| 0741 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0742 | PUSH4 | 0x28715901 |
| 0747 | PUSH1 | 0xe2 |
| 0749 | SHL | |
| 074a | DUP11 | |
| 074b | MSTORE | |
| 074c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 074e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0750 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0752 | SHL | |
| 0753 | SUB | |
| 0754 | DUP3 | |
| 0755 | AND | |
| 0756 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0758 | MSTORE | |
| 0759 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 075b | DUP11 | |
| 075c | REVERT | |
| 075d | JUMPDEST | |
| 075e | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 0763 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0765 | SHL | |
| 0766 | DUP11 | |
| 0767 | MSTORE | |
| 0768 | PUSH1 | 0x11 |
| 076a | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 076c | MSTORE | |
| 076d | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 076f | DUP11 | |
| 0770 | REVERT | |
| 0771 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0772 | PUSH4 | 0x30e7c0c1 |
| 0777 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0779 | SHL | |
| 077a | DUP11 | |
| 077b | MSTORE | |
| 077c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 077e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0780 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0782 | SHL | |
| 0783 | SUB | |
| 0784 | DUP3 | |
| 0785 | AND | |
| 0786 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0788 | MSTORE | |
| 0789 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 078b | DUP11 | |
| 078c | REVERT | |
| 078d | JUMPDEST | |
| 078e | DUP9 | |
| 078f | DUP1 | |
| 0790 | REVERT | |
| 0791 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0792 | DUP8 | |
| 0793 | DUP1 | |
| 0794 | DUP4 | |
| 0795 | DUP12 | |
| 0796 | DUP14 | |
| 0797 | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000e604b1cf1ae764636263e394c206508b9e9a965e |
| 07b8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 07ba | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 07bc | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 07be | SHL | |
| 07bf | SUB | |
| 07c0 | AND | |
| 07c1 | DUP1 | |
| 07c2 | EXTCODESIZE | |
| 07c3 | ISZERO | |
| 07c4 | PUSH2 | 0x0818 |
| 07c7 | JUMPI | |
| 07c8 | PUSH2 | 0x07eb |
| 07cb | SWAP4 | |
| 07cc | DUP6 | |
| 07cd | DUP1 | |
| 07ce | SWAP5 | |
| 07cf | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 07d1 | MLOAD | |
| 07d2 | SWAP7 | |
| 07d3 | DUP8 | |
| 07d4 | SWAP6 | |
| 07d5 | DUP7 | |
| 07d6 | SWAP5 | |
| 07d7 | DUP6 | |
| 07d8 | SWAP4 | |
| 07d9 | PUSH4 | 0x0e1bfc5f |
| 07de | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 07e0 | SHL | |
| 07e1 | DUP6 | |
| 07e2 | MSTORE | |
| 07e3 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 07e5 | DUP6 | |
| 07e6 | ADD | |
| 07e7 | PUSH2 | 0x0f8d |
| 07ea | JUMP | |
| 07eb | JUMPDEST | |
| 07ec | SUB | |
| 07ed | SWAP3 | |
| 07ee | GAS | |
| 07ef | CALL | |
| 07f0 | DUP1 | |
| 07f1 | ISZERO | |
| 07f2 | PUSH2 | 0x080d |
| 07f5 | JUMPI | |
| 07f6 | PUSH2 | 0x07fc |
| 07f9 | JUMPI | |
| 07fa | POP | |
| 07fb | RETURN | |
| 07fc | JUMPDEST | |
| 07fd | DUP2 | |
| 07fe | PUSH2 | 0x0806 |
| 0801 | SWAP2 | |
| 0802 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 0805 | JUMP | |
| 0806 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0807 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 080a | JUMPI | |
| 080b | DUP1 | |
| 080c | RETURN | |
| 080d | JUMPDEST | |
| 080e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0810 | MLOAD | |
| 0811 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0812 | DUP5 | |
| 0813 | DUP3 | |
| 0814 | RETURNDATACOPY | |
| 0815 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0816 | SWAP1 | |
| 0817 | REVERT | |
| 0818 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0819 | DUP5 | |
| 081a | DUP1 | |
| 081b | REVERT | |
| 081c | JUMPDEST | |
| 081d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 081f | PUSH3 | 0x1398b9 |
| 0823 | PUSH1 | 0xe3 |
| 0825 | SHL | |
| 0826 | SUB | |
| 0827 | NOT | |
| 0828 | DUP6 | |
| 0829 | MSTORE | |
| 082a | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 082c | DUP6 | |
| 082d | REVERT | |
| 082e | JUMPDEST | |
| 082f | PUSH4 | 0xf8e9faab |
| 0834 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0836 | SHL | |
| 0837 | DUP6 | |
| 0838 | MSTORE | |
| 0839 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 083b | DUP4 | |
| 083c | AND | |
| 083d | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 083f | MSTORE | |
| 0840 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0842 | DUP6 | |
| 0843 | REVERT | |
| 0844 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0845 | PUSH4 | 0x86ebc01d |
| 084a | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 084c | SHL | |
| 084d | DUP6 | |
| 084e | MSTORE | |
| 084f | CALLER | |
| 0850 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0852 | MSTORE | |
| 0853 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0855 | DUP6 | |
| 0856 | REVERT | |
| 0857 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0858 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 085a | MLOAD | |
| 085b | PUSH4 | 0x2e4bfa51 |
| 0860 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0862 | SHL | |
| 0863 | DUP2 | |
| 0864 | MSTORE | |
| 0865 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0867 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0869 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 086b | SHL | |
| 086c | SUB | |
| 086d | DUP10 | |
| 086e | AND | |
| 086f | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0871 | DUP3 | |
| 0872 | ADD | |
| 0873 | MSTORE | |
| 0874 | PUSH32 | 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 |
| 0895 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0897 | DUP3 | |
| 0898 | ADD | |
| 0899 | MSTORE | |
| 089a | SWAP2 | |
| 089b | POP | |
| 089c | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 089e | SWAP1 | |
| 089f | DUP3 | |
| 08a0 | SWAP1 | |
| 08a1 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 08a3 | SWAP1 | |
| 08a4 | DUP3 | |
| 08a5 | SWAP1 | |
| 08a6 | GAS | |
| 08a7 | STATICCALL | |
| 08a8 | SWAP1 | |
| 08a9 | DUP2 | |
| 08aa | ISZERO | |
| 08ab | PUSH2 | 0x08ec |
| 08ae | JUMPI | |
| 08af | DUP7 | |
| 08b0 | SWAP2 | |
| 08b1 | PUSH2 | 0x08bd |
| 08b4 | JUMPI | |
| 08b5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 08b6 | POP | |
| 08b7 | ISZERO | |
| 08b8 | PUSH0 | |
| 08b9 | PUSH2 | 0x04bf |
| 08bc | JUMP | |
| 08bd | JUMPDEST | |
| 08be | PUSH2 | 0x08df |
| 08c1 | SWAP2 | |
| 08c2 | POP | |
| 08c3 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 08c5 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 08c6 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 08c8 | GT | |
| 08c9 | PUSH2 | 0x08e5 |
| 08cc | JUMPI | |
| 08cd | JUMPDEST | |
| 08ce | PUSH2 | 0x08d7 |
| 08d1 | DUP2 | |
| 08d2 | DUP4 | |
| 08d3 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 08d6 | JUMP | |
| 08d7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 08d8 | DUP2 | |
| 08d9 | ADD | |
| 08da | SWAP1 | |
| 08db | PUSH2 | 0x1069 |
| 08de | JUMP | |
| 08df | JUMPDEST | |
| 08e0 | PUSH0 | |
| 08e1 | PUSH2 | 0x08b5 |
| 08e4 | JUMP | |
| 08e5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 08e6 | POP | |
| 08e7 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 08e8 | PUSH2 | 0x08cd |
| 08eb | JUMP | |
| 08ec | JUMPDEST | |
| 08ed | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 08ef | MLOAD | |
| 08f0 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 08f1 | DUP9 | |
| 08f2 | DUP3 | |
| 08f3 | RETURNDATACOPY | |
| 08f4 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 08f5 | SWAP1 | |
| 08f6 | REVERT | |
| 08f7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 08f8 | PUSH2 | 0x091a |
| 08fb | SWAP2 | |
| 08fc | SWAP8 | |
| 08fd | POP | |
| 08fe | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0900 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0901 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0903 | GT | |
| 0904 | PUSH2 | 0x0921 |
| 0907 | JUMPI | |
| 0908 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0909 | PUSH2 | 0x0912 |
| 090c | DUP2 | |
| 090d | DUP4 | |
| 090e | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 0911 | JUMP | |
| 0912 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0913 | DUP2 | |
| 0914 | ADD | |
| 0915 | SWAP1 | |
| 0916 | PUSH2 | 0x104a |
| 0919 | JUMP | |
| 091a | JUMPDEST | |
| 091b | SWAP6 | |
| 091c | PUSH0 | |
| 091d | PUSH2 | 0x04ab |
| 0920 | JUMP | |
| 0921 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0922 | POP | |
| 0923 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0924 | PUSH2 | 0x0908 |
| 0927 | JUMP | |
| 0928 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0929 | DUP4 | |
| 092a | DUP1 | |
| 092b | REVERT | |
| 092c | JUMPDEST | |
| 092d | POP | |
| 092e | CALLVALUE | |
| 092f | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0932 | JUMPI | |
| 0933 | DUP1 | |
| 0934 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0936 | NOT | |
| 0937 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0938 | ADD | |
| 0939 | SLT | |
| 093a | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 093d | JUMPI | |
| 093e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0940 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0942 | MLOAD | |
| 0943 | PUSH2 | 0x0e10 |
| 0946 | DUP2 | |
| 0947 | MSTORE | |
| 0948 | RETURN | |
| 0949 | JUMPDEST | |
| 094a | POP | |
| 094b | CALLVALUE | |
| 094c | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 094f | JUMPI | |
| 0950 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0952 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0953 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0955 | NOT | |
| 0956 | ADD | |
| 0957 | SLT | |
| 0958 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 095b | JUMPI | |
| 095c | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 095e | PUSH2 | 0x0968 |
| 0961 | PUSH2 | 0x027a |
| 0964 | PUSH2 | 0x0e88 |
| 0967 | JUMP | |
| 0968 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0969 | ISZERO | |
| 096a | ISZERO | |
| 096b | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 096d | MLOAD | |
| 096e | SWAP1 | |
| 096f | DUP2 | |
| 0970 | MSTORE | |
| 0971 | RETURN | |
| 0972 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0973 | POP | |
| 0974 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0975 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0978 | JUMPI | |
| 0979 | DUP1 | |
| 097a | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 097c | NOT | |
| 097d | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 097e | ADD | |
| 097f | SLT | |
| 0980 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0983 | JUMPI | |
| 0984 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0986 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0988 | MLOAD | |
| 0989 | PUSH3 | 0x03f480 |
| 098d | DUP2 | |
| 098e | MSTORE | |
| 098f | RETURN | |
| 0990 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0991 | POP | |
| 0992 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0993 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0996 | JUMPI | |
| 0997 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0999 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 099a | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 099c | NOT | |
| 099d | ADD | |
| 099e | SLT | |
| 099f | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 09a2 | JUMPI | |
| 09a3 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 09a5 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 09a6 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 09a8 | DUP2 | |
| 09a9 | LT | |
| 09aa | ISZERO | |
| 09ab | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 09ae | JUMPI | |
| 09af | PUSH2 | 0x09b6 |
| 09b2 | PUSH2 | 0x0e9e |
| 09b5 | JUMP | |
| 09b6 | JUMPDEST | |
| 09b7 | SWAP2 | |
| 09b8 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 09ba | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 09bb | SWAP2 | |
| 09bc | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 09be | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 09bf | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 09c1 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 09c3 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 09c5 | SHL | |
| 09c6 | SUB | |
| 09c7 | DUP2 | |
| 09c8 | AND | |
| 09c9 | SWAP3 | |
| 09ca | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 09cc | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 09cd | SWAP3 | |
| 09ce | SWAP2 | |
| 09cf | DUP5 | |
| 09d0 | DUP2 | |
| 09d1 | SUB | |
| 09d2 | PUSH2 | 0x01c3 |
| 09d5 | JUMPI | |
| 09d6 | PUSH2 | 0x09dd |
| 09d9 | PUSH2 | 0x135d |
| 09dc | JUMP | |
| 09dd | JUMPDEST | |
| 09de | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 09e0 | MLOAD | |
| 09e1 | PUSH4 | 0xf5778b03 |
| 09e6 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 09e8 | SHL | |
| 09e9 | DUP2 | |
| 09ea | MSTORE | |
| 09eb | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 09ed | DUP2 | |
| 09ee | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 09f0 | DUP2 | |
| 09f1 | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000c19d888a2f7ba65a8dcf8d03ad8f1af5cdc66430 |
| 0a12 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a14 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a16 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0a18 | SHL | |
| 0a19 | SUB | |
| 0a1a | AND | |
| 0a1b | GAS | |
| 0a1c | STATICCALL | |
| 0a1d | SWAP1 | |
| 0a1e | DUP2 | |
| 0a1f | ISZERO | |
| 0a20 | PUSH2 | 0x0c72 |
| 0a23 | JUMPI | |
| 0a24 | DUP4 | |
| 0a25 | SWAP2 | |
| 0a26 | PUSH2 | 0x0c53 |
| 0a29 | JUMPI | |
| 0a2a | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a2b | POP | |
| 0a2c | DUP6 | |
| 0a2d | ISZERO | |
| 0a2e | SWAP1 | |
| 0a2f | DUP2 | |
| 0a30 | ISZERO | |
| 0a31 | PUSH2 | 0x0c2f |
| 0a34 | JUMPI | |
| 0a35 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a36 | POP | |
| 0a37 | PUSH2 | 0x0c1b |
| 0a3a | JUMPI | |
| 0a3b | PUSH2 | 0x0a45 |
| 0a3e | DUP5 | |
| 0a3f | DUP9 | |
| 0a40 | DUP6 | |
| 0a41 | PUSH2 | 0x0fe7 |
| 0a44 | JUMP | |
| 0a45 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a46 | SWAP6 | |
| 0a47 | PUSH0 | |
| 0a48 | NOT | |
| 0a49 | DUP2 | |
| 0a4a | SUB | |
| 0a4b | PUSH2 | 0x0c16 |
| 0a4e | JUMPI | |
| 0a4f | POP | |
| 0a50 | DUP6 | |
| 0a51 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a52 | DUP1 | |
| 0a53 | SWAP7 | |
| 0a54 | DUP2 | |
| 0a55 | ISZERO | |
| 0a56 | PUSH2 | 0x0c07 |
| 0a59 | JUMPI | |
| 0a5a | DUP1 | |
| 0a5b | DUP3 | |
| 0a5c | GT | |
| 0a5d | PUSH2 | 0x0be2 |
| 0a60 | JUMPI | |
| 0a61 | POP | |
| 0a62 | DUP3 | |
| 0a63 | SWAP2 | |
| 0a64 | DUP5 | |
| 0a65 | PUSH2 | 0x0af4 |
| 0a68 | JUMPI | |
| 0a69 | POP | |
| 0a6a | POP | |
| 0a6b | DUP2 | |
| 0a6c | DUP1 | |
| 0a6d | DUP1 | |
| 0a6e | DUP1 | |
| 0a6f | DUP10 | |
| 0a70 | DUP10 | |
| 0a71 | GAS | |
| 0a72 | CALL | |
| 0a73 | PUSH2 | 0x0a7a |
| 0a76 | PUSH2 | 0x101b |
| 0a79 | JUMP | |
| 0a7a | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a7b | POP | |
| 0a7c | ISZERO | |
| 0a7d | PUSH2 | 0x0ae0 |
| 0a80 | JUMPI | |
| 0a81 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a82 | PUSH2 | 0x0acc |
| 0a85 | JUMPI | |
| 0a86 | POP | |
| 0a87 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0a89 | DUP1 | |
| 0a8a | MLOAD | |
| 0a8b | SWAP3 | |
| 0a8c | DUP4 | |
| 0a8d | MSTORE | |
| 0a8e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0a90 | DUP4 | |
| 0a91 | DUP2 | |
| 0a92 | ADD | |
| 0a93 | DUP7 | |
| 0a94 | SWAP1 | |
| 0a95 | MSTORE | |
| 0a96 | SWAP6 | |
| 0a97 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a99 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a9b | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0a9d | SHL | |
| 0a9e | SUB | |
| 0a9f | AND | |
| 0aa0 | SWAP3 | |
| 0aa1 | PUSH32 | 0x7643c83e539cea2f6bf506545392e52cfd5f917e327efbcd0ba28f29c28d042e |
| 0ac2 | SWAP2 | |
| 0ac3 | SWAP1 | |
| 0ac4 | LOG4 | |
| 0ac5 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0ac7 | MLOAD | |
| 0ac8 | SWAP1 | |
| 0ac9 | DUP2 | |
| 0aca | MSTORE | |
| 0acb | RETURN | |
| 0acc | JUMPDEST | |
| 0acd | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 0ad2 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0ad4 | SHL | |
| 0ad5 | DUP2 | |
| 0ad6 | MSTORE | |
| 0ad7 | PUSH1 | 0x21 |
| 0ad9 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0adb | MSTORE | |
| 0adc | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0ade | SWAP1 | |
| 0adf | REVERT | |
| 0ae0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ae1 | PUSH4 | 0x65f4a9ef |
| 0ae6 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0ae8 | SHL | |
| 0ae9 | DUP3 | |
| 0aea | MSTORE | |
| 0aeb | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0aed | DUP3 | |
| 0aee | SWAP1 | |
| 0aef | MSTORE | |
| 0af0 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0af2 | DUP3 | |
| 0af3 | REVERT | |
| 0af4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0af5 | DUP4 | |
| 0af6 | SWAP3 | |
| 0af7 | POP | |
| 0af8 | SWAP1 | |
| 0af9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0afb | DUP6 | |
| 0afc | SUB | |
| 0afd | PUSH2 | 0x0b4e |
| 0b00 | JUMPI | |
| 0b01 | POP | |
| 0b02 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0b04 | MLOAD | |
| 0b05 | PUSH4 | 0xa9059cbb |
| 0b0a | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0b0c | SHL | |
| 0b0d | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0b0f | DUP3 | |
| 0b10 | ADD | |
| 0b11 | MSTORE | |
| 0b12 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0b14 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0b16 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0b18 | SHL | |
| 0b19 | SUB | |
| 0b1a | SWAP1 | |
| 0b1b | SWAP2 | |
| 0b1c | AND | |
| 0b1d | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0b1f | DUP3 | |
| 0b20 | ADD | |
| 0b21 | MSTORE | |
| 0b22 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 0b24 | DUP2 | |
| 0b25 | ADD | |
| 0b26 | DUP8 | |
| 0b27 | SWAP1 | |
| 0b28 | MSTORE | |
| 0b29 | PUSH2 | 0x0b49 |
| 0b2c | SWAP1 | |
| 0b2d | PUSH2 | 0x0b43 |
| 0b30 | DUP2 | |
| 0b31 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0b33 | DUP2 | |
| 0b34 | ADD | |
| 0b35 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b36 | SUB | |
| 0b37 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0b39 | NOT | |
| 0b3a | DUP2 | |
| 0b3b | ADD | |
| 0b3c | DUP4 | |
| 0b3d | MSTORE | |
| 0b3e | DUP3 | |
| 0b3f | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 0b42 | JUMP | |
| 0b43 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b44 | DUP9 | |
| 0b45 | PUSH2 | 0x14fb |
| 0b48 | JUMP | |
| 0b49 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b4a | PUSH2 | 0x0a81 |
| 0b4d | JUMP | |
| 0b4e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b4f | SWAP7 | |
| 0b50 | SWAP2 | |
| 0b51 | POP | |
| 0b52 | POP | |
| 0b53 | DUP2 | |
| 0b54 | SWAP6 | |
| 0b55 | PUSH1 | 0x02 |
| 0b57 | DUP5 | |
| 0b58 | EQ | |
| 0b59 | PUSH0 | |
| 0b5a | EQ | |
| 0b5b | PUSH2 | 0x0b97 |
| 0b5e | JUMPI | |
| 0b5f | POP | |
| 0b60 | POP | |
| 0b61 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0b63 | SWAP5 | |
| 0b64 | PUSH2 | 0x0b49 |
| 0b67 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0b69 | MLOAD | |
| 0b6a | PUSH4 | 0x23b872dd |
| 0b6f | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0b71 | SHL | |
| 0b72 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0b74 | DUP3 | |
| 0b75 | ADD | |
| 0b76 | MSTORE | |
| 0b77 | ADDRESS | |
| 0b78 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0b7a | DUP3 | |
| 0b7b | ADD | |
| 0b7c | MSTORE | |
| 0b7d | DUP7 | |
| 0b7e | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 0b80 | DUP3 | |
| 0b81 | ADD | |
| 0b82 | MSTORE | |
| 0b83 | DUP6 | |
| 0b84 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0b86 | DUP3 | |
| 0b87 | ADD | |
| 0b88 | MSTORE | |
| 0b89 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0b8b | DUP2 | |
| 0b8c | MSTORE | |
| 0b8d | PUSH2 | 0x0b43 |
| 0b90 | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 0b92 | DUP3 | |
| 0b93 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 0b96 | JUMP | |
| 0b97 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b98 | PUSH2 | 0x0b49 |
| 0b9b | SWAP1 | |
| 0b9c | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0b9e | SWAP8 | |
| 0b9f | SWAP3 | |
| 0ba0 | SWAP8 | |
| 0ba1 | MLOAD | |
| 0ba2 | SWAP1 | |
| 0ba3 | PUSH4 | 0x79212195 |
| 0ba8 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0baa | SHL | |
| 0bab | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0bad | DUP4 | |
| 0bae | ADD | |
| 0baf | MSTORE | |
| 0bb0 | ADDRESS | |
| 0bb1 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0bb3 | DUP4 | |
| 0bb4 | ADD | |
| 0bb5 | MSTORE | |
| 0bb6 | DUP8 | |
| 0bb7 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 0bb9 | DUP4 | |
| 0bba | ADD | |
| 0bbb | MSTORE | |
| 0bbc | DUP7 | |
| 0bbd | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0bbf | DUP4 | |
| 0bc0 | ADD | |
| 0bc1 | MSTORE | |
| 0bc2 | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 0bc4 | DUP3 | |
| 0bc5 | ADD | |
| 0bc6 | MSTORE | |
| 0bc7 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0bc9 | PUSH1 | 0xa4 |
| 0bcb | DUP3 | |
| 0bcc | ADD | |
| 0bcd | MSTORE | |
| 0bce | DUP4 | |
| 0bcf | PUSH1 | 0xc4 |
| 0bd1 | DUP3 | |
| 0bd2 | ADD | |
| 0bd3 | MSTORE | |
| 0bd4 | PUSH1 | 0xc4 |
| 0bd6 | DUP2 | |
| 0bd7 | MSTORE | |
| 0bd8 | PUSH2 | 0x0b43 |
| 0bdb | PUSH1 | 0xe4 |
| 0bdd | DUP3 | |
| 0bde | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 0be1 | JUMP | |
| 0be2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0be3 | PUSH4 | 0x21909681 |
| 0be8 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0bea | SHL | |
| 0beb | DUP5 | |
| 0bec | MSTORE | |
| 0bed | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0bef | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0bf1 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0bf3 | SHL | |
| 0bf4 | SUB | |
| 0bf5 | DUP10 | |
| 0bf6 | AND | |
| 0bf7 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0bf9 | MSTORE | |
| 0bfa | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0bfc | SWAP2 | |
| 0bfd | SWAP1 | |
| 0bfe | SWAP2 | |
| 0bff | MSTORE | |
| 0c00 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 0c02 | MSTORE | |
| 0c03 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0c05 | DUP3 | |
| 0c06 | REVERT | |
| 0c07 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c08 | PUSH4 | 0x7c2e506f |
| 0c0d | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0c0f | SHL | |
| 0c10 | DUP5 | |
| 0c11 | MSTORE | |
| 0c12 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0c14 | DUP5 | |
| 0c15 | REVERT | |
| 0c16 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c17 | PUSH2 | 0x0a51 |
| 0c1a | JUMP | |
| 0c1b | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c1c | PUSH4 | 0x15150d4d |
| 0c21 | PUSH1 | 0xe3 |
| 0c23 | SHL | |
| 0c24 | DUP3 | |
| 0c25 | MSTORE | |
| 0c26 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0c28 | DUP6 | |
| 0c29 | SWAP1 | |
| 0c2a | MSTORE | |
| 0c2b | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0c2d | DUP3 | |
| 0c2e | REVERT | |
| 0c2f | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c30 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c32 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c34 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0c36 | SHL | |
| 0c37 | SUB | |
| 0c38 | AND | |
| 0c39 | DUP7 | |
| 0c3a | EQ | |
| 0c3b | ISZERO | |
| 0c3c | SWAP1 | |
| 0c3d | POP | |
| 0c3e | DUP1 | |
| 0c3f | PUSH2 | 0x0c49 |
| 0c42 | JUMPI | |
| 0c43 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c44 | PUSH0 | |
| 0c45 | PUSH2 | 0x0a35 |
| 0c48 | JUMP | |
| 0c49 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c4a | POP | |
| 0c4b | CALLER | |
| 0c4c | DUP6 | |
| 0c4d | EQ | |
| 0c4e | ISZERO | |
| 0c4f | PUSH2 | 0x0c43 |
| 0c52 | JUMP | |
| 0c53 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c54 | PUSH2 | 0x0c6c |
| 0c57 | SWAP2 | |
| 0c58 | POP | |
| 0c59 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0c5b | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0c5c | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0c5e | GT | |
| 0c5f | PUSH2 | 0x0921 |
| 0c62 | JUMPI | |
| 0c63 | PUSH2 | 0x0912 |
| 0c66 | DUP2 | |
| 0c67 | DUP4 | |
| 0c68 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 0c6b | JUMP | |
| 0c6c | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c6d | PUSH0 | |
| 0c6e | PUSH2 | 0x0a2a |
| 0c71 | JUMP | |
| 0c72 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c73 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0c75 | MLOAD | |
| 0c76 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0c77 | DUP6 | |
| 0c78 | DUP3 | |
| 0c79 | RETURNDATACOPY | |
| 0c7a | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0c7b | SWAP1 | |
| 0c7c | REVERT | |
| 0c7d | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c7e | POP | |
| 0c7f | CALLVALUE | |
| 0c80 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0c83 | JUMPI | |
| 0c84 | DUP1 | |
| 0c85 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0c87 | NOT | |
| 0c88 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0c89 | ADD | |
| 0c8a | SLT | |
| 0c8b | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0c8e | JUMPI | |
| 0c8f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0c91 | MLOAD | |
| 0c92 | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000c19d888a2f7ba65a8dcf8d03ad8f1af5cdc66430 |
| 0cb3 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0cb5 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0cb7 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0cb9 | SHL | |
| 0cba | SUB | |
| 0cbb | AND | |
| 0cbc | DUP2 | |
| 0cbd | MSTORE | |
| 0cbe | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0cc0 | SWAP1 | |
| 0cc1 | RETURN | |
| 0cc2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0cc3 | POP | |
| 0cc4 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0cc5 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0cc8 | JUMPI | |
| 0cc9 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 0ccb | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0ccc | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0cce | NOT | |
| 0ccf | ADD | |
| 0cd0 | SLT | |
| 0cd1 | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0cd4 | JUMPI | |
| 0cd5 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0cd7 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0cd8 | SWAP1 | |
| 0cd9 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0cdb | DUP3 | |
| 0cdc | LT | |
| 0cdd | ISZERO | |
| 0cde | PUSH2 | 0x012e |
| 0ce1 | JUMPI | |
| 0ce2 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0ce4 | PUSH2 | 0x0288 |
| 0ce7 | DUP4 | |
| 0ce8 | PUSH2 | 0x0cef |
| 0ceb | PUSH2 | 0x0e9e |
| 0cee | JUMP | |
| 0cef | JUMPDEST | |
| 0cf0 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 0cf2 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0cf3 | SWAP2 | |
| 0cf4 | PUSH2 | 0x0fe7 |
| 0cf7 | JUMP | |
| 0cf8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0cf9 | POP | |
| 0cfa | CALLVALUE | |
| 0cfb | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0cfe | JUMPI | |
| 0cff | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0d01 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0d02 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0d04 | NOT | |
| 0d05 | ADD | |
| 0d06 | SLT | |
| 0d07 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0d0a | JUMPI | |
| 0d0b | PUSH2 | 0x0d12 |
| 0d0e | PUSH2 | 0x0e88 |
| 0d11 | JUMP | |
| 0d12 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d13 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0d15 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0d16 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d18 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d1a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0d1c | SHL | |
| 0d1d | SUB | |
| 0d1e | DUP2 | |
| 0d1f | GT | |
| 0d20 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0d23 | JUMPI | |
| 0d24 | PUSH2 | 0x0d31 |
| 0d27 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d28 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0d29 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d2a | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0d2c | ADD | |
| 0d2d | PUSH2 | 0x0f0d |
| 0d30 | JUMP | |
| 0d31 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d32 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d33 | SWAP2 | |
| 0d34 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d35 | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000e604b1cf1ae764636263e394c206508b9e9a965e |
| 0d56 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d58 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d5a | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0d5c | SHL | |
| 0d5d | SUB | |
| 0d5e | AND | |
| 0d5f | DUP1 | |
| 0d60 | EXTCODESIZE | |
| 0d61 | ISZERO | |
| 0d62 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0d65 | JUMPI | |
| 0d66 | PUSH2 | 0x0d89 |
| 0d69 | SWAP4 | |
| 0d6a | PUSH0 | |
| 0d6b | DUP1 | |
| 0d6c | SWAP5 | |
| 0d6d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0d6f | MLOAD | |
| 0d70 | SWAP7 | |
| 0d71 | DUP8 | |
| 0d72 | SWAP6 | |
| 0d73 | DUP7 | |
| 0d74 | SWAP5 | |
| 0d75 | DUP6 | |
| 0d76 | SWAP4 | |
| 0d77 | PUSH4 | 0x0e1bfc5f |
| 0d7c | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0d7e | SHL | |
| 0d7f | DUP6 | |
| 0d80 | MSTORE | |
| 0d81 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0d83 | DUP6 | |
| 0d84 | ADD | |
| 0d85 | PUSH2 | 0x0f8d |
| 0d88 | JUMP | |
| 0d89 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d8a | SUB | |
| 0d8b | SWAP3 | |
| 0d8c | GAS | |
| 0d8d | CALL | |
| 0d8e | DUP1 | |
| 0d8f | ISZERO | |
| 0d90 | PUSH2 | 0x0da9 |
| 0d93 | JUMPI | |
| 0d94 | PUSH2 | 0x0d9b |
| 0d97 | JUMPI | |
| 0d98 | POP | |
| 0d99 | DUP1 | |
| 0d9a | RETURN | |
| 0d9b | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d9c | PUSH2 | 0x0da7 |
| 0d9f | SWAP2 | |
| 0da0 | POP | |
| 0da1 | PUSH0 | |
| 0da2 | SWAP1 | |
| 0da3 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 0da6 | JUMP | |
| 0da7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0da8 | STOP | |
| 0da9 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0daa | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0dac | MLOAD | |
| 0dad | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0dae | PUSH0 | |
| 0daf | DUP3 | |
| 0db0 | RETURNDATACOPY | |
| 0db1 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 0db2 | SWAP1 | |
| 0db3 | REVERT | |
| 0db4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0db5 | PUSH0 | |
| 0db6 | DUP1 | |
| 0db7 | REVERT | |
| 0db8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0db9 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0dba | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0dbd | JUMPI | |
| 0dbe | PUSH0 | |
| 0dbf | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0dc0 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0dc2 | NOT | |
| 0dc3 | ADD | |
| 0dc4 | SLT | |
| 0dc5 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0dc8 | JUMPI | |
| 0dc9 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0dcb | MLOAD | |
| 0dcc | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000e604b1cf1ae764636263e394c206508b9e9a965e |
| 0ded | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0def | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0df1 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0df3 | SHL | |
| 0df4 | SUB | |
| 0df5 | AND | |
| 0df6 | DUP2 | |
| 0df7 | MSTORE | |
| 0df8 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0dfa | SWAP1 | |
| 0dfb | RETURN | |
| 0dfc | JUMPDEST | |
| 0dfd | CALLVALUE | |
| 0dfe | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0e01 | JUMPI | |
| 0e02 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0e04 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0e05 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0e07 | NOT | |
| 0e08 | ADD | |
| 0e09 | SLT | |
| 0e0a | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0e0d | JUMPI | |
| 0e0e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0e10 | PUSH2 | 0x0258 |
| 0e13 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e15 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e17 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0e19 | SHL | |
| 0e1a | SUB | |
| 0e1b | PUSH2 | 0x0e22 |
| 0e1e | PUSH2 | 0x0ee1 |
| 0e21 | JUMP | |
| 0e22 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e23 | AND | |
| 0e24 | DIV | |
| 0e25 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e27 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e29 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0e2b | SHL | |
| 0e2c | SUB | |
| 0e2d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0e2f | MLOAD | |
| 0e30 | SWAP2 | |
| 0e31 | AND | |
| 0e32 | DUP2 | |
| 0e33 | MSTORE | |
| 0e34 | RETURN | |
| 0e35 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e36 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0e37 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0e3a | JUMPI | |
| 0e3b | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 0e3d | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0e3e | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0e40 | NOT | |
| 0e41 | ADD | |
| 0e42 | SLT | |
| 0e43 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0e46 | JUMPI | |
| 0e47 | PUSH2 | 0x0e4e |
| 0e4a | PUSH2 | 0x0e88 |
| 0e4d | JUMP | |
| 0e4e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e4f | POP | |
| 0e50 | PUSH2 | 0x0e57 |
| 0e53 | PUSH2 | 0x0e9e |
| 0e56 | JUMP | |
| 0e57 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e58 | POP | |
| 0e59 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0e5b | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0e5c | SWAP1 | |
| 0e5d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e5f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e61 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0e63 | SHL | |
| 0e64 | SUB | |
| 0e65 | DUP3 | |
| 0e66 | GT | |
| 0e67 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0e6a | JUMPI | |
| 0e6b | PUSH2 | 0x0e7a |
| 0e6e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0e70 | SWAP3 | |
| 0e71 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0e72 | SWAP1 | |
| 0e73 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0e75 | ADD | |
| 0e76 | PUSH2 | 0x0eb4 |
| 0e79 | JUMP | |
| 0e7a | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e7b | POP | |
| 0e7c | POP | |
| 0e7d | PUSH4 | 0x0a85bd01 |
| 0e82 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0e84 | SHL | |
| 0e85 | DUP2 | |
| 0e86 | MSTORE | |
| 0e87 | RETURN | |
| 0e88 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e89 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0e8b | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0e8c | SWAP1 | |
| 0e8d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e8f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e91 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0e93 | SHL | |
| 0e94 | SUB | |
| 0e95 | DUP3 | |
| 0e96 | AND | |
| 0e97 | DUP3 | |
| 0e98 | SUB | |
| 0e99 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0e9c | JUMPI | |
| 0e9d | JUMP | |
| 0e9e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e9f | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0ea1 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0ea2 | SWAP1 | |
| 0ea3 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ea5 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ea7 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0ea9 | SHL | |
| 0eaa | SUB | |
| 0eab | DUP3 | |
| 0eac | AND | |
| 0ead | DUP3 | |
| 0eae | SUB | |
| 0eaf | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0eb2 | JUMPI | |
| 0eb3 | JUMP | |
| 0eb4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0eb5 | SWAP2 | |
| 0eb6 | DUP2 | |
| 0eb7 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0eb9 | DUP5 | |
| 0eba | ADD | |
| 0ebb | SLT | |
| 0ebc | ISZERO | |
| 0ebd | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0ec0 | JUMPI | |
| 0ec1 | DUP3 | |
| 0ec2 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0ec3 | SWAP2 | |
| 0ec4 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ec6 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ec8 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0eca | SHL | |
| 0ecb | SUB | |
| 0ecc | DUP4 | |
| 0ecd | GT | |
| 0ece | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0ed1 | JUMPI | |
| 0ed2 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0ed4 | DUP4 | |
| 0ed5 | DUP2 | |
| 0ed6 | DUP7 | |
| 0ed7 | ADD | |
| 0ed8 | SWAP6 | |
| 0ed9 | ADD | |
| 0eda | ADD | |
| 0edb | GT | |
| 0edc | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0edf | JUMPI | |
| 0ee0 | JUMP | |
| 0ee1 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ee2 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0ee4 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0ee5 | SWAP1 | |
| 0ee6 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ee8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0eea | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0eec | SHL | |
| 0eed | SUB | |
| 0eee | DUP3 | |
| 0eef | AND | |
| 0ef0 | DUP3 | |
| 0ef1 | SUB | |
| 0ef2 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0ef5 | JUMPI | |
| 0ef6 | JUMP | |
| 0ef7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ef8 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0efa | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0efb | SWAP1 | |
| 0efc | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0efe | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f00 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f02 | SHL | |
| 0f03 | SUB | |
| 0f04 | DUP3 | |
| 0f05 | AND | |
| 0f06 | DUP3 | |
| 0f07 | SUB | |
| 0f08 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0f0b | JUMPI | |
| 0f0c | JUMP | |
| 0f0d | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f0e | SWAP2 | |
| 0f0f | DUP2 | |
| 0f10 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0f12 | DUP5 | |
| 0f13 | ADD | |
| 0f14 | SLT | |
| 0f15 | ISZERO | |
| 0f16 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0f19 | JUMPI | |
| 0f1a | DUP3 | |
| 0f1b | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0f1c | SWAP2 | |
| 0f1d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f1f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f21 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f23 | SHL | |
| 0f24 | SUB | |
| 0f25 | DUP4 | |
| 0f26 | GT | |
| 0f27 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0f2a | JUMPI | |
| 0f2b | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0f2d | DUP1 | |
| 0f2e | DUP6 | |
| 0f2f | ADD | |
| 0f30 | SWAP5 | |
| 0f31 | DUP5 | |
| 0f32 | PUSH1 | 0x05 |
| 0f34 | SHL | |
| 0f35 | ADD | |
| 0f36 | ADD | |
| 0f37 | GT | |
| 0f38 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0f3b | JUMPI | |
| 0f3c | JUMP | |
| 0f3d | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f3e | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 0f40 | DUP2 | |
| 0f41 | ADD | |
| 0f42 | SWAP1 | |
| 0f43 | DUP2 | |
| 0f44 | LT | |
| 0f45 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f47 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f49 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f4b | SHL | |
| 0f4c | SUB | |
| 0f4d | DUP3 | |
| 0f4e | GT | |
| 0f4f | OR | |
| 0f50 | PUSH2 | 0x0f58 |
| 0f53 | JUMPI | |
| 0f54 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f56 | MSTORE | |
| 0f57 | JUMP | |
| 0f58 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f59 | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 0f5e | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0f60 | SHL | |
| 0f61 | PUSH0 | |
| 0f62 | MSTORE | |
| 0f63 | PUSH1 | 0x41 |
| 0f65 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0f67 | MSTORE | |
| 0f68 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0f6a | PUSH0 | |
| 0f6b | REVERT | |
| 0f6c | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f6d | SWAP1 | |
| 0f6e | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0f70 | DUP1 | |
| 0f71 | NOT | |
| 0f72 | SWAP2 | |
| 0f73 | ADD | |
| 0f74 | AND | |
| 0f75 | DUP2 | |
| 0f76 | ADD | |
| 0f77 | SWAP1 | |
| 0f78 | DUP2 | |
| 0f79 | LT | |
| 0f7a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f7c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f7e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f80 | SHL | |
| 0f81 | SUB | |
| 0f82 | DUP3 | |
| 0f83 | GT | |
| 0f84 | OR | |
| 0f85 | PUSH2 | 0x0f58 |
| 0f88 | JUMPI | |
| 0f89 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f8b | MSTORE | |
| 0f8c | JUMP | |
| 0f8d | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f8e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f90 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f92 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0f94 | SHL | |
| 0f95 | SUB | |
| 0f96 | SWAP1 | |
| 0f97 | SWAP2 | |
| 0f98 | AND | |
| 0f99 | DUP2 | |
| 0f9a | MSTORE | |
| 0f9b | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f9d | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0f9f | DUP3 | |
| 0fa0 | ADD | |
| 0fa1 | DUP2 | |
| 0fa2 | SWAP1 | |
| 0fa3 | MSTORE | |
| 0fa4 | DUP2 | |
| 0fa5 | ADD | |
| 0fa6 | DUP4 | |
| 0fa7 | SWAP1 | |
| 0fa8 | MSTORE | |
| 0fa9 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 0fab | ADD | |
| 0fac | SWAP2 | |
| 0fad | PUSH0 | |
| 0fae | SWAP1 | |
| 0faf | JUMPDEST | |
| 0fb0 | DUP1 | |
| 0fb1 | DUP3 | |
| 0fb2 | LT | |
| 0fb3 | PUSH2 | 0x0fbc |
| 0fb6 | JUMPI | |
| 0fb7 | POP | |
| 0fb8 | POP | |
| 0fb9 | POP | |
| 0fba | SWAP1 | |
| 0fbb | JUMP | |
| 0fbc | JUMPDEST | |
| 0fbd | SWAP1 | |
| 0fbe | SWAP2 | |
| 0fbf | SWAP3 | |
| 0fc0 | DUP4 | |
| 0fc1 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0fc2 | SWAP1 | |
| 0fc3 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0fc5 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0fc7 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0fc9 | SHL | |
| 0fca | SUB | |
| 0fcb | DUP3 | |
| 0fcc | AND | |
| 0fcd | DUP1 | |
| 0fce | SWAP3 | |
| 0fcf | SUB | |
| 0fd0 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 0fd3 | JUMPI | |
| 0fd4 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0fd6 | DUP2 | |
| 0fd7 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0fd9 | SWAP4 | |
| 0fda | DUP3 | |
| 0fdb | SWAP4 | |
| 0fdc | MSTORE | |
| 0fdd | ADD | |
| 0fde | SWAP5 | |
| 0fdf | ADD | |
| 0fe0 | SWAP3 | |
| 0fe1 | ADD | |
| 0fe2 | SWAP1 | |
| 0fe3 | PUSH2 | 0x0faf |
| 0fe6 | JUMP | |
| 0fe7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0fe8 | SWAP1 | |
| 0fe9 | PUSH2 | 0x0ff2 |
| 0fec | SWAP3 | |
| 0fed | SWAP2 | |
| 0fee | PUSH2 | 0x1206 |
| 0ff1 | JUMP | |
| 0ff2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ff3 | DUP1 | |
| 0ff4 | ISZERO | |
| 0ff5 | PUSH2 | 0x0ffb |
| 0ff8 | JUMPI | |
| 0ff9 | SWAP1 | |
| 0ffa | JUMP | |
| 0ffb | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ffc | POP | |
| 0ffd | PUSH0 | |
| 0ffe | SWAP1 | |
| 0fff | JUMP | |
| 1000 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1001 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1003 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1005 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1007 | SHL | |
| 1008 | SUB | |
| 1009 | DUP2 | |
| 100a | GT | |
| 100b | PUSH2 | 0x0f58 |
| 100e | JUMPI | |
| 100f | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 1011 | ADD | |
| 1012 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 1014 | NOT | |
| 1015 | AND | |
| 1016 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1018 | ADD | |
| 1019 | SWAP1 | |
| 101a | JUMP | |
| 101b | JUMPDEST | |
| 101c | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 101d | ISZERO | |
| 101e | PUSH2 | 0x1045 |
| 1021 | JUMPI | |
| 1022 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 1023 | SWAP1 | |
| 1024 | PUSH2 | 0x102c |
| 1027 | DUP3 | |
| 1028 | PUSH2 | 0x1000 |
| 102b | JUMP | |
| 102c | JUMPDEST | |
| 102d | SWAP2 | |
| 102e | PUSH2 | 0x103a |
| 1031 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1033 | MLOAD | |
| 1034 | SWAP4 | |
| 1035 | DUP5 | |
| 1036 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 1039 | JUMP | |
| 103a | JUMPDEST | |
| 103b | DUP3 | |
| 103c | MSTORE | |
| 103d | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 103e | PUSH0 | |
| 103f | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1041 | DUP5 | |
| 1042 | ADD | |
| 1043 | RETURNDATACOPY | |
| 1044 | JUMP | |
| 1045 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1046 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 1048 | SWAP1 | |
| 1049 | JUMP | |
| 104a | JUMPDEST | |
| 104b | SWAP1 | |
| 104c | DUP2 | |
| 104d | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 104f | SWAP2 | |
| 1050 | SUB | |
| 1051 | SLT | |
| 1052 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 1055 | JUMPI | |
| 1056 | MLOAD | |
| 1057 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1059 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 105b | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 105d | SHL | |
| 105e | SUB | |
| 105f | DUP2 | |
| 1060 | AND | |
| 1061 | DUP2 | |
| 1062 | SUB | |
| 1063 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 1066 | JUMPI | |
| 1067 | SWAP1 | |
| 1068 | JUMP | |
| 1069 | JUMPDEST | |
| 106a | SWAP1 | |
| 106b | DUP2 | |
| 106c | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 106e | SWAP2 | |
| 106f | SUB | |
| 1070 | SLT | |
| 1071 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 1074 | JUMPI | |
| 1075 | MLOAD | |
| 1076 | DUP1 | |
| 1077 | ISZERO | |
| 1078 | ISZERO | |
| 1079 | DUP2 | |
| 107a | SUB | |
| 107b | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 107e | JUMPI | |
| 107f | SWAP1 | |
| 1080 | JUMP | |
| 1081 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1082 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1084 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1086 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1088 | SHL | |
| 1089 | SUB | |
| 108a | PUSH2 | 0x0e10 |
| 108d | SWAP2 | |
| 108e | AND | |
| 108f | ADD | |
| 1090 | SWAP1 | |
| 1091 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1093 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1095 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1097 | SHL | |
| 1098 | SUB | |
| 1099 | DUP3 | |
| 109a | GT | |
| 109b | PUSH2 | 0x10a0 |
| 109e | JUMPI | |
| 109f | JUMP | |
| 10a0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 10a1 | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 10a6 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 10a8 | SHL | |
| 10a9 | PUSH0 | |
| 10aa | MSTORE | |
| 10ab | PUSH1 | 0x11 |
| 10ad | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 10af | MSTORE | |
| 10b0 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 10b2 | PUSH0 | |
| 10b3 | REVERT | |
| 10b4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 10b5 | SWAP2 | |
| 10b6 | SWAP1 | |
| 10b7 | DUP2 | |
| 10b8 | LT | |
| 10b9 | ISZERO | |
| 10ba | PUSH2 | 0x10f5 |
| 10bd | JUMPI | |
| 10be | PUSH1 | 0x05 |
| 10c0 | SHL | |
| 10c1 | DUP2 | |
| 10c2 | ADD | |
| 10c3 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 10c4 | SWAP1 | |
| 10c5 | PUSH1 | 0x1e |
| 10c7 | NOT | |
| 10c8 | DUP2 | |
| 10c9 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 10ca | SUB | |
| 10cb | ADD | |
| 10cc | DUP3 | |
| 10cd | SLT | |
| 10ce | ISZERO | |
| 10cf | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 10d2 | JUMPI | |
| 10d3 | ADD | |
| 10d4 | SWAP1 | |
| 10d5 | DUP2 | |
| 10d6 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 10d7 | SWAP2 | |
| 10d8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 10da | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 10dc | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 10de | SHL | |
| 10df | SUB | |
| 10e0 | DUP4 | |
| 10e1 | GT | |
| 10e2 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 10e5 | JUMPI | |
| 10e6 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 10e8 | ADD | |
| 10e9 | DUP3 | |
| 10ea | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 10eb | SUB | |
| 10ec | DUP2 | |
| 10ed | SGT | |
| 10ee | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 10f1 | JUMPI | |
| 10f2 | SWAP2 | |
| 10f3 | SWAP1 | |
| 10f4 | JUMP | |
| 10f5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 10f6 | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 10fb | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 10fd | SHL | |
| 10fe | PUSH0 | |
| 10ff | MSTORE | |
| 1100 | PUSH1 | 0x32 |
| 1102 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1104 | MSTORE | |
| 1105 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1107 | PUSH0 | |
| 1108 | REVERT | |
| 1109 | JUMPDEST | |
| 110a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 110c | DUP1 | |
| 110d | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 110f | SHL | |
| 1110 | SUB | |
| 1111 | AND | |
| 1112 | SWAP1 | |
| 1113 | DUP2 | |
| 1114 | PUSH0 | |
| 1115 | MSTORE | |
| 1116 | PUSH0 | |
| 1117 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1119 | MSTORE | |
| 111a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 111c | PUSH0 | |
| 111d | KECCAK256 | |
| 111e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1120 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1122 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1124 | SHL | |
| 1125 | SUB | |
| 1126 | DUP3 | |
| 1127 | AND | |
| 1128 | PUSH0 | |
| 1129 | MSTORE | |
| 112a | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 112c | MSTORE | |
| 112d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 112f | PUSH0 | |
| 1130 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1131 | DUP1 | |
| 1132 | SLOAD | |
| 1133 | SWAP1 | |
| 1134 | DUP2 | |
| 1135 | ISZERO | |
| 1136 | PUSH2 | 0x11c8 |
| 1139 | JUMPI | |
| 113a | PUSH2 | 0x1142 |
| 113d | DUP4 | |
| 113e | PUSH2 | 0x11d0 |
| 1141 | JUMP | |
| 1142 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1143 | SWAP1 | |
| 1144 | POP | |
| 1145 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1147 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1149 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 114b | SHL | |
| 114c | SUB | |
| 114d | PUSH2 | 0x115c |
| 1150 | DUP2 | |
| 1151 | PUSH2 | 0x03e8 |
| 1154 | TIMESTAMP | |
| 1155 | DIV | |
| 1156 | AND | |
| 1157 | SWAP3 | |
| 1158 | PUSH2 | 0x1081 |
| 115b | JUMP | |
| 115c | JUMPDEST | |
| 115d | AND | |
| 115e | LT | |
| 115f | PUSH2 | 0x11c8 |
| 1162 | JUMPI | |
| 1163 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1165 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 1167 | SWAP2 | |
| 1168 | ADD | |
| 1169 | SLOAD | |
| 116a | AND | |
| 116b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 116d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 116f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1171 | SHL | |
| 1172 | SUB | |
| 1173 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1175 | MLOAD | |
| 1176 | SWAP4 | |
| 1177 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1179 | DUP6 | |
| 117a | ADD | |
| 117b | SWAP6 | |
| 117c | PUSH32 | 0x950ffa6ffe5372ffbba1d3c001d1b4dde1b251b8f53aa8d8bb11cc9691ac6c17 |
| 119d | DUP8 | |
| 119e | MSTORE | |
| 119f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11a1 | DUP7 | |
| 11a2 | ADD | |
| 11a3 | MSTORE | |
| 11a4 | AND | |
| 11a5 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 11a7 | DUP5 | |
| 11a8 | ADD | |
| 11a9 | MSTORE | |
| 11aa | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 11ac | DUP4 | |
| 11ad | ADD | |
| 11ae | MSTORE | |
| 11af | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 11b1 | DUP3 | |
| 11b2 | ADD | |
| 11b3 | MSTORE | |
| 11b4 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 11b6 | DUP2 | |
| 11b7 | MSTORE | |
| 11b8 | PUSH2 | 0x11c2 |
| 11bb | PUSH1 | 0xc0 |
| 11bd | DUP3 | |
| 11be | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 11c1 | JUMP | |
| 11c2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 11c3 | MLOAD | |
| 11c4 | SWAP1 | |
| 11c5 | KECCAK256 | |
| 11c6 | SWAP1 | |
| 11c7 | JUMP | |
| 11c8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 11c9 | POP | |
| 11ca | POP | |
| 11cb | POP | |
| 11cc | POP | |
| 11cd | PUSH0 | |
| 11ce | SWAP1 | |
| 11cf | JUMP | |
| 11d0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 11d1 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 11d3 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 11d5 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11d7 | SHL | |
| 11d8 | SUB | |
| 11d9 | PUSH2 | 0x0258 |
| 11dc | SWAP2 | |
| 11dd | AND | |
| 11de | MUL | |
| 11df | SWAP1 | |
| 11e0 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 11e2 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 11e4 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11e6 | SHL | |
| 11e7 | SUB | |
| 11e8 | DUP3 | |
| 11e9 | AND | |
| 11ea | SWAP2 | |
| 11eb | DUP3 | |
| 11ec | SUB | |
| 11ed | PUSH2 | 0x10a0 |
| 11f0 | JUMPI | |
| 11f1 | PUSH2 | 0x0258 |
| 11f4 | DUP3 | |
| 11f5 | ADD | |
| 11f6 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 11f8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 11fa | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11fc | SHL | |
| 11fd | SUB | |
| 11fe | DUP2 | |
| 11ff | GT | |
| 1200 | PUSH2 | 0x10a0 |
| 1203 | JUMPI | |
| 1204 | SWAP1 | |
| 1205 | JUMP | |
| 1206 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1207 | SWAP1 | |
| 1208 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 120a | DUP3 | |
| 120b | LT | |
| 120c | ISZERO | |
| 120d | PUSH2 | 0x1349 |
| 1210 | JUMPI | |
| 1211 | DUP2 | |
| 1212 | ISZERO | |
| 1213 | PUSH2 | 0x1342 |
| 1216 | JUMPI | |
| 1217 | PUSH0 | |
| 1218 | SWAP3 | |
| 1219 | DUP4 | |
| 121a | SWAP3 | |
| 121b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 121d | DUP2 | |
| 121e | EQ | |
| 121f | PUSH2 | 0x1319 |
| 1222 | JUMPI | |
| 1223 | PUSH1 | 0x02 |
| 1225 | EQ | |
| 1226 | PUSH2 | 0x1291 |
| 1229 | JUMPI | |
| 122a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 122c | MLOAD | |
| 122d | PUSH3 | 0x7eeac7 |
| 1231 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 1233 | SHL | |
| 1234 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1236 | DUP3 | |
| 1237 | ADD | |
| 1238 | SWAP1 | |
| 1239 | DUP2 | |
| 123a | MSTORE | |
| 123b | ADDRESS | |
| 123c | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 123e | DUP4 | |
| 123f | ADD | |
| 1240 | MSTORE | |
| 1241 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 1243 | DUP3 | |
| 1244 | ADD | |
| 1245 | SWAP3 | |
| 1246 | SWAP1 | |
| 1247 | SWAP3 | |
| 1248 | MSTORE | |
| 1249 | PUSH2 | 0x1255 |
| 124c | DUP2 | |
| 124d | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 124f | DUP2 | |
| 1250 | ADD | |
| 1251 | PUSH2 | 0x0b35 |
| 1254 | JUMP | |
| 1255 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1256 | MLOAD | |
| 1257 | SWAP2 | |
| 1258 | GAS | |
| 1259 | STATICCALL | |
| 125a | PUSH2 | 0x1261 |
| 125d | PUSH2 | 0x101b |
| 1260 | JUMP | |
| 1261 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1262 | SWAP1 | |
| 1263 | DUP1 | |
| 1264 | PUSH2 | 0x1285 |
| 1267 | JUMPI | |
| 1268 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1269 | ISZERO | |
| 126a | PUSH2 | 0x0ffb |
| 126d | JUMPI | |
| 126e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1270 | DUP2 | |
| 1271 | MLOAD | |
| 1272 | SWAP2 | |
| 1273 | DUP2 | |
| 1274 | DUP1 | |
| 1275 | DUP3 | |
| 1276 | ADD | |
| 1277 | SWAP4 | |
| 1278 | DUP5 | |
| 1279 | SWAP3 | |
| 127a | ADD | |
| 127b | ADD | |
| 127c | SUB | |
| 127d | SLT | |
| 127e | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 1281 | JUMPI | |
| 1282 | MLOAD | |
| 1283 | SWAP1 | |
| 1284 | JUMP | |
| 1285 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1286 | POP | |
| 1287 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1289 | DUP2 | |
| 128a | MLOAD | |
| 128b | LT | |
| 128c | ISZERO | |
| 128d | PUSH2 | 0x1268 |
| 1290 | JUMP | |
| 1291 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1292 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1294 | MLOAD | |
| 1295 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1297 | DUP2 | |
| 1298 | ADD | |
| 1299 | SWAP2 | |
| 129a | PUSH4 | 0x31a9108f |
| 129f | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 12a1 | SHL | |
| 12a2 | DUP4 | |
| 12a3 | MSTORE | |
| 12a4 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 12a6 | DUP3 | |
| 12a7 | ADD | |
| 12a8 | MSTORE | |
| 12a9 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 12ab | DUP2 | |
| 12ac | MSTORE | |
| 12ad | PUSH2 | 0x12b7 |
| 12b0 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 12b2 | DUP3 | |
| 12b3 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 12b6 | JUMP | |
| 12b7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 12b8 | MLOAD | |
| 12b9 | SWAP2 | |
| 12ba | GAS | |
| 12bb | STATICCALL | |
| 12bc | PUSH2 | 0x12c3 |
| 12bf | PUSH2 | 0x101b |
| 12c2 | JUMP | |
| 12c3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 12c4 | DUP2 | |
| 12c5 | PUSH2 | 0x130b |
| 12c8 | JUMPI | |
| 12c9 | JUMPDEST | |
| 12ca | DUP2 | |
| 12cb | PUSH2 | 0x12de |
| 12ce | JUMPI | |
| 12cf | JUMPDEST | |
| 12d0 | POP | |
| 12d1 | ISZERO | |
| 12d2 | PUSH2 | 0x12da |
| 12d5 | JUMPI | |
| 12d6 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 12d8 | SWAP1 | |
| 12d9 | JUMP | |
| 12da | JUMPDEST | |
| 12db | PUSH0 | |
| 12dc | SWAP1 | |
| 12dd | JUMP | |
| 12de | JUMPDEST | |
| 12df | SWAP1 | |
| 12e0 | POP | |
| 12e1 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 12e3 | DUP2 | |
| 12e4 | DUP1 | |
| 12e5 | MLOAD | |
| 12e6 | DUP2 | |
| 12e7 | ADD | |
| 12e8 | SUB | |
| 12e9 | SLT | |
| 12ea | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 12ed | JUMPI | |
| 12ee | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 12f0 | ADD | |
| 12f1 | MLOAD | |
| 12f2 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 12f4 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 12f6 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 12f8 | SHL | |
| 12f9 | SUB | |
| 12fa | DUP2 | |
| 12fb | AND | |
| 12fc | SWAP1 | |
| 12fd | DUP2 | |
| 12fe | SWAP1 | |
| 12ff | SUB | |
| 1300 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 1303 | JUMPI | |
| 1304 | ADDRESS | |
| 1305 | EQ | |
| 1306 | PUSH0 | |
| 1307 | PUSH2 | 0x12cf |
| 130a | JUMP | |
| 130b | JUMPDEST | |
| 130c | SWAP1 | |
| 130d | POP | |
| 130e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1310 | DUP2 | |
| 1311 | MLOAD | |
| 1312 | LT | |
| 1313 | ISZERO | |
| 1314 | SWAP1 | |
| 1315 | PUSH2 | 0x12c9 |
| 1318 | JUMP | |
| 1319 | JUMPDEST | |
| 131a | POP | |
| 131b | POP | |
| 131c | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 131e | MLOAD | |
| 131f | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1321 | DUP2 | |
| 1322 | ADD | |
| 1323 | SWAP1 | |
| 1324 | PUSH4 | 0x70a08231 |
| 1329 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 132b | SHL | |
| 132c | DUP3 | |
| 132d | MSTORE | |
| 132e | ADDRESS | |
| 132f | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1331 | DUP3 | |
| 1332 | ADD | |
| 1333 | MSTORE | |
| 1334 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1336 | DUP2 | |
| 1337 | MSTORE | |
| 1338 | PUSH2 | 0x1255 |
| 133b | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 133d | DUP3 | |
| 133e | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 1341 | JUMP | |
| 1342 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1343 | POP | |
| 1344 | POP | |
| 1345 | POP | |
| 1346 | SELFBALANCE | |
| 1347 | SWAP1 | |
| 1348 | JUMP | |
| 1349 | JUMPDEST | |
| 134a | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 134f | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 1351 | SHL | |
| 1352 | PUSH0 | |
| 1353 | MSTORE | |
| 1354 | PUSH1 | 0x21 |
| 1356 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1358 | MSTORE | |
| 1359 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 135b | PUSH0 | |
| 135c | REVERT | |
| 135d | JUMPDEST | |
| 135e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1360 | MLOAD | |
| 1361 | PUSH4 | 0x28305db1 |
| 1366 | PUSH1 | 0xe2 |
| 1368 | SHL | |
| 1369 | DUP2 | |
| 136a | MSTORE | |
| 136b | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000c19d888a2f7ba65a8dcf8d03ad8f1af5cdc66430 |
| 138c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 138e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1390 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 1392 | SHL | |
| 1393 | SUB | |
| 1394 | AND | |
| 1395 | SWAP1 | |
| 1396 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1398 | DUP2 | |
| 1399 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 139b | DUP2 | |
| 139c | DUP6 | |
| 139d | GAS | |
| 139e | STATICCALL | |
| 139f | SWAP1 | |
| 13a0 | DUP2 | |
| 13a1 | ISZERO | |
| 13a2 | PUSH2 | 0x0da9 |
| 13a5 | JUMPI | |
| 13a6 | PUSH0 | |
| 13a7 | SWAP2 | |
| 13a8 | PUSH2 | 0x14dc |
| 13ab | JUMPI | |
| 13ac | JUMPDEST | |
| 13ad | POP | |
| 13ae | ISZERO | |
| 13af | DUP1 | |
| 13b0 | PUSH2 | 0x1487 |
| 13b3 | JUMPI | |
| 13b4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 13b5 | PUSH2 | 0x1484 |
| 13b8 | JUMPI | |
| 13b9 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 13bb | MLOAD | |
| 13bc | PUSH4 | 0xe14c465b |
| 13c1 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 13c3 | SHL | |
| 13c4 | DUP2 | |
| 13c5 | MSTORE | |
| 13c6 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 13c8 | DUP2 | |
| 13c9 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 13cb | DUP2 | |
| 13cc | DUP6 | |
| 13cd | GAS | |
| 13ce | STATICCALL | |
| 13cf | SWAP1 | |
| 13d0 | DUP2 | |
| 13d1 | ISZERO | |
| 13d2 | PUSH2 | 0x0da9 |
| 13d5 | JUMPI | |
| 13d6 | PUSH0 | |
| 13d7 | SWAP2 | |
| 13d8 | PUSH2 | 0x1450 |
| 13db | JUMPI | |
| 13dc | JUMPDEST | |
| 13dd | POP | |
| 13de | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 13e0 | MLOAD | |
| 13e1 | PUSH4 | 0x2e4bfa51 |
| 13e6 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 13e8 | SHL | |
| 13e9 | DUP2 | |
| 13ea | MSTORE | |
| 13eb | CALLER | |
| 13ec | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 13ee | DUP3 | |
| 13ef | ADD | |
| 13f0 | MSTORE | |
| 13f1 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 13f3 | DUP2 | |
| 13f4 | ADD | |
| 13f5 | SWAP2 | |
| 13f6 | SWAP1 | |
| 13f7 | SWAP2 | |
| 13f8 | MSTORE | |
| 13f9 | SWAP1 | |
| 13fa | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 13fc | SWAP1 | |
| 13fd | DUP3 | |
| 13fe | SWAP1 | |
| 13ff | DUP2 | |
| 1400 | DUP1 | |
| 1401 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 1403 | DUP2 | |
| 1404 | ADD | |
| 1405 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1406 | SUB | |
| 1407 | SWAP2 | |
| 1408 | GAS | |
| 1409 | STATICCALL | |
| 140a | SWAP1 | |
| 140b | DUP2 | |
| 140c | ISZERO | |
| 140d | PUSH2 | 0x0da9 |
| 1410 | JUMPI | |
| 1411 | PUSH0 | |
| 1412 | SWAP2 | |
| 1413 | PUSH2 | 0x1431 |
| 1416 | JUMPI | |
| 1417 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1418 | POP | |
| 1419 | PUSH2 | 0x142f |
| 141c | JUMPI | |
| 141d | PUSH4 | 0x321cbc09 |
| 1422 | PUSH1 | 0xe2 |
| 1424 | SHL | |
| 1425 | PUSH0 | |
| 1426 | MSTORE | |
| 1427 | CALLER | |
| 1428 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 142a | MSTORE | |
| 142b | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 142d | PUSH0 | |
| 142e | REVERT | |
| 142f | JUMPDEST | |
| 1430 | JUMP | |
| 1431 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1432 | PUSH2 | 0x144a |
| 1435 | SWAP2 | |
| 1436 | POP | |
| 1437 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1439 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 143a | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 143c | GT | |
| 143d | PUSH2 | 0x08e5 |
| 1440 | JUMPI | |
| 1441 | PUSH2 | 0x08d7 |
| 1444 | DUP2 | |
| 1445 | DUP4 | |
| 1446 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 1449 | JUMP | |
| 144a | JUMPDEST | |
| 144b | PUSH0 | |
| 144c | PUSH2 | 0x1417 |
| 144f | JUMP | |
| 1450 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1451 | SWAP1 | |
| 1452 | POP | |
| 1453 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1455 | DUP2 | |
| 1456 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 1457 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1459 | GT | |
| 145a | PUSH2 | 0x147c |
| 145d | JUMPI | |
| 145e | JUMPDEST | |
| 145f | DUP2 | |
| 1460 | PUSH2 | 0x146b |
| 1463 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1465 | SWAP4 | |
| 1466 | DUP4 | |
| 1467 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 146a | JUMP | |
| 146b | JUMPDEST | |
| 146c | DUP2 | |
| 146d | ADD | |
| 146e | SUB | |
| 146f | SLT | |
| 1470 | PUSH2 | 0x0db4 |
| 1473 | JUMPI | |
| 1474 | MLOAD | |
| 1475 | PUSH2 | 0x1405 |
| 1478 | PUSH2 | 0x13dc |
| 147b | JUMP | |
| 147c | JUMPDEST | |
| 147d | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 147e | SWAP2 | |
| 147f | POP | |
| 1480 | PUSH2 | 0x145e |
| 1483 | JUMP | |
| 1484 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1485 | POP | |
| 1486 | JUMP | |
| 1487 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1488 | POP | |
| 1489 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 148b | MLOAD | |
| 148c | PUSH4 | 0xf5778b03 |
| 1491 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 1493 | SHL | |
| 1494 | DUP2 | |
| 1495 | MSTORE | |
| 1496 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1498 | DUP2 | |
| 1499 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 149b | DUP2 | |
| 149c | DUP6 | |
| 149d | GAS | |
| 149e | STATICCALL | |
| 149f | SWAP1 | |
| 14a0 | DUP2 | |
| 14a1 | ISZERO | |
| 14a2 | PUSH2 | 0x0da9 |
| 14a5 | JUMPI | |
| 14a6 | PUSH0 | |
| 14a7 | SWAP2 | |
| 14a8 | PUSH2 | 0x14bd |
| 14ab | JUMPI | |
| 14ac | JUMPDEST | |
| 14ad | POP | |
| 14ae | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 14b0 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 14b2 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 14b4 | SHL | |
| 14b5 | SUB | |
| 14b6 | AND | |
| 14b7 | CALLER | |
| 14b8 | EQ | |
| 14b9 | PUSH2 | 0x13b4 |
| 14bc | JUMP | |
| 14bd | JUMPDEST | |
| 14be | PUSH2 | 0x14d6 |
| 14c1 | SWAP2 | |
| 14c2 | POP | |
| 14c3 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 14c5 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 14c6 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 14c8 | GT | |
| 14c9 | PUSH2 | 0x0921 |
| 14cc | JUMPI | |
| 14cd | PUSH2 | 0x0912 |
| 14d0 | DUP2 | |
| 14d1 | DUP4 | |
| 14d2 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 14d5 | JUMP | |
| 14d6 | JUMPDEST | |
| 14d7 | PUSH0 | |
| 14d8 | PUSH2 | 0x14ac |
| 14db | JUMP | |
| 14dc | JUMPDEST | |
| 14dd | PUSH2 | 0x14f5 |
| 14e0 | SWAP2 | |
| 14e1 | POP | |
| 14e2 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 14e4 | RETURNDATASIZE | |
| 14e5 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 14e7 | GT | |
| 14e8 | PUSH2 | 0x08e5 |
| 14eb | JUMPI | |
| 14ec | PUSH2 | 0x08d7 |
| 14ef | DUP2 | |
| 14f0 | DUP4 | |
| 14f1 | PUSH2 | 0x0f6c |
| 14f4 | JUMP | |
| 14f5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 14f6 | PUSH0 | |
| 14f7 | PUSH2 | 0x13ac |
| 14fa | JUMP | |
| 14fb | JUMPDEST | |
| 14fc | SWAP1 | |
| 14fd | DUP2 | |
| 14fe | EXTCODESIZE | |
| 14ff | ISZERO | |
| 1500 | PUSH2 | 0x157a |
| 1503 | JUMPI | |
| 1504 | PUSH0 | |
| 1505 | DUP2 | |
| 1506 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1508 | DUP3 | |
| 1509 | SWAP4 | |
| 150a | MLOAD | |
| 150b | SWAP2 | |
| 150c | ADD | |
| 150d | DUP3 | |
| 150e | DUP6 | |
| 150f | GAS | |
| 1510 | CALL | |
| 1511 | PUSH2 | 0x1518 |
| 1514 | PUSH2 | 0x101b |
| 1517 | JUMP | |
| 1518 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1519 | SWAP1 | |
| 151a | ISZERO | |
| 151b | SWAP1 | |
| 151c | DUP2 | |
| 151d | ISZERO | |
| 151e | PUSH2 | 0x154a |
| 1521 | JUMPI | |
| 1522 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1523 | POP | |
| 1524 | PUSH2 | 0x152a |
| 1527 | JUMPI | |
| 1528 | POP | |
| 1529 | JUMP | |
| 152a | JUMPDEST | |
| 152b | PUSH4 | 0x65f4a9ef |
| 1530 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 1532 | SHL | |
| 1533 | PUSH0 | |
| 1534 | SWAP1 | |
| 1535 | DUP2 | |
| 1536 | MSTORE | |
| 1537 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1539 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 153b | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 153d | SHL | |
| 153e | SUB | |
| 153f | SWAP2 | |
| 1540 | SWAP1 | |
| 1541 | SWAP2 | |
| 1542 | AND | |
| 1543 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1545 | MSTORE | |
| 1546 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1548 | SWAP1 | |
| 1549 | REVERT | |
| 154a | JUMPDEST | |
| 154b | DUP1 | |
| 154c | MLOAD | |
| 154d | DUP1 | |
| 154e | ISZERO | |
| 154f | ISZERO | |
| 1550 | SWAP3 | |
| 1551 | POP | |
| 1552 | DUP3 | |
| 1553 | PUSH2 | 0x155f |
| 1556 | JUMPI | |
| 1557 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1558 | POP | |
| 1559 | POP | |
| 155a | PUSH0 | |
| 155b | PUSH2 | 0x1522 |
| 155e | JUMP | |
| 155f | JUMPDEST | |
| 1560 | PUSH2 | 0x1572 |
| 1563 | SWAP3 | |
| 1564 | POP | |
| 1565 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1567 | DUP1 | |
| 1568 | SWAP2 | |
| 1569 | DUP4 | |
| 156a | ADD | |
| 156b | ADD | |
| 156c | SWAP2 | |
| 156d | ADD | |
| 156e | PUSH2 | 0x1069 |
| 1571 | JUMP | |
| 1572 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1573 | ISZERO | |
| 1574 | PUSH0 | |
| 1575 | DUP1 | |
| 1576 | PUSH2 | 0x1557 |
| 1579 | JUMP | |
| 157a | JUMPDEST | |
| 157b | POP | |
| 157c | PUSH4 | 0x65f4a9ef |
| 1581 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 1583 | SHL | |
| 1584 | PUSH0 | |
| 1585 | SWAP1 | |
| 1586 | DUP2 | |
| 1587 | MSTORE | |
| 1588 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 158a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 158c | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 158e | SHL | |
| 158f | SUB | |
| 1590 | SWAP2 | |
| 1591 | SWAP1 | |
| 1592 | SWAP2 | |
| 1593 | AND | |
| 1594 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1596 | MSTORE | |
| 1597 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1599 | SWAP1 | |
| 159a | REVERT |